Mozambique’s LNG future faces uncertainty as Rwanda signals a potential troop withdrawal from Cabo Delgado, exposing the fragility of externally supported security arrangements in a conflict-prone region. This development carries broader strategic consequences, including implications for India’s investments in the regional energy infrastructure.

On 14 March 2026, Rwanda warned that it may withdraw its troops from northern Mozambique if external funding, particularly from the European Union (EU), is not sustained.[i] This development follows reports that EU financial support for Rwanda’s counter-insurgency operations in Cabo Delgado may not be extended beyond May.[ii] In a recent interview, President Paul Kagame said that the possible withdrawal of Rwandan troops is not a threat but a practical issue. He explained that Rwanda’s intervention has helped improve security in Cabo Delgado, but most of the costs are being paid by Rwanda itself. The EU’s contribution of about US$ 23 million covers only a small part of the total expenses needed to maintain a force of around 5,000 troops. Kagame pointed out that this funding is meant to support Mozambique and the international energy stakeholders operating there, not Rwanda. He made it clear that if security is important, it must be properly funded; Rwanda cannot continue its deployment.[iii]

Rwanda’s potential withdrawal raises critical concerns regarding the sustainability of externally funded stabilisation efforts in conflict-affected regions. More importantly, it highlights the fragility of the security architecture underpinning Mozambique’s resource-rich Cabo Delgado province, an area central not only to regional stability but also to global energy investments. For India, the stakes are particularly significant. Mozambique has emerged as a key partner in India’s energy diplomacy, especially in the liquefied natural gas (LNG) sector, with major investments by Indian public sector undertakings in offshore gas projects.[iv]

Cabo Delgado’s Fragile Security Architecture

Cabo Delgado, located in northern Mozambique, has emerged as a critical theatre of conflict since 2017, driven by a combination of Islamist insurgency and deep-rooted socio-economic grievances. The region’s vast natural gas reserves and mineral wealth have elevated its strategic importance, attracted major international investments, while simultaneously making it vulnerable to violent contestation. The insurgency, initially spearheaded by Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaah and later aligned with the Islamic State, has resulted in the displacement of a significant portion of the province’s population. Beyond its humanitarian toll, the conflict has disrupted global energy projects, particularly LNG operations, thereby linking Cabo Delgado’s instability to broader geopolitical and economic dynamics. As a result, the crisis represents not merely a domestic security challenge for Mozambique but a complex intersection of local grievances, terrorism and resource-driven politics.[v]

In response, Cabo Delgado has witnessed overlapping interventions: Rwanda’s deployment, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), and the African Union’s (AU) political engagement. Rwanda intervened rapidly through a direct agreement with Mozambique, focusing on securing strategic zones and demonstrating high operational effectiveness. In contrast, SAMIM represented a regional effort under SADC, deploying multinational forces with a broader mandate but facing challenges related to coordination, logistics and strategic coherence. The AU, while not directly operational, provided political endorsement and normative legitimacy to these efforts, reflecting its role within Africa’s broader peace and security architecture.[vi]

Notably, these interventions operated simultaneously without a unified command structure, illustrating a fragmented yet adaptive security environment characterised by overlapping mandates and partial coordination. However, in comparative terms, Rwanda’s intervention has been relatively more effective and positively perceived, achieving faster stabilisation of key areas and demonstrating greater operational coherence than the SADC- and AU-led efforts, which were constrained by institutional and logistical limitations. Rwanda has effectively become the backbone of counter-insurgency efforts, and any sudden withdrawal could reverse the progress achieved on the ground.

Mozambique’s own limitations further complicate the situation. Its armed forces lack the operational capacity, coordination and logistical strength required to manage the insurgency independently. Regional efforts, particularly those led by the Southern African Development Community, have also faced challenges such as slow deployment, limited resources and weak coordination. As a result, Mozambique remains heavily dependent on Rwanda for internal security, which raises concerns about its long-term stability.[vii]

External support has played an important role in sustaining Rwanda’s deployment. Financial and logistical assistance, especially through mechanisms such as the European Peace Facility, has helped cover key operational costs, including troop transport, equipment and logistics.[viii] Daniel Chapo, who took........

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