The Pulse | Security | South Asia

India’s Iran Blind Spot and the Gulf War: A Litmus Test of Strategic Autonomy 

New Delhi probably hoped that the conflict would end quickly and hence it could pursue a hands-off policy. That hasn’t worked out.

As the conflict between Iran, Israel, and the United States escalates and enters its third week, it has become apparent that decision-makers in the White House and Tel Aviv miscalculated Iran’s resilience and determination. Having apparently given strategy a miss, they also underestimated Iran’s ability to impose a near-total blockade on traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, which has severely impacted energy security for several countries in Asia. For India, Hormuz is an energy lifeline with about 90 percent of its LPG imports and around 46-50 percent of India’s crude oil imports normally passing through the strait. The closure of Hormuz is thus impacting millions of households in India.

Meanwhile, it appears that New Delhi is quietly benefiting from U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to lift sanctions on Russian crude oil, even as it continues its transactional relations with Tehran. There is no balancing act or strategic autonomy in play. New Delhi’s stance on the war and its policy seem to be shifting based on pressing domestic needs.

As Indians queued up with their empty LPG cylinders – and four Indian states are readying for April polls – India’s external affairs minister, S. Jaishankar, called his Iranian counterpart, Seyed Abbas Araghchi, four times in less than two weeks. Prime Minister Narendra Modi dialed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on March 2 to discuss “the current regional situation” and to convey “India’s concerns over recent developments,” especially the priority of safety for civilians. Between 9 and 10 million Indians are estimated to be working in the Middle Eastern region at the moment and approximately 220,000 have returned following the outbreak of the conflict. Modi then placed a call to Iranian Prime Minister Masoud Pezeshkian 10 days later, on March 12. Details of that call have not been revealed, yet it is most likely that India was asking for Iranian assistance to tide over the energy crisis and let India-bound ships pass without harm through the Strait of Hormuz. 

Results came quickly. Two of the total 22 ships waiting subsequently passed through the perilous s trait and reached Indian ports. Jaishankar showcased this as an example of a successful diplomatic negotiation, while denying that India had to promise anything in return. At least one media report, however, suggested otherwise. Iran has reportedly asked India to release three tankers seized in February. The ships had been detained due to alleged concealment or alteration of their identities and involvement in illegal ship-to-ship transfers at sea. Further, Tehran has allegedly sought supplies of certain medicines and medical equipment. 

Iran may also have requested that the BRICS group, of which both India and Iran are members, take a unified position on the war, one favorable to Iran, by condemning the U.S. and Israel. 

The alleged trade-off is unlikely to be confirmed by India. Jaishankar denied Iran had received anything in exchange for the safe passage of the two ships.

Contrast this spate of talks to developments three weeks earlier. Modi’s two-day official trip to Israel on February 25-26 upgraded the bilateral relationship to a special strategic partnership for technology, defense, and security. Modi was hailed as a brother by Netanyahu and delivered in return the statement that “India stands with Israel.” This led Indian analysts to wonder if Modi knew about the impending attack, which was launched on February 28. 

The question, however, is larger than whether Modi had been tipped off about the Israeli-U.S. move, as unlikely as that would seem. Rather, it is about India’s policies and posturing as the war erupted and then unfolded – and its inability or unwillingness to question the rationale behind the conflict, as well as to provide the Global South’s perspective on the violations of international law and the disruption it has caused. 

In recent years, India, with its rising power aspirations, has repeatedly positioned itself as a rightful candidate for a permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), making the case that the realities of power have expanded and so, too, should the council. Indeed, economic sources place India on the path to shortly become the fourth leading economy in the world. Beyond its individual merits, India has argued that acknowledging its new position and global role would also mean giving voice to representation of the Global South and the developing world, currently absent in the UNSC. The latest developments, though, bring this stance into question. 

