When the United States and Israel launched coordinated strikes against Iran on 28 February 2026, within hours, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan condemned the attacks against Iran.[i] The following day, Erdogan expressed condolences over the death of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was killed in the US–Israeli attacks.[ii] The response reflected the depth of Ankara’s unease at watching its neighbourhood consumed by a war it neither wanted nor could afford to ignore. Türkiye, a NATO ally hosting American forces, a neighbour of Iran, an opponent of Israeli regional ambitions, and a country wrestling with its own Kurdish question, is one of the most vulnerable states in the current crisis.

Turkish Strategic Balancing Posture

Türkiye’s official stance has been carefully calibrated, reflecting its long-standing preference for strategic autonomy and balancing NATO commitments with regional pragmatism. Ankara has criticised both the American-Israeli air campaign and Iran’s retaliatory missile and drone strikes against Gulf states hosting US personnel. On 14 February 2026, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan captured this dual posture succinctly: diplomacy has no ‘conducive’ conditions because the Iranians ‘feel betrayed’, having been attacked a second time while engaged in negotiations with the US over their nuclear programme.[iii]

However, Türkiye–Iran relations reflect a pattern of competitive co-existence. Before Bashar al-Assad’s fall in December 2024, Syria was the primary arena of rivalry, with Tehran backing the regime and Ankara supporting opposition forces while consolidating its presence in northern Syria.[iv] Assad’s ouster has shifted this balance: Türkiye has gained greater influence in post-Assad Syria, whereas Iran’s position has weakened. Nevertheless, both sides continue to maintain a cautious working relationship shaped by shared concerns over Kurdish militancy, border stability, and regional spillover risk.

Before the 28 February strikes, Türkiye, alongside regional mediators, supported a diplomatic framework that included discussion on limits on Iranian uranium enrichment, constraints on its ballistic missile programme, and restrictions on support to proxy groups.[v] That effort failed, but Türkiye’s investment in the diplomatic track served a dual purpose: demonstrating good faith to Washington while signalling at least tacit sympathy with Tehran’s beleaguered government. From Ankara’s perspective, an externally imposed regime change in Tehran is not a stabilising solution; what it fears is the emergence of a pro-Western, pro-Israeli government in Tehran that would entrench Israeli-American influence across the region.[vi]

Türkiye has also sought to position itself as a limited intermediary in the Iran crisis. Reports reveal that Ankara has been relaying messages between Tehran and Washington, while Hakan Fidan has separately called for de-escalation.[vii] This diplomatic posture was visible in Türkiye’s participation in a consultative meeting in Riyadh on 19 March 2026 and in the Islamabad talks on 29 March 2026, where Turkish, Saudi and Egyptian foreign ministers discussed proposals to reduce tensions and re-open diplomatic channels.[viii]

Domestic political pressures also shape this calculus. According to a 2025 Pew Research Centre survey, 93 per cent of Turks view Israel negatively.[ix] Erdogan’s vocal criticism of the strikes channels this sentiment without committing Türkiye to any costly entanglement. Crucially, Ankara has confirmed that Incirlik Air Base has not been utilised in offensive operations against Iran, a clarification designed to forestall Iranian escalation while preserving Türkiye’s claim to non-belligerency.[x]

NATO Infrastructure in Türkiye under........

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