The U.S.-Israeli war against Iran over recent months has reshaped several dimensions of the conflict. Alongside the economic pressure Iran exerted by disrupting activity in the Strait of Hormuz, the nuclear file remains equally consequential. Weeks ago, Iranian media outlets close to the Revolutionary Guard Corps, along with statements attributed to military sources, suggested that Tehran still possesses advanced weapons it has yet to deploy. Those signals raise a broader question about the nature and limits of Iranian deterrence, and whether the nuclear issue has become part of that undeclared deterrence strategy. The debate today is no longer centered on whether Iran possesses the technical capacity to develop nuclear weapons. Rather, it focuses on whether Tehran has made the political decision to acquire a nuclear deterrent. On March 25, the Trump administration reportedly presented Iran with a peace proposal that included far-reaching restrictions on its nuclear program. The proposal called for the dismantlement of all nuclear facilities, the transfer of all nuclear materials and equipment to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and a permanent halt to uranium enrichment. Iran responded by reiterating its readiness to provide all necessary guarantees that it would not pursue nuclear weapons, while insisting on its right to develop and use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, a position consistent with the one it adopted under the 2015 nuclear agreement. Yet the war marked a new chapter in the cycle of tension and mistrust that has long defined Iranian-American relations. It followed earlier turning points that deepened Tehran’s skepticism toward Washington, most notably the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal in 2018 and the attack on the Natanz nuclear facility in 2021, which Iran viewed as a violation of its national sovereignty.

The roots of Iran’s nuclear program stretch back to the 1950s under the Shah. During the 1970s, the United States played a leading role in supporting the development of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, at a time when Tehran was one of Washington’s closest regional allies. That position shifted dramatically after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The United States became one of the strongest advocates for dismantling Iran’s nuclear program, viewing it as a threat to regional stability. Warnings about Iran’s nuclear ambitions soon became a recurring feature of international politics. In 1992, Benjamin Netanyahu claimed that Iran was nearing the capability to produce a nuclear weapon. Three years later, President Bill Clinton accused Tehran of seeking to build an atomic bomb. As allegations mounted over secret uranium-enrichment facilities and Western sanctions were imposed in 2002, a decree issued the following year by Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, reaffirmed that Iran had no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons. That position went on to become a central pillar of official Iranian policy. Khamenei reinforced this stance in 2012, declaring that nuclear weapons were religiously forbidden and that Iran did not regard them as a source of strength. Instead, Tehran consistently framed its nuclear ambitions as part of a civilian program aimed at securing peaceful nuclear technology. That position was reflected in Iran’s decision to enter negotiations with the United States and other world powers, ultimately leading to the 2015 nuclear agreement under President Barack Obama. Under the deal, Iran accepted strict limits on uranium enrichment and extensive international monitoring of its nuclear activities. After President Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew from the agreement in 2018 and reimposed sanctions, Iran expanded its nuclear program. Yet even as its capabilities grew, Tehran stopped short of publicly declaring a political decision to develop a nuclear weapon.

Before 2010, Iran’s uranium enrichment levels remained at around 3.5 percent. That changed after the collapse of the 2009 Tehran Research Reactor fuel-swap deal,........

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