The evidence does not establish that Qatar “operated” Benjamin Netanyahu. It establishes something serious enough: a failed strategy built around Qatari influence in Gaza, disturbing allegations involving people in the prime minister’s inner circle, and new reports about warnings before October 7 that Israel still has not properly investigated.

Nearly three years after October 7, Israel is heading toward another election without having completed the most basic task demanded by a national catastrophe: establishing what happened, who knew what, which decisions failed, and who bears responsibility.

The failure of October 7 was not the work of one man. The IDF failed. Military intelligence failed. The Shin Bet failed. The political leadership failed. An entire strategic conception regarding Hamas collapsed in a matter of hours. But collective failure cannot become collective immunity. Benjamin Netanyahu was prime minister, had shaped Israel’s policy toward Hamas for years, and held the highest political responsibility for the country’s security. That responsibility cannot disappear simply because others failed as well.

A new report makes that principle more urgent. According to an investigation based on a book by journalists Shlomi Eldar and Ruth Yuval, UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed personally warned Netanyahu roughly ten days before October 7 that Yahya Sinwar was preparing a major move. The warning was reportedly described in terms of an “earthquake,” and, according to the report, Netanyahu assessed that Hamas’s attention was focused primarily on the West Bank. The information was not passed to the heads of the IDF, Shin Bet or Mossad. Netanyahu’s office has categorically denied the account, calling it a “complete lie” and denying that such a warning was received.

The denial matters. So does the allegation. If the report is accurate, it does not prove that Netanyahu knew when Hamas would attack, how the assault would unfold or that thousands of terrorists would cross the border on October 7. But that is not the relevant standard. A direct warning from the president of the UAE concerning the intentions of the leader of Hamas was precisely the kind of information that should have entered Israel’s national-security system, been assessed against other intelligence and reached those responsible for preparing the country for war.

If it reached the prime minister and stopped there, that is not a minor intelligence-processing error. It is a failure at the political center of the state. For years, Netanyahu’s defenders have argued that the security establishment failed to alert him adequately before October 7. The new report, if substantiated, complicates that defense profoundly. It suggests that the problem was not simply that intelligence failed to travel upward. Potentially critical information may also have failed to travel downward from the prime minister himself.

That matters because October 7 was preceded not only by an intelligence failure, but by a strategic conception.........

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)