China Power | Diplomacy | East Asia

Trilateral Dynamics: China’s Strategy to Test US Restraint of Japan

Takaichi’s overwhelming victory during the February election suggests China’s coercive approach might be counterproductive. But Beijing’s tactics are not aimed only at the bilateral relationship.

U.S. President Donald Trump welcomes Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae to deliver remarks to Yokosuka Naval troops aboard the USS George Washington at Yokosuka Naval Base, Japan on Oct. 28, 2025.

On April 17, 1895, the Qing dynasty signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki (also known as the Treaty of Maguan) with Japan, ending the First Sino-Japanese War and dethroning the “Middle Kingdom.” More than a century later, on the same date, a Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) vessel passed through the Taiwan Strait. On Weibo, a Chinese version of Twitter, a hashtag “China is no longer the China of 131 years ago” accused Japan of provocative action, attracting over 14 million views. 

The current Sino-Japanese tension began long before the April 17 MSDF transit, however. It started with Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae’s remarks in early November 2025 that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could become “a situation threatening Japan’s survival.” 

A rapid escalatory spiral followed, including a radar incident, Chinese economic coercion, an intrusion in the Chinese Embassy in Tokyo, Japan’s deployment of new long-range missiles, and Japan’s lifting of its ban on lethal weapons exports. After the Japanese vessel transited through the Taiwan Strait, China responded with military exercises in waters near Japan. The center of the deteriorated bilateral relations has expanded from the Taiwan issue to regional security in general.

Meanwhile, Chinese authoritative outlets, such as People’s Daily, have continuously published articles almost on a weekly basis over the past seven months alleging the rise of Japanese right-wing forces and the resurgence of Japanese militarism under the Takaichi government. 

While China pressures Japan on both economic and propaganda fronts, Takaichi’s overwhelming victory during the February election suggests China’s approach might be counterproductive. Then, one must ask why Beijing persists with this strategy despite its apparent failure. 

Some argue that Beijing, believing it possesses superior military and economic strengths, might be using aggressive moves to test Japan’s boundaries. Others argue that Beijing wants to “kill the chicken to scare the monkey,” punishing Japan to warn other countries that might be considering closer alignment with Taiwan or security cooperation with the United States.  

However, these arguments fall short of offering a full explanation for why these counterproductive approaches persist as China tries to position itself as a defender of global stability amid instability. The discrepancy implies that there is greater complexity underlying Beijing’s strategy toward Tokyo: China is playing a trilateral game.

Historically, the Sino-Japanese bilateral relationship has been strained by factors such as territorial disputes, nationalism, and competition for regional leadership. Yet beyond this dimension, the Japan-U.S. alliance has also played a critical role in shaping Sino-Japanese dynamics. 

During the Occupation of Japan, the United States adopted a “dual containment” strategy, aimed both at deterring communist aggression in the region and at controlling Japan’s postwar trajectory, including restraining Japanese remilitarization under Article 9 of the 1947 U.S.-imposed pacifist constitution. 

The security framework was further solidified through the 1951 Security Treaty, allowing U.S. military bases to be stationed in Japan, and was revised in 1960 as the Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty to include the U.S. commitment to defend Japan.  

However, Japan, beginning with the Abe government, has begun to reinterpret Article 9 of the constitution to grow its military and strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance and partnerships with other like-minded countries. Citing the external environment, including the rise of China and nuclear threats from North Korea, late Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, a staunch Japanese nationalist, had leveraged these threats to advance the right-wing agenda of transforming Japan into a “normal” nation. Nevertheless, the scale of the Chinese military expansion has left even moderate Japanese leaders feeling the need to respond. The Japanese ambition to up its defense capabilities aligned with the U.S. strategy toward Asia, namely, containing China. In response, China has repeatedly condemned the Cold War mentality of the U.S.-led alliance.

Positioning herself as the successor to Abe, Takaichi is following her mentor’s line to strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance. However, Takaichi is facing a different Trump administration from the one that overlapped with Abe’s tenure. 

The second Trump administration has adopted a more transactional approach toward Japan, not only pressuring on the economic front but also demanding that it shoulder greater defense burdens. What makes things more complicated is President Donald Trump’s unpredictable approach toward China. 

Japan’s recent developments of its defense capabilities align with the U.S. National Security Strategy. But Japan’s strategy toward China remains deeply contingent upon China-U.S. relations. U.S. President Richard Nixon’s visit to the People’s........

© The Diplomat