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After weeks of military buildup that includes two carrier battle groups, the United States now has more air assets in the Middle East than at any point since the 2003 invasion of Iraq. But the steady drift toward war against Iran is not matched by clear strategic thinking. President Donald Trump barely mentioned Iran’s nuclear and missile program in his long State of the Union  speech. And he has failed to explain why the United States might use force or what it seeks to accomplish.

By looking at Truth Social posts, past U.S. actions, and casual presidential remarks, it is possible to identify several possible objectives. Some are achievable, others impractical. But even the ones within reach are difficult, and this is made worse by the lack of clarity on the American side. Ultimately, the United States appears to be trying to achieve ambitious political outcomes at low risk and with limited use of military force, a combination that seems rife for failure.

After weeks of military buildup that includes two carrier battle groups, the United States now has more air assets in the Middle East than at any point since the 2003 invasion of Iraq. But the steady drift toward war against Iran is not matched by clear strategic thinking. President Donald Trump barely mentioned Iran’s nuclear and missile program in his long State of the Union  speech. And he has failed to explain why the United States might use force or what it seeks to accomplish.

By looking at Truth Social posts, past U.S. actions, and casual presidential remarks, it is possible to identify several possible objectives. Some are achievable, others impractical. But even the ones within reach are difficult, and this is made worse by the lack of clarity on the American side. Ultimately, the United States appears to be trying to achieve ambitious political outcomes at low risk and with limited use of military force, a combination that seems rife for failure.

The U.S. use of force could have at least four objectives: 1. Supporting Iranian protesters and installing a popular government; 2. Imposing limited regime change along the Venezuelan model; 3. Halting Iran’s support for terrorist and insurgent proxies and ending its missile and nuclear programs; and 4. Coercing Iran only into ending its nuclear program.

The most ambitious option would be to back Iranian protesters in their attempts to change the regime. Trump has declared that regime change “would be the best thing that could happen” and has embraced the protesters, writing on Truth Social, “Iranian Patriots, KEEP PROTESTING … HELP IS ON ITS WAY.” Such an option would require ending the clerical dictatorship and replacing it with a popular government.

A less ambitious, and less comprehensive, approach to regime change would be a “Maduro model,” killing or otherwise removing key regime figures such as Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei until more pliable Iranian leaders take the helm. Who the Delcy Rodríguez equivalent is in Iran remains unclear. It could range from former leaders such as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose populist style gives him some legitimacy with the poor, to Khamenei’s designated successor Ali Larijani, to a largely unknown Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) leader.

The point would be for the United States to carry on with attacks until a leader emerges who is willing to do the U.S. bidding on select issues, even if that person rejects democratic principles and is otherwise tied to the old order.

Less demanding—but still ambitious—would be to bomb and otherwise put pressure on Iran until the current leadership agrees to a wide range........

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