New Delhi appears to be positioning itself more through rhetoric than action, as demonstrated by its self-relegation to the background in the key debates of the ongoing Iranian war. Following the outbreak of the war, Modi spoke to eight Gulf leaders in 48 hours in early March, voicing Indian concerns about Iran’s drone and missile attacks on the Gulf countries and the safety of Indian workers in the region who send back nearly $120 billion in remittances every year. At the same time, India chose to ignore the killing of 168 schoolgirls in Minab in a U.S. missile strike on February 28, a surprising move considering Modi’s prolific use of social media and India’s close links with Tehran. 

This odd sequence of events invariably sends a mixed signal that India is no longer a neutral player in the conflict but has tilted toward Tel Aviv and Washington without expressly saying so. As such, it has broken ranks with its fellow members of BRICS, this too in a year when it is the chair of the group. Iran is a fellow member of BRICS and enjoys the support of China, Russia, and South Africa. South Africa, in fact, which had such a formative role in the development of Gandhi and ultimately Indian political thought, has increasingly found itself in direct confrontation with the policies emanating from the U.S. administration. At home, Indian opposition leaders have castigated the government for sacrificing the historical relationship with Iran and compromising its strategic autonomy for the sake of building special relationship with the U.S. and Israel, the purpose of which remains largely unstated. 

New Delhi probably hoped that the conflict would end quickly and hence it could pursue a hands-off policy, but the American submarine torpedo attack on March 4 against the IRIS Dena, an Iranian naval vessel invited by New Delhi to attend a multination exercise (MILAN) in Visakhapatnam and on its way back to Iran, added to the government’s woes. As the conflict suddenly loomed closer – coinciding with rapid deterioration of the oil supply situation – the government’s effort to lurk in the shadows was thrust into the light.

Jaishankar labored hard to explain to the media that the Indian Ocean is not India’s ocean, justifying the U.S. action and India’s lack of responsibility. This was clearly batting on a sticky wicket, since Indian leaders have previously been at pains to advance a position claiming the country’s ability to provide “net security” in the Indian Ocean region. Not a word of protest was directed to Washington for torpedoing the Dena, which would not have been in such a vulnerable position had it not been India’s guest. 

Such a coincidence places the Indian government between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, geoeconomic and strategic considerations have primacy – not only the country’s energy imports transiting the Strait of Hormuz but its use of Iran to bypass Pakistani control of land access to Central Asia. On the other hand, the scope of India’s relations with Tehran, which remain necessarily important, have nonetheless shrunk over the years, especially since its decision, under American pressure, to stop buying Iranian crude. The last possible link – the Chabahar port, India’s would-be gateway project to Central Asia through Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, and where India has invested at least $120 million – too has been in the doldrums following American sanctions impinging on its greater regional connectivity ambition through the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). This has worked to the advantage of the Chinese. Still, there is no getting around the central position of the Strait of Hormuz. Assessments have indicated that its complete closure could potentially reduce India’s GDP growth by up to 0.5 percentage points.

At another level, this pragmatism carries a huge reputational cost. Modi was quoted by Bloomberg as observing that “military conflict alone cannot yield a solution to any issue, be it Ukraine or West Asia.” Indeed, India’s self-proclaimed identity as a leader of the Global South would seem shaky. In recent years, the Indian political elite has been vocal about the country’s need to maintain its strategic autonomy.; that now seems to be put under severe test. 

As the energy security, and economic costs mount, Iran has re-emerged as a friend of India. Jaishankar referred to the history of relations between the two countries, a bond which extends to the cultural (Persian, for instance, remained central to Indian court life even as the British moved to conquer the subcontinent). In the initial days of the war, when India remained aloof, an opposition leader had identified what he termed a “paradoxical statecraft” characterized by a “sharp tongue but weak knees.” Within a fortnight, New Delhi seems to have moved on to a more engaged stance, one that acknowledges the deleterious impact upon India’s rising power aspirations if it discards a long-term vision and commiserate actions on the ground as the conflict escalates and destabilizes the region.

Get to the bottom of the story

Subscribe today and join thousands of diplomats, analysts, policy professionals and business readers who rely on The Diplomat for expert Asia-Pacific coverage.

Get unlimited access to in-depth analysis you won't find anywhere else, from South China Sea tensions to ASEAN diplomacy to India-Pakistan relations. More than 5,000 articles a year.

