On Saturday, 26 September, US President Donald Trump announced that he had rejected Iran’s proposal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and bring hostilities to an end. Within hours, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said that the intermediaries carrying messages between the two governments had conveyed no such rejection to Tehran. Washington has not stated what, if anything, is to replace the proposal it claims to have declined. Seven months into the closure of the strait, the operative US policy therefore amounts to a public “no”, an unconfirmed private channel and no timetable. Each of those elements carries a measurable cost. None of it is being paid in Washington.

The stakes are quantifiable. In the first half of 2025, roughly 20 million barrels per day of oil and petroleum products passed through the strait – about one-fifth of global petroleum-liquids consumption and more than a quarter of seaborne oil trade – together with roughly one-fifth of the world’s liquefied natural gas (LNG), according to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA).

Since the closure on 4 March, the International Energy Agency (IEA) has described the result as the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market. Visible transits fell from a historical average of around 138 a day to as few as six by 12 July.

Since the closure on 4 March, the International Energy Agency (IEA) has described the result as the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market. Visible transits fell from a historical average of around 138 a day to as few as six by 12 July.

The EIA’s Short-Term Energy Outlook now assumes flows of about........

© Middle East Monitor