A flurry of diplomatic activities is taking place in Islamabad, Pakistan, a country that has positioned itself as the lead facilitator and mediator of an elusive dialogue between the United States and Iran. Days before hosting the foreign ministers of Türkiye, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia for talks in Islamabad, Pakistan delivered a 15-point document prepared by the United States to Iran.

While the US has framed the document as a peace proposal, Iran has called it unreasonable, excessive, and unacceptable, further denting the already slim prospects of a ceasefire. Although the exchange of messages, not least through Pakistan, is somewhat positive, even a cursory look at the US demand set underscores the improbability of reaching a negotiated settlement.

There are several reasons why these demands, in and of themselves, might become the biggest stumbling block in ending the war.

First, the demands are wide-ranging; they cover almost all aspects that Iran considers critical to safeguarding its sovereignty. They range from bringing an end to Iran’s civilian nuclear programme to severing ties with its regional allies.

The magnitude of the demands is too high, making it exceedingly difficult for any state, let alone Iran, to accept them. The literature on coercion also informs us that states refuse to comply when coercers put too many demands on the table.

This problem will be exacerbated by relentless attacks, including on critical infrastructure, by both Israel and the US. Iran would simply dig in, rightly concluding that both its adversaries desire its collapse.

Second, the nuclear-related demands are not only unreasonable but also illegal. The US wants Iran to dismantle its nuclear facilities in Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow. It also wants Iran not to enrich uranium.

As a State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the US cannot deny Iran, another State Party to the NPT, its inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Iran, it must be stressed, also concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1974.

If the US is serious about finding a negotiated end to the war, it needs to revisit the document with a view to preparing a new, more reasonable one in which Iran’s sovereignty-related concerns are acknowledged and addressed

If the US is serious about finding a negotiated end to the war, it needs to revisit the document with a view to preparing a new, more reasonable one in which Iran’s sovereignty-related concerns are acknowledged and addressed

From 2003 until 2006, it implemented the Additional Protocol voluntarily. After signing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015, Iran provisionally applied it until 2021.

Its refusal to continue adhering to the Additional Protocol was a belated response to Washington’s unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA, an agreement with which Iran was compliant. Given that the facilities the US wants Iran to dismantle are safeguarded, this US demand holds no legal or normative value.

Moreover, by virtue of being a State Party to the NPT and under the safeguards agreement, Iran reserves the right to enrich uranium and reprocess plutonium for civilian use. Therefore, Iran can rightfully reject this US demand as well.

Third, Iran is least likely to accept any kind of limits on its ballistic missile programme. One reason helps explain Iran’s reticence when it comes to curtailing its ballistic missile programme: ballistic missiles are Iran’s best means of hitting and destroying targets inside Israel.

While the Shahed drones are becoming an important plank of Iran’s strategy, a weakened missile force would not serve Iran well, especially when it faces two behemoths: Israel and the US. In other words, it is unreasonable to expect Iran to undermine a vital component of its inventory.

This is particularly the case when its adversaries are committed to both regime change and state collapse.

Last but not least, Iran is unlikely to sever ties with outfits like Hezbollah, as they are a key component of its Forward Defence policy. While the said policy has not been able to deter the US and Israel from launching two wars in the span of eight months, it can still help Iran wage an asymmetric war of attrition.

The bruised and weakened Hezbollah is causing significant attrition to Israel in the ongoing war. The Yemen-based Ansarallah—another key pillar of the Forward Defence policy—also provides considerable leverage to Iran.

Not least, it does so by threatening to close or disrupt the Bab al-Mandab Strait, which connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden.

At a time when Iran is not only being bombed but also threatened with a ground invasion, it would consider it folly to end partnerships that provide it with varying degrees of leverage across the Middle East.

All of this indicates that the demands the US has sent through Pakistan are structurally unfair. To accept any of them would be akin to weakening a country that is already fighting on its own.

Therefore, if the US is serious about finding a negotiated end to the war, it needs to revisit the document with a view to preparing a new, more reasonable one in which Iran’s sovereignty-related concerns are acknowledged and addressed.

© The Friday Times