The threats have changed, but sovereignty, central authority, and the Red Sea corridor still shape the regional strategy.

Arab policy toward Somalia has adapted to new threats, yet its central instinct endures preserve a recognized Somali state, work through Mogadishu, and resist redrawing borders. In 1988, that logic helped sustain Major General Mohamed Siad Barre as his forces devastated Somaliland. Today, it supports Somalia’s Federal Government and opposition to Somaliland’s recognition. Communism has given way to jihadism, piracy, and maritime rivalry, but the strategic lens remains state centric.

1988: A Cold War Client at the Red Sea’s Gate

By the late 1980s, Barre’s regime was fighting the Somali National Movement while inflicting devastating violence on Isaaq civilians. Hargeisa and Burao were bombarded, communities displaced, and Somaliland was scarred by mass atrocities. Yet Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and other conservative Arab governments still viewed Barre as a useful partner.

Three calculations drove that choice. First, Somalia had broken with the Soviet Union after the Ogaden War and moved toward the Western and Gulf camp. Ethiopia’s Soviet-backed Derg government hosted the SNM. Arab capitals therefore saw the uprising less as resistance to repression than as another front in a regional proxy war.

Second, Somalia had joined the Arab League in 1974.........

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