A Ukrainian investigation shows how Russia scaled FPV drones that cannot be stopped by ordinary electronic warfare. China supplies the industrial ecosystem behind them — while Hezbollah is already applying the same battlefield logic against Israel.

A battlefield covered in almost invisible strands of glass may sound like science fiction. In Ukraine, it is already a military reality.

Fiber-optic FPV drones are physically connected to their operators by a thin cable that unwinds during flight. Because the commands and video signal travel through this cable rather than over radio frequencies, conventional electronic warfare cannot simply jam the connection.

Russia has rapidly expanded its use of these drones against Ukraine. At the same time, Hezbollah has begun employing fiber-optic-guided FPV drones against Israeli forces.

The two countries are fighting on different fronts and against different enemies. But the technological threat is increasingly similar.

A 23-page report reviewed by NAnews and prepared by the Center for Defense Reforms, a Ukrainian non-governmental security and defense research organization, examines the industrial foundations of Russia’s fiber-optic drone program: production capacity, imported raw materials, Chinese suppliers, specialized reels and Russia’s efforts to build a complete domestic manufacturing cycle.

The organization is chaired by Ukrainian security expert Oleksandr Danylyuk. The Center for Defense Reforms works on national security, defense-sector reform, Russian hybrid threats and the development of practical responses to modern military challenges.

The report’s most important conclusion is that Russia has achieved considerable battlefield scale, but its production system remains heavily dependent on imported technology and, above all, China.

The drone that electronic warfare cannot jam

A conventional FPV drone receives commands and transmits video through a radio link. Once that connection is disrupted, the operator may lose both control and the live image needed to guide the drone into its target.

The report cites rough estimates suggesting that between 70% and 90% of conventional FPV drones may fail to reach their targets because the radio connection is lost or jammed. The saturation of the Ukrainian battlefield with electronic warfare systems therefore created a powerful incentive to develop a different control method.

A fiber-optic drone solves that problem through a physical connection.

The cable provides stable communication and a high-quality video feed even in an environment filled with radio interference. The technology does not necessarily require an entirely new drone: existing FPV platforms can be modified to carry the additional reel and transmission equipment if they have sufficient payload capacity.

The first known open-source report of a Russian fiber-optic FPV drone appeared in March 2024. After the battles in Russia’s Kursk region in late 2024, their use began to expand much more rapidly.

By July 2025, such systems may have represented approximately 15% to 20% of Russian FPV platforms. According to Russian claims cited in the study, their share may have reached as much as 60% in certain frontline sectors by early 2026. The report stresses that this figure cannot be generalized to the entire front.

Most fiber-optic drones are believed to operate at ranges of up to 20 kilometers. Yet in November 2025, Ukrainian officials confirmed that Russia had begun deploying models with cables extending up to 50 kilometers.

In February 2026, one reportedly reached the northern outskirts of Kharkiv, approximately 23.4 kilometers from the Russian border.

That development expands the danger beyond frontline trenches. Supply roads, artillery positions, warehouses, command posts and civilian infrastructure deeper behind the line can all become targets.

Fifty thousand drones a month — according to the manufacturer

The best-known Russian fiber-optic drone is the “Prince Vandal of Novgorod,” commonly abbreviated as KVN.

According to claims made by its manufacturer and cited in the report, production increased to approximately 50,000 units per month in 2025. This figure has not been independently verified and should be treated as a Russian claim, but it offers a basis for estimating the scale of demand.

If each KVN carries a ten-kilometer reel, that model alone would consume approximately six million kilometers of optical fiber annually. If twenty-kilometer reels are used, annual consumption could approach 12 million kilometers.

And KVN is only one platform.

Russian sources also mention the VT-40, Gortenzia, Ovod-Pro, Veles, Piranha and Skvorets series, although the report notes that the battlefield use of some models has not been independently confirmed.

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