Shehadi reads “economic D-Day” as theater aimed at four audiences—Tehran, Iranians, the world, and U.S. voters—not as a proven way to topple a regime. Sanctions usually punish civilians and let rulers blame Washington (Iraq 1991, Syria, Iran). At home they still signal “something is being done.”

Neither side can look weak. Biden’s sanction relief was treated as a gift; Trump will not split nukes from missiles and proxies the way 2015 did. Hormuz pressure hurts China more than the U.S.; fighting on Iranian soil after 47 years of proxy wars is costlier for the IRGC.

Squeezing Iranian oil is also a chip for talks with Xi. Midterms or street unrest could still force a climbdown. Elites do not starve; ordinary people do. The piece is a political reading, not a bet that sanctions will “work.”

There are many ways of looking at US President Donald Trump’s “economic D-Day” against Iran. Conventional wisdom says that economic sanctions on the economy simply do not work, but maybe they were never meant to. This is part of a many-sided mind game involving both domestic and international audiences. It is like a gunman in a cowboy movie aiming at several targets at the same time. There is the opponent, the opponent’s public, the international audience of allies and rivals, and, most importantly, your own domestic public. 

Sanctions are sometimes the default option to show that something is being done. This can be for internal political reasons, to avoid other choices or as a digression to gain time. These curbs have little effect on the regimes being sanctioned and instead it is the civilian population that bears the brunt via the economic collapse of their day-to-day lives. The targeted regime can use the restrictions to grow stronger by directing the anger at the US rather than at itself. We have seen this in many cases, from Saddam........

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