The Iran war has entered a phase where Pakistan’s defence alignment with Saudi Arabia is no longer a distant policy posture but increasingly subject to real-world testing. What began with Israeli decapitation strikes inside Iran—targeting senior military leadership and command structures in Tehran—has expanded into direct attacks on strategic and economic assets, including the South Pars gas field. This escalation, undertaken without consulting Washington, reflects a deliberate Israeli strategy to raise the stakes and expand the conflict regionally.

Iran’s response has been immediate and concrete. Ballistic missiles and drone strikes have hit Qatar’s Ras Laffan LNG complex—the world’s largest gas export hub—while additional attacks and interceptions have affected Saudi refinery infrastructure in Yanbu, the UAE’s Habshan gas facility and Bab oil field, and refineries in Kuwait. These are direct strikes on the economic lifelines of Gulf states, sharply raising the cost of restraint and bringing the prospect of Saudi—and by extension Pakistani—involvement closer to reality.

Saudi Arabia has responded with a calibrated but increasingly firm signal. Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan has warned that the Kingdom’s patience is “not unlimited” and that Saudi Arabia and its partners “possess the capabilities to respond decisively if required”. This position was reinforced collectively in Riyadh, where foreign ministers from eleven Arab and Muslim nations—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Pakistan and Indonesia—issued a joint statement calling for “immediate de-escalation”, warning against “the expansion of the conflict into the Gulf”, and stressing that continued escalation “poses a direct threat to regional and global stability”.

At the same time, President Donald Trump has warned that any further Iranian escalation against Gulf energy infrastructure would trigger direct US strikes on Iran’s remaining assets. With both Israel and Iran raising the escalatory ladder, the space for Gulf states to remain outside the conflict is rapidly narrowing.

The structure of the war is therefore no longer containable. It has moved from targeted strikes within Iran to a broader contest over energy infrastructure and regional security. As pressure on Saudi Arabia and its Gulf partners mounts, the likelihood of a collective response increases. Under such conditions, Pakistan’s long-standing defence commitments are no longer theoretical. If the Gulf is compelled to enter the conflict, Pakistan’s alignment will move from signalling to action.

Iran’s response pattern is not confined to this war. Since 1979, it has projected influence through sectarian proxy networks across multiple theatres. For Saudi Arabia, this has translated into direct security threats. The Houthis in Yemen, supported over time by Iran, have repeatedly targeted Saudi cities and key oil facilities such as Abqaiq and Khurais, aiming to disrupt production and impose strategic costs.

Engagement with Iran is driven by necessity; alignment with Saudi Arabia is grounded in institutional commitments and converging strategic interests

Engagement with Iran is driven by necessity; alignment with Saudi Arabia is grounded in institutional commitments and converging strategic interests

For Pakistan, the consequences have been internal and regional. Sectarian polarisation intensified after 1979, contributing to cycles of violence that required sustained state intervention. Along its western frontier, Iran’s regional alignments have intersected with Pakistan’s security concerns through militant sanctuaries, Afghan theatre dynamics, and recurring cross-border tensions, including the 2024 exchange of fire and air strikes.

The Chabahar factor reinforced this mistrust. India’s presence in Iran, positioned against Gwadar, carried implications for Pakistan’s security environment, including concerns linked to the Baloch insurgency. India’s disengagement from the project on the eve of this war does not alter the broader strategic pattern that shaped Pakistan’s assessment.

These accumulated experiences explain why Saudi Arabia and Pakistan interpret the current escalation in similar terms. For the Gulf, the China-facilitated normalisation with Iran reflected a deliberate attempt to de-escalate and safeguard economic transformation. The persistence of Iranian-linked pressures, however, has reinforced underlying mistrust rather than resolved it. Ongoing attacks on civilian infrastructure and energy installations have further eroded the limited goodwill the Iranian regime had begun to rebuild among Gulf governments and publics.

