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Kolkata: Barely a month before the West Bengal assembly elections, Ram Navami on March 26 once again played host to violence in West Bengal. In the state’s increasingly polarised political climate, the festival has become an instrument of mobilisation, competitive symbolism, and, in some places, violent confrontation. 

The clash in Raghunathganj in Mushidabad, the most serious Ram Navami-related incident of violence in Bengal this season, raises a difficult but unavoidable question. Coming just days after the Election Commission of India (ECI) transferred several top-tier police officials, the violence has triggered a political dispute over whether it was an isolated law-and-order failure or part of a broader pattern of tension during the election period.

There are differing accounts of how the clash began. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has alleged that a Ram Navami procession came under attack after stones were thrown at it. Local accounts, however, indicate that tensions escalated after Muslim religious flags were removed and Ram Navami flags were put up in their place in the town. While the exact sequence of events is contested, accounts from the ground suggest that the situation quickly moved from slogan-shouting and verbal provocation to stone-pelting, vandalism and arson.

“We did not earlier have this kind of religious frenzy in our area. Unfortunately, this is now being created. All of us must remain alert because politics of division has begun,” the Trinamool Congress (TMC) MP from Jangipur, Khalilur Rahaman, told The Wire.

Security personnel at the site of the Ram Navami clash on March 26 at Raghunathgunj in Bengal. Photo: Video screengrab.

Eyewitnesses alleged that several shops owned by members of the Muslim community were selectively vandalised and set on fire as the procession moved through a key junction in the town. Vehicles, motorcycles and vans were also damaged, triggering panic among residents. 

The BJP demanded the arrest of a local social media influencer after a video appeared to show a group wearing saffron flags and scarves setting fire to shops and carrying out attacks. 

Raju Shaikh, the influencer who runs local social media channel OM TV, later noted that the video was restricted in India by Meta following a request from the law enforcement agency. 

The takedown notice shared by OM TV.

Murshidabad Range Deputy Inspector General of Police Ajit Singh Yadav visited the area on March 27.  On March 28, Murshidabad police arrested 30 people in the course of its investigation, including two district-level Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh leaders. 

“Whatever happened took place in front of police cameras. I myself was in no way involved in this clash. But it is true that such clashes affect the minds of voters, and their impact is seen in elections,” admitted local BJP leader in the Jangipur-Raghunathganj belt, Dhananjay Ghosh, while speaking to The Wire. 

Addressing a political rally on the campaign trail, Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee accused the police officers recently transferred to the area by the ECI of instigating riots. “Looting and rioting were carried out. District-level officials have been removed from their posts. BJP’s people have been sent here. They (officers) have been transferred here so that they can instigate riots. Shops were vandalised in Raghunathganj,” Banerjee said.

Union home minister Amit Shah, in response, said, “This time, West Bengal has seen the least amount of violence after Ram Navami. Every year the scale is much bigger. Because neutral officers are now at the top of the administration, it has been possible to suppress the unrest.” 

Shah’s remarks bring scrutiny to the larger question of the repeated eruption of violence around Ram Navami in West Bengal in the recent years. Some processions now operate within a political atmosphere in which provocation is anticipated, tension is useful and escalation is electorally profitable. 

That is also what makes the contrast with Bengal’s longer traditions politically revealing given that festivals like Durga Puja and Eid, despite their scale and emotional investment, have historically been observed across much of Bengal without comparable patterns of confrontation. Earlier this month, the state celebrated Eid without any noticeable communal tension. 

Raghunathganj is a Muslim-majority assembly constituency in Murshidabad district and falls within the Jangipur Lok Sabha seat. It has been represented since 2011 by Akhruzzaman, who first won as a Congress candidate and later, after switching parties, as a Trinamool Congress candidate in 2021. In the final electoral roll published in February 2026, 115,087 voters in the constituency, or 45.90% of the electorate, were marked as “under adjudication” despite over 99% showing linkage with 2002 electoral rolls.  

The timing of the clash, with the election process underway and the administration functioning under the supervision of the ECI, has made the incident politically sensitive. In such a setting, any communal disturbance is likely to be read through both administrative and electoral lenses.

“The main objective is to create division in the name of a festival. If voters are divided, both the BJP and the Trinamool will benefit politically. We appeal to people in the district to stay alert and not be provoked,” alleged Congress district leader Abdullah Kafi.

“What is creating fear among ordinary people is that both the BJP and the Trinamool are producing criminal rioters and looters for electoral gain,” claimed CPI(M) leader Jamir Mollah. 

Murshidabad as a communal hotspot

The latest unrest however follows a documented history of communal and political friction in Murshidabad. Over the past several years, the district has seen recurring tension during religious festivals, including disputes during Karthik Puja, and at localised flashpoints like Beldanga, Shaktipur, and Samsherganj. While each event involves unique local triggers, the frequency of these clashes during election cycles suggests a pattern that extends beyond isolated failures of public order.

Murshidabad has, in effect, become one of those districts where communal tension appears episodic but politically useful.

“This clash was orchestrated ahead of the election, and senior leaders from both the ruling party and the opposition are behind it. It is being used to spread propaganda and counter-propaganda, and religious conflict has become an instrument of vote politics,” alleged Humayun Kabir, founder of the Aam Janata Unnayan Party (AJUP).

Ironically, Kabir, a local controversial political figure, is accused of inciting communal tension during the 2024 general election, with remarks for which he later issued a public apology, asserting they had been made at the direction of Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee. He established the AJUP recently following his suspension from the TMC over a proposal to construct a mosque in Murshidabad modelled after the demolished Babri Masjid and contesting the election in alliance with All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM). 

As Central Forces enforce a fragile normalcy in Raghunathganj, the focus in Murshidabad is shifting from communal friction to political fallout. The blurring of religious observance and electoral mobilisation has turned this season’s festivities into a high-stakes barometer for the 2026 polls. Whether these incidents are viewed as isolated administrative failures or part of a structurally useful pattern of polarisation, their true impact will likely be measured not in the streets, but at the polling station.

© The Wire