The Pulse | Security | South Asia

India’s Iran Blind Spot and the Gulf War: A Litmus Test of Strategic Autonomy 

New Delhi probably hoped that the conflict would end quickly and hence it could pursue a hands-off policy. That hasn’t worked out.

As the conflict between Iran, Israel, and the United States escalates and enters its third week, it has become apparent that decision-makers in the White House and Tel Aviv miscalculated Iran’s resilience and determination. Having apparently given strategy a miss, they also underestimated Iran’s ability to impose a near-total blockade on traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, which has severely impacted energy security for several countries in Asia. For India, Hormuz is an energy lifeline with about 90 percent of its LPG imports and around 46-50 percent of India’s crude oil imports normally passing through the strait. The closure of Hormuz is thus impacting millions of households in India.

Meanwhile, it appears that New Delhi is quietly benefiting from U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to lift sanctions on Russian crude oil, even as it continues its transactional relations with Tehran. There is no balancing act or strategic autonomy in play. New Delhi’s stance on the war and its policy seem to be shifting based on pressing domestic needs.

As Indians queued up with their empty LPG cylinders – and four Indian states are readying for April polls – India’s external affairs minister, S. Jaishankar, called his Iranian counterpart, Seyed Abbas Araghchi, four times in less than two weeks. Prime Minister Narendra Modi dialed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on March 2 to discuss “the current regional situation” and to convey “India’s concerns over recent developments,” especially the priority of safety for civilians. Between 9 and 10 million Indians are estimated to be working in the Middle Eastern region at the moment and approximately 220,000 have returned following the outbreak of the conflict. Modi then placed a call to Iranian Prime Minister Masoud Pezeshkian 10 days later, on March 12. Details of that call have not been revealed, yet it is most likely that India was asking for Iranian assistance to tide over the energy crisis and let India-bound ships pass without harm through the Strait of Hormuz. 

Results came quickly. Two of the total 22 ships waiting subsequently passed through the perilous s trait and reached Indian ports. Jaishankar showcased this as an example of a successful diplomatic negotiation, while denying that India had to promise anything in return. At least one media report, however, suggested otherwise. Iran has reportedly asked India to release three tankers seized in February. The ships had been detained due to alleged concealment or alteration of their identities and involvement in illegal ship-to-ship transfers at sea. Further, Tehran has allegedly sought supplies of certain medicines and medical equipment. 

Iran may also have requested that the BRICS group, of which both India and Iran are members, take a unified position on the war, one favorable to Iran, by condemning the U.S. and Israel. 

The alleged trade-off is unlikely to be confirmed by India. Jaishankar denied Iran had received anything in exchange for the safe passage of the two ships.

Contrast this spate of talks to developments three weeks earlier. Modi’s two-day official trip to Israel on February 25-26 upgraded the bilateral relationship to a special strategic partnership for technology, defense, and security. Modi was hailed as a brother by Netanyahu and delivered in return the statement that “India stands with Israel.” This led Indian analysts to wonder if Modi knew about the impending attack, which was launched on February 28. 

The question, however, is larger than whether Modi had been tipped off about the Israeli-U.S. move, as unlikely as that would seem. Rather, it is about India’s policies and posturing as the war erupted and then unfolded – and its inability or unwillingness to question the rationale behind the conflict, as well as to provide the Global South’s perspective on the violations of international law and the disruption it has caused. 

In recent years, India, with its rising power aspirations, has repeatedly positioned itself as a rightful candidate for a permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), making the case that the realities of power have expanded and so, too, should the council. Indeed, economic sources place India on the path to shortly become the fourth leading economy in the world. Beyond its individual merits, India has argued that acknowledging its new position and global role would also mean giving voice to representation of the Global South and the developing world, currently absent in the UNSC. The latest developments, though, bring this stance into question. 

New Delhi appears to be positioning itself more through rhetoric than action, as demonstrated by its self-relegation to the background in the key debates of the ongoing Iranian war. Following the outbreak of the war, Modi spoke to eight Gulf leaders in 48 hours in early........

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