Unlimited articles and expert analysis

Weekly newsletter with exclusive insights

16-year archive of diplomatic coverage

Ad-free reading on all devices

Support independent journalism

Already have an account? Log in.

As the conflict between Iran, Israel, and the United States escalates and enters its third week, it has become apparent that decision-makers in the White House and Tel Aviv miscalculated Iran’s resilience and determination. Having apparently given strategy a miss, they also underestimated Iran’s ability to impose a near-total blockade on traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, which has severely impacted energy security for several countries in Asia. For India, Hormuz is an energy lifeline with about 90 percent of its LPG imports and around 46-50 percent of India’s crude oil imports normally passing through the strait. The closure of Hormuz is thus impacting millions of households in India.

Meanwhile, it appears that New Delhi is quietly benefiting from U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to lift sanctions on Russian crude oil, even as it continues its transactional relations with Tehran. There is no balancing act or strategic autonomy in play. New Delhi’s stance on the war and its policy seem to be shifting based on pressing domestic needs.

As Indians queued up with their empty LPG cylinders – and four Indian states are readying for April polls – India’s external affairs minister, S. Jaishankar, called his Iranian counterpart, Seyed Abbas Araghchi, four times in less than two weeks. Prime Minister Narendra Modi dialed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on March 2 to discuss “the current regional situation” and to convey “India’s concerns over recent developments,” especially the priority of safety for civilians. Between 9 and 10 million Indians are estimated to be working in the Middle Eastern region at the moment and approximately 220,000 have returned following the outbreak of the conflict. Modi then placed a call to Iranian Prime Minister Masoud Pezeshkian 10 days later, on March 12. Details of that call have not been revealed, yet it is most likely that India was asking for Iranian assistance to tide over the energy crisis and let India-bound ships pass without harm through the Strait of Hormuz. 

Results came quickly. Two of the total 22 ships waiting subsequently passed through the perilous s trait and reached Indian ports. Jaishankar showcased this as an example of a successful diplomatic negotiation, while denying that India had to promise anything in return. At least one media report, however, suggested otherwise. Iran has reportedly asked India to release three tankers seized in February. The ships had been detained due to alleged concealment or alteration of their identities and involvement in illegal ship-to-ship transfers at sea. Further, Tehran has allegedly sought supplies of certain medicines and medical equipment. 

Iran may also have requested that the BRICS group, of which both India and Iran are members, take a unified position on the war, one favorable to Iran, by condemning the U.S. and Israel. 

The alleged trade-off is unlikely to be confirmed by India. Jaishankar denied Iran had received anything in exchange for the safe passage of the two ships.

Contrast this spate of talks to developments three weeks earlier. Modi’s two-day official trip to Israel on February 25-26 upgraded the bilateral relationship to a special strategic partnership for technology, defense, and security. Modi was hailed as a brother by Netanyahu and delivered in return the statement that “India stands with Israel.” This led Indian analysts to wonder if Modi knew about the impending attack, which was launched on February 28. 

The question, however, is larger than whether Modi had been tipped off about the Israeli-U.S. move, as unlikely as that would seem. Rather, it is about India’s policies and posturing as the war erupted and then unfolded – and its inability or unwillingness to question the rationale behind the conflict, as well as to provide the Global South’s perspective on the violations of international law and the disruption it has caused. 

In recent years, India, with its rising power aspirations, has repeatedly positioned itself as a rightful candidate for a permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), making the case that the realities of power have expanded and so, too, should the council. Indeed, economic sources place India on the path to shortly become the fourth leading economy in the world. Beyond its individual merits, India has argued that acknowledging its new position and global role would also mean giving voice to representation of the Global South and the developing world, currently absent in the UNSC. The latest developments, though, bring this stance into question. 