At the same time, Israeli expansionism—enabled by consistent US complicity—is reshaping regional perceptions. Israel’s conduct is not viewed in the Gulf as a limited campaign but as part of a broader effort to impose a new regional order through force, with Washington providing diplomatic cover and strategic backing. Gulf states, bearing the economic and security fallout from the course of this war—despite having preferred diplomacy and de-escalation—are increasingly viewing the US-led security framework with caution. This has reinforced intra-Gulf solidarity and a growing reliance on indigenous defence coordination, creating greater space for partners such as Pakistan to play a more defined security role.

This is interacting with a deeper shift since Gaza. Public opinion across the Gulf has hardened sharply against Israel, constraining governments that had previously explored normalisation and pushing greater reliance on indigenous and coordinated security frameworks. In Pakistan, speculation about a pro-Israel outcome in Iran overlooks both this shift and historical precedent. Pakistan maintained strong ties with Iran even under the Shah, despite his alignment with the West and Israel. Any post-war configuration in Iran will be driven by stabilisation needs, not ideological alignment.

Saudi Arabia and its Gulf partners have so far exercised restraint despite mounting pressure. Riyadh has avoided direct involvement, rerouted exports through Red Sea terminals, restored disrupted capacity, and maintained diplomatic coordination with Arab and Muslim nations. Qatar and the UAE have followed similar approaches, seeking to shield their economies from a conflict they did not initiate.

However, the structure of escalation is narrowing this space. Iranian signalling towards Gulf energy infrastructure and Israel’s strategy of raising costs for Tehran are together increasing the risk of regionalisation. The question is no longer whether the Gulf prefers restraint, but how long it can sustain it under sustained pressure.

It is within this evolving environment that Pakistan’s position is anchored.

Diplomatic engagement with Iran continues, reflecting geography and the need to manage escalation along the border. Pakistan has maintained foreign minister-level coordination, supported diplomatic efforts involving regional actors, and issued statements aimed at limiting spillover.

At the same time, its strategic signalling has been clear. When a Pakistani oil tanker transited the Strait of Hormuz under heightened threat conditions, naval vessels were deployed in advance, and their movement was publicly announced. This was a deliberate signal that Pakistan would act to safeguard maritime routes and protect energy flows critical to both its own economy and global stability.

Pakistan has also aligned with international positions condemning attacks on Gulf infrastructure while maintaining consistency in opposing broader escalation. Domestically, it has acted against protests linked to the conflict, signalling zero tolerance for internal destabilisation driven by external developments.

The argument that Pakistan is balancing between Iran and Saudi Arabia does not hold. Engagement with Iran is driven by necessity; alignment with Saudi Arabia is grounded in institutional commitments and converging strategic interests.

Pakistan’s entry would be a consequential escalation, and this is well understood in Tehran

Pakistan’s entry would be a consequential escalation, and this is well understood in Tehran

That alignment is rooted in decades of defence cooperation. From training missions in the 1960s to structured deployments and operational coordination, Pakistan has consistently contributed to Saudi defence. The Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement, concluded in 2025, formalised this trajectory at a time when the conflict was already moving towards the Gulf.

Economic ties reinforce this position. Saudi Arabia has repeatedly supported Pakistan during periods of financial stress through oil facilities, financial assistance, and employment opportunities for millions of Pakistanis. Instability in the Kingdom carries immediate consequences for Pakistan’s own economic stability.

The domestic debate within Pakistan has not fully reflected these realities. A segment of opinion-makers, shaped in part by sectarian and ideological affinities, continues to frame the conflict through selective narratives that overlook both the sequence of escalation and the Iranian regime’s long record of projecting influence through sectarian proxies.

The current war follows a trajectory set in motion by the October 2023 attack by Iran-backed Hamas, which triggered Israel’s genocidal campaign in Gaza and subsequent devastating strikes against Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen. The subsequent collapse of the Assad regime in Syria has further weakened Iran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance”. In this war, that proxy-based strategy of regional destabilisation has effectively reversed on itself, leaving the Iranian regime to bear the costs of its own conflict-driven approach.

