Defining Success in the Second Phase of Gaza’s Ceasefire
As January 2026 nears, global attention has shifted to the next phase of the ceasefire. Building on the US-brokered 20-point peace plan endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2803 on November 17, 2025, Phase Two aims for the demilitarization of Hamas, Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, the deployment of an International Stabilization Force (ISF), the creation of a technocratic Palestinian committee under a Board of Peace, and the transfer of authority to a reformed Palestinian Authority (PA).
While the plan states the right things in many parts, several details and their sequencing remain unclear. Besides, mutual accusations of violations severely undermine trust. Current diplomatic efforts, research-based analytical models, and benchmarks from other Middle East agreements indicate a 20–30 percent success rate for Phase Two. This aligns with a 75 percent historical failure rate for transitional governance in occupied territories.
This bleak assessment stems from two opposing conditions: Israel’s military dominance clashes with Hamas’s intransigence. Without renewed US resolve and diplomacy, appeasement will remain slim.
Phase Two primarily focuses on disarming Hamas, whereas the plan proposed by President Donald Trump called for a process of complete demilitarization. Yet, Hamas has outright rejected disarmament, and the interim period has allowed the group to regain civilian control in parts of Gaza quietly. Hamas recently indicated that it is open to freezing or storing its arms, but this is not what the plan envisions.
Other UN-monitored disarmaments in Bosnia (1995) and Lebanon........





















Toi Staff
Sabine Sterk
Gideon Levy
Mark Travers Ph.d
Waka Ikeda
Tarik Cyril Amar
Grant Arthur Gochin