New Delhi appears to be positioning itself more through rhetoric than action, as demonstrated by its self-relegation to the background in the key debates of the ongoing Iranian war. Following the outbreak of the war, Modi spoke to eight Gulf leaders in 48 hours in early March, voicing Indian concerns about Iran’s drone and missile attacks on the Gulf countries and the safety of Indian workers in the region who send back nearly $120 billion in remittances every year. At the same time, India chose to ignore the killing of 168 schoolgirls in Minab in a U.S. missile strike on February 28, a surprising move considering Modi’s prolific use of social media and India’s close links with Tehran. 

This odd sequence of events invariably sends a mixed signal that India is no longer a neutral player in the conflict but has tilted toward Tel Aviv and Washington without expressly saying so. As such, it has broken ranks with its fellow members of BRICS, this too in a year when it is the chair of the group. Iran is a fellow member of BRICS and enjoys the support of China, Russia, and South Africa. South Africa, in fact, which had such a formative role in the development of Gandhi and ultimately Indian political thought, has increasingly found itself in direct confrontation with the policies emanating from the U.S. administration. At home, Indian opposition leaders have castigated the government for sacrificing the historical relationship with Iran and compromising its strategic autonomy for the sake of building special relationship with the U.S. and Israel, the purpose of which remains largely unstated. 

New Delhi probably hoped that the conflict would end quickly and hence it could pursue a hands-off policy, but the American submarine torpedo attack on March 4 against the IRIS Dena, an Iranian naval vessel invited by New Delhi to attend a multination exercise (MILAN) in Visakhapatnam and on its way back to Iran, added to the government’s woes. As the conflict suddenly loomed closer – coinciding with rapid deterioration of the oil supply situation – the government’s effort to lurk in the shadows was thrust into the light.

Jaishankar labored hard to explain to the media that the Indian Ocean is not India’s ocean, justifying the U.S. action and India’s lack of responsibility. This was clearly batting on a sticky wicket, since Indian leaders have previously been at pains to advance a position claiming the country’s ability to provide “net security” in the Indian Ocean region. Not a word of protest was directed to Washington for torpedoing the Dena, which would not have been in such a vulnerable position had it not been India’s guest. 

Such a coincidence places the Indian government between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, geoeconomic and strategic considerations have primacy – not only the country’s energy imports transiting the Strait of Hormuz but its use of Iran to bypass Pakistani control of land access to Central Asia. On the other hand, the scope of India’s relations with Tehran, which remain necessarily important, have nonetheless shrunk over the years, especially since its decision, under American pressure, to stop buying Iranian crude. The last possible link – the Chabahar port, India’s would-be gateway project to Central Asia through Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, and where India has invested at least $120 million – too has been in the doldrums following American sanctions impinging on its greater regional connectivity ambition through the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). This has worked to the advantage of the Chinese. Still, there is no getting around the central position of the Strait of Hormuz. Assessments have indicated that its complete closure could potentially reduce India’s GDP growth by up to 0.5 percentage points.

At another level, this pragmatism carries a huge reputational cost. Modi was quoted by Bloomberg as observing that “military conflict alone cannot yield a solution to any issue, be it Ukraine or West Asia.” Indeed, India’s self-proclaimed identity as a leader of the Global South would seem shaky. In recent years, the Indian political elite has been vocal about the country’s need to maintain its strategic autonomy.; that now seems to be put under severe test. 

As the energy security, and economic costs mount, Iran has re-emerged as a friend of India. Jaishankar referred to the history of relations between the two countries, a bond which extends to the cultural (Persian, for instance, remained central to Indian court life even as the British moved to conquer the subcontinent). In the initial days of the war, when India remained aloof, an opposition leader had identified what he termed a “paradoxical statecraft” characterized by a “sharp tongue but weak knees.” Within a fortnight, New Delhi seems to have moved on to a more engaged stance, one that acknowledges the deleterious impact upon India’s rising power aspirations if it discards a long-term vision and commiserate actions on the ground as the conflict escalates and destabilizes the region.

Shanthie Mariet D’Souza

Dr. Shanthie Mariet D’Souza is the founder & president, Mantraya Institute for Strategic Studies (MISS), a senior research fellow, University of Massachusetts Amherst and visiting faculty at the Naval War College, Goa, India.

India-Israel relations

© The Diplomat