A distinction must therefore be maintained between the Iranian regime and the Iranian people. The trajectory of the conflict reflects decisions taken at the level of the state, while the costs are borne by the population. Pakistan’s position is directed at the former, while recognising the humanitarian implications for the latter.

Much of the analytical framing around the war has blurred the line between assumption and reality. The conflict has unfolded far less linearly than suggested, with moments of apparent Iranian strength offset by leadership decapitation, sustained attrition, and growing vulnerability. Expectations about the durability of its proxy network and the likelihood of internal mobilisation have only partially held. Signs of strain are increasingly visible—captured in Ali Larijani’s reported appeal to the Muslim world shortly before his death, and the Saudi Foreign Minister’s pointed response at the Riyadh meeting that a state under attack cannot be expected to assist the very source of that threat—underscoring a deepening sense of isolation and pressure on the regime.

The Iranian regime increasingly appears to be operating in survival mode, with a strategy that risks widening the conflict rather than containing it. Despite this, Saudi Arabia and its partners, including Pakistan, are likely to exercise maximum restraint to avoid entanglement, given the high costs involved. They will seek to assess how far escalation continues and whether critical red lines—some already tested—are crossed decisively. The next phase will depend on whether Gulf states continue to absorb pressure or conclude that retaliation is unavoidable, a decision that is likely to be taken collectively within the GCC framework.

Under those conditions, Pakistan’s alignment will move from signalling to operational involvement. Its role will remain defensive: protection of Saudi territory, security of critical infrastructure, and safeguarding maritime routes. Pakistan’s entry would be a consequential escalation, and this is well understood in Tehran. Despite expanding attacks across multiple theatres—from the Levant to the Eastern Mediterranean and parts of the Caucasus—Iran has avoided direct escalation towards Pakistan, reflecting an awareness of the costs of military engagement with a capable, nuclear-armed state that has already demonstrated resolve, including through its calibrated strikes in 2024.

While nuclear deterrence in Pakistan’s doctrine remains India-specific, its conventional credibility—shaped by sustained counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, prior US-led coalition experience in Afghanistan, recent high-intensity air operations against the Taliban, and its claimed success in last year’s limited conflict with a larger adversary, India—places it in a different category of regional actors. In this context, Pakistan is not a peripheral player but a serious security actor, capable of coordinated operations with Gulf partners while maintaining functional alignment with the United States where required.

Beyond the immediate operational implications, this alignment carries broader strategic consequences in the post-war period. A consistent partnership with Saudi Arabia strengthens Pakistan’s position in the Gulf, deepens economic integration, and reinforces its credibility as a reliable security partner in a region undergoing rapid recalibration.

At the same time, shifting Gulf public and state preferences are narrowing the strategic space for countries visibly aligned with Israel. India’s alignment with Israel is clear, while emerging evidence suggests that the United States was drawn into this war of choice through Israeli influence despite earlier reservations. This does not imply a break with Washington; Gulf states will maintain close ties—particularly under the Trump administration—while seeking greater autonomy in regional security.

This approach aligns with Pakistan’s positioning, combining Gulf alignment with pragmatic US engagement, including its role in Saudi-led coordination among key Muslim states within emerging post-war initiatives under Trump’s Board of Peace framework. In contrast, India’s visible proximity to Israel during the conflict risks limiting its strategic space in a Gulf environment where both public sentiment and state priorities are recalibrating, thereby enhancing Pakistan’s relative position as a more acceptable and reliable partner.

What is unfolding is not a shift in Pakistan’s policy, but the point at which its underlying logic is being tested. As the war moves closer to Saudi Arabia’s core interests, Pakistan’s commitments and regional realities are converging.

© The Friday Times