Overnight, the Pakistan–Afghanistan standoff edged closer to open conflict. Following Sunday’s strikes on TTP targets, Taliban forces launched cross-border attacks, and Pakistan responded with hits on Taliban military installations in Kabul and Kandahar. The crisis has moved beyond border skirmishes into direct military exchange.

The immediate backdrop is a series of deadly terrorist attacks inside Pakistan this month. A suicide bombing at a Shia mosque in Islamabad killed at least 32 worshippers. Days later, a vehicle-borne attack in Bajaur killed 11 soldiers. On 21 February, a suicide bomber struck a security convoy in Bannu, killing two soldiers, including a lieutenant colonel. Islamabad attributed the Bajaur and Bannu attacks to TTP hideouts and asserted links to leadership nodes based in eastern Afghanistan. The mosque bombing was claimed by ISKP, though Pakistani authorities stated that the bomber had travelled repeatedly to Afghanistan.

These incidents came after a year in which violence had already surged. In 2025, Pakistan recorded its deadliest year of terrorism in nearly a decade, with hundreds of security personnel and civilians killed. Many of the attacks were traced to TTP networks operating from Afghan soil. It was during that surge that Islamabad publicly adopted a reprisals approach: major attacks linked to cross-border terrorist sanctuaries would invite a direct response.

The strikes this week are therefore not a sudden departure but the continuation of that declared policy. Last Sunday’s air operations in Nangarhar, Paktika and Khost were described as intelligence-based action against TTP and ISKP camps. The Taliban responded with heavy cross-border fire near Torkham and in sectors opposite Kunar and Nangarhar. By 26–27 February, Pakistan expanded its strikes to Taliban military infrastructure, including installations in Kabul’s Darul Aman area and facilities in Kandahar associated with corps-level formations. The conflict has now shifted from targeting non-state actors to reciprocal state action.

Attempts to stabilise the situation last year did not succeed. Talks following earlier Pakistani strikes collapsed when Kabul refused to provide written guarantees that Afghan territory would not be used for cross-border terrorist attacks against Pakistan. Mediation efforts by Türkiye and Qatar narrowed some tactical gaps but left this core issue untouched. Even confidence-building gestures, including Saudi facilitation of the return of detained Pakistani soldiers earlier this month, did not change the security trajectory.

The structural dispute is straightforward. Pakistan maintains that terrorist networks, including TTP, operate from Afghan territory and conduct terrorist attacks across the border. The Taliban leadership denies responsibility and frames the issue as Pakistan’s internal problem. The absence of verifiable enforcement has deepened mistrust on both sides.

The challenge is to sustain deterrence while preventing the slide into a broader conflict

The challenge is to sustain deterrence while preventing the slide into a broader conflict

History weighs heavily on the present. In the 1990s, Pakistan backed the Taliban’s rise under the logic of strategic depth and the expectation that a friendly Pashtun-dominated regime in Kabul would provide stability. Recognition followed after they captured the Afghan capital. Yet early episodes — refusal to hand over Osama bin Laden, the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas, the Mazar-e-Sharif massacre — showed that ideological rigidity often overrode external advice.

After 9/11, policy recalibrated under pressure, but ambiguity persisted. The distinction between Afghan and Pakistani terrorist groups proved difficult to sustain in practice. Pakistan paid heavily in lives and resources during its internal war against terrorism. The Taliban’s return to power in 2021 revived hopes that governing responsibilities would moderate behaviour. That hope has not been reflected in security outcomes.

The regional environment adds complexity. ISKP has demonstrated transnational reach, including major attacks in Moscow and Tajikistan. Russia and Central Asian states remain alert to extremist spillover. China watches closely for threats affecting Xinjiang and the safety of its nationals and infrastructure projects in Pakistan. Afghanistan’s internal security landscape now intersects with wider regional concerns.

Inside Afghanistan, the Taliban leadership also faces its own pressures. Any decisive move against TTP risks internal dissent among factions that remain ideologically aligned with cross-border terrorist groups. Yet failure to act has pushed relations with Pakistan to their lowest point since 2021. This internal balancing act reduces the chances of quick de-escalation.

Within Pakistan, public patience is thin. The resurgence of cross-border terrorism has revived memories of years when terrorist groups destabilised entire districts. Hard-won gains against extremism and terrorism cannot be allowed to erode. The credibility of the state now rests on ensuring that terrorist sanctuaries across the border do not again translate into insecurity at home.

There are also economic stakes. Prolonged instability along the western frontier affects transit routes, border trade and investor confidence. Terrorism linked to TTP and BLA networks has already strained key development corridors and raised security costs. Escalation on the Afghan front compounds those pressures.

At present, neither side appears to seek full-scale war. Pakistan retains clear conventional superiority, particularly in air capability. The Taliban rely on ground engagements and asymmetric tactics. Yet escalation thresholds are visible. Sustained strikes on senior Taliban leadership sites or high-profile suicide attacks in major Pakistani cities could widen the conflict rapidly.

For Pakistan, the objective remains clear: Afghan territory must not serve as a staging ground for terrorist attacks against it. That position is rooted in recent experience and national security necessity. The challenge is to sustain deterrence while preventing the slide into a broader conflict.

The latest turn of events has removed any remaining ambiguity. The relationship between Islamabad and Kabul is no longer defined by guarded engagement but by open confrontation. Whether this confrontation remains contained or deepens further will depend on one central issue: measurable action against cross-border terrorism, which lies at the heart of the crisis.

What then should Pakistan do?

First, Islamabad must widen the frame. The dispute is not only about cross-border terrorism. It is about the character of a regime that has failed on multiple fronts — counterterrorism enforcement, governance credibility and basic rights. A government that cannot prevent terrorist networks from operating on its soil and simultaneously denies girls’ education and women’s right to work cannot be treated as a normal state entity. Pakistan should make this case consistently in regional and international forums.

Second, a regional and international coalition must be built around two linked pillars: counterterrorism and human rights. Russia, China, Central Asian states, Gulf countries and Western actors all share concerns about terrorist safe havens. The United Nations system remains seized of the humanitarian and rights crisis inside Afghanistan. Pakistan should actively engage these platforms, not in isolation, but as part of a coordinated diplomatic effort that places measurable counterterrorism compliance at the centre of any engagement with Kabul.

Third, Pakistan must strengthen internal preparedness. The threat of retaliatory suicide squads, openly voiced by Afghan commanders, cannot be dismissed. Security forces, intelligence agencies and provincial authorities must operate at sustained high alert. Urban centres, sensitive installations and critical infrastructure require reinforced protection. The aim must be prevention, not reaction.

Fourth, border management must be tightened further. Surveillance, fencing integrity, rapid response capability and intelligence coordination across provinces, especially in the terror-stricken border regions, must be strengthened. The lesson of the past decade is clear: porous oversight creates operational space for terrorist networks.

Finally, public clarity is essential, both at the level of the state and society. There can be no return to selective distinctions between terrorist or militant categories. A consistent national position — that no terrorist group using Afghan soil against Pakistan or any other country will be tolerated — must guide both policy and messaging.

Enough ambiguity has accumulated over three decades. The current crisis is not only a military confrontation; it is a test of strategic resolve. If Pakistan sustains deterrence, strengthens internal security, and builds wider diplomatic alignment around counterterrorism and basic rights, it will not stand alone. The broader international community has little interest in seeing Afghanistan once again become a hotbed of transnational terrorism.

© The Friday Times