The United States is once again at the forefront of efforts to establish a lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians. President Donald Trump’s October 2025 cease-fire agreement produced an uneasy truce between the two sides in Gaza, and a United Nations Security Council resolution in the following month approved the outlines of the president’s plan for the territory. It envisions the formal dissolution of Hamas as a governing body in Gaza, a U.S.-led Board of Peace to guide redevelopment, and an International Stabilization Force to oversee security and train Palestinian police forces.

In the months since, fighting has continued to flare between Israeli forces and Hamas militants, underlining the urgency of moving beyond the increasingly fragile cease-fire terms toward the next phases envisioned in the peace plan’s roadmap. With little trust between Hamas and Israel, the challenges are enormous. Arab countries are watching developments with deep concern. The collapse of previous attempts to find peace in the region—notably, the breakdown in the late 1990s of the process outlined by the Oslo accords—invites fresh cynicism and doubt as a new batch of American leaders attempts to resolve conflict in the Middle East.

But Washington should not be disheartened. Indeed, the United States need only turn to its own record to find examples of how to engineer success and avoid failure. Over the past half century, Washington has played a leading role in the mediation of conflicts in the Middle East—sometimes successfully, sometimes less so. The 1979 Camp David accords reached a peace between Egypt and Israel that holds to this day. The 1994 Jordan-Israel agreement also endures. But subsequent efforts to broker a treaty between Syria and Israel floundered. And, most notably, repeated attempts to achieve a lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians have yet to achieve lasting results.

Whether successful or unsuccessful, these efforts have yielded a number of useful lessons on how to conduct negotiations among regional actors. The sustained and active involvement of top-level government officials, for instance, is critical. Shielding participants from political pressures back home has also proved vital. Negotiators should carefully time incentives and penalties to keep talks moving forward. Security guarantees, including through monitoring, peacekeeping forces, and intelligence support, provide needed reassurance. And public diplomacy can help neutralize spoilers and promote constituencies in favor of peace. The Trump administration often styles its policy as mounting a sharp break with the past. But as it tries to usher in peace between Israelis and Palestinians, it should remember that recent history may be the best guide forward.

In the 1970s, Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat’s decision to reject alignment with the Soviet Union and seek rapprochement with the United States opened a unique window. Sadat’s 1977 Jerusalem visit, despite enormous political risks, jolted the region by signaling that one of Israel’s biggest and most hostile foes was ready to make a deal. Henry Kissinger, then the U.S. national security adviser, amplified that momentum with what came to be known as “shuttle diplomacy,” a series of personal interventions that helped to establish common ground. President Jimmy Carter’s intensive 1978 Camp David summit with Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin moved the process forward by insulating leaders from political pressures at home and allowing U.S. brokers to sequence negotiations in a way that turned once irreconcilable positions into subjects for discussion. Not only did the summit produce a framework for peace between Egypt and Israel, but it also introduced a five-year transitional timeline toward a fully autonomous and self-governed Palestine. That plan may not have reached fruition, but it marked a significant breakthrough after years of deadlock. At Camp David, Carter shuttled between principals who rarely met face-to-face, limiting political posturing and allowing the United States to apply pressure without damaging either leader’s image.

Carter’s decision to handle Egyptian-Israeli bilateral issues separately from the Palestinian question proved critical. The Camp David framework allowed negotiators to focus on finite problems (such as the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Sinai and the normalization of ties between Egypt and Israel) while deferring more complex issues to do with the Palestinians. This modular approach reduced the chances of a single issue failing leading to the collapse of the entire negotiations.

Following Camp David, the United States offered substantial economic and military assistance to Egypt, replacing Soviet support and helping Sadat withstand domestic criticism. To Israel, the United States promised security cooperation and advanced military supplies, reducing the perceived costs of Israel’s withdrawal from Sinai. The treaty complemented territorial withdrawal with layered security: demilitarization of Sinai, deployment of multinational observer forces, and clear verification protocols.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the United States tackled the far more complex Israeli-Palestinian relationship. Secretary........

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