The presidential trip to Japan, which started on 29 March and is scheduled to conclude on 31 March, is a significant development in relation to President  Prabowo Subianto’s foreign policy. The presidential trip is aimed at strengthening Indonesia’s role in the Indo-Pacific region, which is becoming increasingly unstable and competitive. The tour appears to have three main components: modernising the military, realising the goal of a high-growth economic trajectory, and ensuring stability in the region. The key challenge is to ensure that Indonesia is able to maintain its strategic autonomy while pursuing a multi-vector foreign policy. The president’s visit to Japan at the end of his tour suggests that the president has attempted to pursue a foreign policy agenda that aspires to turn Indonesia into a major power in a new regional order where middle powers play a more active role.

Indonesia is attempting to modernise its military, but its procurement processes are disjointed, and it doesn’t really have a defence strategy. Japan is also updating its defence strategy to take into account increased coercion in the maritime domain, and is looking to strengthen security ties with other countries in the Indo-Pacific, including Indonesia, which offers significant opportunities for cooperation.

Japan has far better technology, surveillance systems, and a far more professional military. Indonesia has long wanted to achieve those things itself, but so far has not managed. Indonesia is also a key country for Japan’s effort to develop the Indo-Pacific under the banner of a “free and open” maritime strategy. With cooperation in the area of marine surveillance, joint military training, and the production of defence-related products, in the context of Prabowo’s visit, Indonesia can at last modernise its military, while Japan becomes more deeply involved in regional defence affairs.

The focal point of Japan’s visit to Indonesia today is expected to be economic cooperation. Japan is Indonesia’s biggest investor and, in recent years, has sought to increase economic cooperation with Indonesia. Indonesia’s new national industrial policy action plan, among others has set a target to transform the automotive industry in Indonesia to electric vehicles and the mineral industry to exploit critical minerals, and to increase the share of renewable energy, all of which need a synergy between Indonesian companies and foreign investors that have high technology competence and sufficient financial strength to undertake capital-intensive investment projects. Japan

At the High Level Dialogue during the Summit, it will be discussed how the needs in the Asia Pacific region can be met in a future where resources must be used in a sustainable way. It will be an opportunity to discuss potential cooperation on battery value chains, hydrogen and sustainable mining, all of which are highly relevant to the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region.

It is also reported that Indonesia and Japan have agreed to support each other in their third level of relationship, or what is called the third dimension of mutual relationship, namely, regional strategic cooperation. Both countries share the view that freedom of navigation in the world’s oceans must be respected, but at the same time, no provocation should be made in other sea lanes. They are also of the view that Japan’s relations with Southeast Asian countries can be complemented by Indonesia’s approach in defending ASEAN centrality. Therefore, Prabowo’s visit can be used as a medium for both countries to agree on common views in dealing with international issues, such as the South China Sea issue, as well as in dealing with the issues of crisis management in the Asia Pacific region.

But cooperation will also run into several obstacles. Japan has made the issue of Indonesia’s “strategic ambiguity” towards China an increasing focus of its defence discussions, a concern that is likely to continue given Jakarta’s close relationship with Beijing. Indonesia’s domestic political factors will also have to be addressed, including the fragmented nature of the bureaucracy and the short-term focus of procurement decision-making at the level of individual ministers. If defence relations between Japan and Indonesia are to be strengthened to the highest level possible, these issues will have to be addressed.

Though differences in military modernisation could be a major source of tension in the relationship between Japan and Indonesia, a range of other issues can also disrupt cooperation. High on this list is the unpredictable business environment, characterised by instability and high risk, which deters investors from coming to Indonesia. Japan’s cautious business culture and the challenges that Japanese companies must contend with when expanding their operations overseas, often due to complaints from other countries about Japan’s role in the regional security sphere, are among the explanations for this complicated situation.

Several measures have to be taken in order to move defence relations between Indonesia and Japan to a higher level. Indonesia must have in place a defence planning mechanism, including a Defence White Paper, long-term defence planning, as well as greater transparency in its procurement practices. A joint Indonesia-Japan defence working group could help reduce administrative barriers to cooperation. The economic area also needs more attention, as more certainty and consistency in policies towards foreign direct investment are required in order to boost Japanese investment in Indonesia. Japan can also play a bigger role in capacity building in the Indonesian defence sector through more training activities for the military. In terms of multilateral cooperation, Indonesia-Japan defence relations have to be integrated within a broader framework, namely under the ASEAN-Japan partnership.

In the end, the purpose of Prabowo’s visit is that middle powers have to play a role in shaping the regional order. Japan has come to realise that Southeast Asia, and Indonesia in particular, is a core component of the Indo-Pacific concept. So, the visit is more than about reaching agreements; it is about the political will and institutional capacity to achieve them and to make them sustainable.

The visit is an important development in Indonesia-Japan relations, especially in terms of defence cooperation, economic relations and the coordination of responses to the complex security challenges unfolding in the Indo-Pacific. Opportunities and challenges will inevitably arise, but these can be managed and overcome if both sides are prepared to work constructively towards the achievement of a reform agenda aimed at realising the shared goals of a partnership that is vital to the stability of Indonesia, Japan and the world in the years ahead.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Ha, H. T., & Tan, E. (2026). Japan’s growing hard-power profile: Implications for Southeast Asia. ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.

Al Badawi, H. (2026). Strategic implications for the Indo-Pacific order: Japan’s defence transformation and its regional consequences. Institute for Security and Strategic Futures. 

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