US+Israel-Iran war: Strategic realities
ON 10 March 2026, US congressmen, after receiving an in-camera briefing from President Donald Trump’s administration on the war against Iran, demanded a public hearing on the subject. According to the lawmakers, the briefing raised more questions than answers, as the White House was not able to clearly explain why the USA entered the conflict. What were its goals? What was the exit strategy? What were the contingency plans? And how long could the war last? According to Al Jazeera, the lawmakers rejected the Trump administration’s argument that the strikes on Iran were justified as a response to an “imminent threat”, countering that US intelligence agencies had stated before the start of the war that they had no evidence of an imminent Iranian threat to the USA or its facilities across the Middle East. Even Republican senators accused the Trump administration of “changing its narrative and rationale for the war on a daily basis.”
Earlier, on 28 February 2026, while the USA and Iran were in the middle of third-party (Oman)-brokered nuclear negotiations, the USA and Israel surprised the world by launching massive strikes on Iran. For the entire world, it was not only a breach of global trust in peace negotiations but also one that lacked essential legal authorization from the UN/UNSC or even the US Congress. After witnessing the conflict entering its third week, it can be safely inferred that it was a decision taken in haste, not thoroughly thought through in terms of clearly defined political and military objectives, strategy, cost of war, end-game considerations, notions of victory, timelines and contingency plans, to say the least. Because of this very reason, President Donald Trump and his aides have been seen changing their goalposts repeatedly and issuing confusing statements regarding the objectives and timeline of the conflict. As a student of military strategy, one can vouch that the first and foremost consideration before launching any military campaign has to be setting realistic and achievable political and military objectives. The course of the conflict reveals that the USA’s political and military leadership appears confused and has visibly shifted from aiming to obliterate Iran’s nuclear programme, to destroying its missile programme, to regime change, to terminating its military equipment manufacturing capabilities, to destroying its military potential, to decapitating its political and military leadership and to annihilating its industrial and energy infrastructure. The achievement of none of these objectives, either completely or partially, was set as a means toward an end or as the ultimate notion of victory to conclude the war.
Another significant consideration had to be an accurate environmental scan based on realistic geopolitical, geo-economic, and geostrategic assumptions, offering viable options against the adversary. The US leadership appears to have failed to correctly envision the pre-war geopolitical environment, regional and global short- and long-term political and economic effects, the true military potential of Iran and its proxies, the role of regional and extra-regional actors, and the likely politico-military and economic effects on the USA and its partners. Without a realistic understanding of the pre- and post-war environment, managing the conflict effectively becomes difficult. Unlike previous non-UN-sanctioned unilateral actions against smaller countries, the USA has not secured support even from its traditional European and NATO allies. Instead, it faces domestic criticism and geopolitical isolation abroad.
Thirdly, the USA and Israel overestimated their military potential and underestimated Iran’s capacity, resulting in a miscalculation of war costs. The USA overlooked that while sitting in a house of glass, one should not throw stones. Over a dozen military setups across the Middle East have reportedly fallen like a house of cards against the Iranian onslaught. Iran has targeted military bases, command and control centres, radars, and fuel depots worth billions of USD across the region. The estimated cost of the war exceeds USD 1 billion per day, excluding infrastructural losses. According to media reports, the USA has so far lost or had damaged at least two AN/FPS-132 long-range radars, four THAAD batteries, four AN/TPY-2 radars, three F-15 Eagles, and seven KC-135 AAR aircraft, among other equipment. For Gulf States, American bases have become a vulnerability, affecting economic and financial stability for years to come. Similarly, Iran has surprised Israel and saturated its Iron Dome through the use of drones, glide vehicles, cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic missiles, along with clustered munitions. Once the fog of war clears, the extent of destruction in Israel will be clearer.
China, Russia, and other regional powers are closely monitoring the conflict. The rapid destruction of expensive US equipment with precision is setting new trends while increasing US vulnerability in other theatres. The conflict also highlights that national resolve and resilience are key assets under sanctions and restrictions, enabling states to impose prohibitive costs on adversaries. It further offers Gulf countries an opportunity to re-evaluate their security architecture and realign geopolitical, geo-economic, and geostrategic choices. It also prompts reflection within the US strategic community on whether unconditional support to Israel has brought more harm than benefit, particularly when Israel has often acted in ways that place it on the wrong side of history. Ultimately, one is left to question whether it is worth placing American soldiers in harm’s way, spending hundreds of billions of USD, and risking national reputation.
—The writer is a retired Air Officer from the PAF and currently serving at the DHA Suffa University (DSU), Karachi.
