Kurdish-Jewish relations are often framed through historical coexistence, the Jewish presence in Kurdistan, collective memory, and experiences of persecution and dispersion. These elements matter, but they are insufficient to sustain a political relationship. This article argues that Kurdish-Jewish relations should be examined through sovereignty, self-determination, collective security, memory diplomacy, state-building, diaspora power, and the changing regional order. It uses “occupied nation” rather than “stateless nation” to describe Kurdistan, because Kurdish statelessness is understood here as the result of partition and dispossession of sovereignty, not an inherent incapacity for statehood. Without equating the Holocaust and Anfal, the article identifies comparable mechanisms of enemy-making and organized state violence, and argues for converting memory into prevention. It concludes that a durable Kurdish-Jewish partnership should rest on political independence, complementary interests, institution-building, and “ethical realism”: the union of power, rights, and responsibility.

Introduction: From Memory to Politics

The international conference “Jewish-Kurdish Relations in a Changing Middle East,” to be held in London on 6–7 September 2026, brings together the history of the Jews of Kurdistan, national movements and survival, genocide and collective memory, regional transformation, Western policy, women and youth, diaspora, and the possibility of sustained Kurdish-Jewish cooperation.

The importance of this agenda is that it can move the relationship beyond historical sympathy. Memory can create trust, but durable political relations require defined interests, institutions, rights, and responsibilities. My approach therefore considers power and survival, law and institutions, and the political force of identity, memory, and narrative together.

From “Stateless Nation” to “Occupied Nation”

Kurds are commonly described as a “stateless nation.” The phrase describes the present condition but obscures the history that produced it. It may suggest that the Kurd nation naturally lacked a tradition or capacity for sovereignty. I reject that implication. The problem of Kurdistan is not a natural absence of statehood, but territorial partition, dispossession of sovereignty, and the imposition of centralized states over Kurdistan.

For that reason, I consider “occupied nation” a more accurate concept. Kurdistan is not merely a set of peripheral regions inhabited by a “Kurdish minority.” It is the historic land of a nation divided among Iran, Turkey, Iraq, and Syria through war, foreign intervention, post-imperial settlements, and the consolidation of centralized states. Their policies have differed, but the underlying fact remains: the Kurd nation has not been allowed freely to determine the final political status of its own land.

Kurdish political history also contradicts claims of incapacity. From Simko’s political authority and the Republic of Kurdistan in Mahabad to contemporary Kurdish institutions, Kurds have repeatedly demonstrated political organization and governance despite military pressure and the absence of international guarantees.

This is why minority rights and self-determination must be distinguished. Minority rights protect language, culture, religion, equality, and participation within an existing state. Self-determination asks a prior question: who has authority to determine the political status of a nation and its land? The UN Charter recognizes self-determination, and common Article 1 of the two 1966 human-rights covenants affirms that all peoples may freely determine their political status.

International law does not automatically turn every national claim into an immediate right of secession. Yet if a people is told it may determine its future while independence is excluded in advance under every circumstance, the result has already been decided.

From the standpoint of the Kurdistan Independence Party, the right to determine Kurdistan’s future belongs to the Kurd nation itself. In my view, independence is not a concession to be granted by the states occupying Kurdistan, nor a temporary tactical preference. It is the fullest expression of Kurdish self-determination and the historical answer to partition, occupation, assimilation, repression, and genocide.

The Jewish Experience: Sovereignty and Political Agency

Comparing Kurds and Jews does not mean declaring their histories identical. Their geographies, social histories, persecutions, migrations, and international positions differ fundamentally. The Holocaust was a specific historical catastrophe and should not be dissolved into loose analogy. What makes comparison useful is a shared political question: what becomes of a nation whose ultimate security and political future remain in the hands of others?

European antisemitism moved from religious prejudice and social exclusion into racial and political ideology, culminating in a state project of annihilation. The Holocaust showed how enemy-making can proceed through deprivation of rights, normalization of hatred, removal of citizenship, dehumanization,........

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)