ASEAN Beat | Security | Southeast Asia

Why China’s Training Center in Laos Will Not Change Vietnam’s Non-Aligned Foreign Policy

Hanoi’s best option to keep its western neighbors neutral is to resist further Chinese encroachment by political means.

A satellite image shows the construction of the China-backed air strip in Ban Keun, Vientiane province, Laos, Jan. 3, 2026.

China’s recent announcement of the opening of a new Joint Logistics and Training Center to train air force pilots in Ban Keun, Laos, has caused much concern about China’s intentions and capabilities. The new center, together with the China-Cambodia Joint Support and Training Center at Ream Naval Base in Cambodia, gives China’s military the ability to cover inland airspace over Indochina and out toward the Gulf of Thailand.

Vietnam has not commented on the new base at Ban Keun, but Prime Minister Le Minh Hung just concluded a visit to Laos and Cambodia. Laos was Hung’s first official visit since assuming the prime ministerial post in April. Hung and Thongloun Sisoulith, the president of Laos and general secretary of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party, affirmed the “great friendship, special solidarity, comprehensive cooperation, and strategic cohesion” between the two nations. Both countries will celebrate the 50th anniversary of the signing of the 1977 Vietnam-Laos Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation next year.

China’s new base in Laos signals one of the major developments in Indochinese affairs since 1991. The 1991 Paris Peace Agreements ended the Third Indochina War and laid the basis for how China and Vietnam would handle Indochinese affairs to avoid a repetition of the polarization and arms race that contributed to Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 and China’s retaliatory invasion of Vietnam in February 1979.

The Agreements demanded the withdrawal of foreign forces and their equipment from Cambodia, thereby ending the direct Vietnamese and Chinese interference in Cambodian affairs. This agreement came two years after China and Laos had normalized ties and three years after Vietnam began to withdraw its troops from Laos. China and Vietnam normalized ties in November 1991, the month after the Paris Peace Agreements. One of the key conditions of normalization is that neither country would seek hegemony in Indochina, which was the main reason China and Vietnam fought in 1979. After 1991, neither Vietnam nor China has had a permanent military base in Laos or Cambodia.

The post-1991 status quo is now enduring a stress test with the opening of China’s joint training centers in Ream and Ban Keun. From Vietnam’s perspective, what matters is not just the current capability but China’s future intentions. Although these centers are of limited military utility, China’s military presence could polarize Indochina if Laos and Cambodia come under pressure to host more Chinese military personnel or equipment, grant China exclusive access to these centers, or give China the right to use them during wartime. If Laos and Cambodia sided with China, it would completely expose Vietnam’s western flank to a hostile foreign power.

However, Vietnam will stick to its non-aligned foreign policy (no military alliances, no siding with one country against another, no foreign military bases, and no use of force or threats to use force in international relations) to maintain its goal of keeping Laos and Cambodia neutral.

If the Third Indochina War taught Vietnam any lessons, it is that allying with a great power to keep Laos and Cambodia in its orbit is not a viable policy option. In 1977, after the Khmer Rouge attacked Vietnam with tacit Chinese support, Vietnam began to side with the Soviet Union to counter Chinese influence in Cambodia.

However, Hanoi’s decision elevated what was a local issue between China and Vietnam into a great-power rivalry between China and the Soviet Union. China could not accommodate Vietnam’s interest in Cambodia and Laos and mediate the Khmer Rouge’s conflict with Vietnam when it perceived that Vietnam was ushering a great power into China’s backyard. Such an involvement made China determined to rid Indochina of any interference by linking Vietnam’s Indochinese ambitions with Soviet “socialist imperialism.”

Beijing accused Hanoi of colonizing its western neighbors and rallied world opinion against Vietnam. Vietnam’s alliance with the Soviet Union could not help it maintain its grip on Laos and Cambodia despite Moscow bankrolling the endeavor because Chinese military and economic punishments were too severe. After the Soviet retrenchment from Indochina in 1991, the neutralization of Laos and Cambodia was inevitable.

If Vietnam hosted a foreign military base on its soil to counter China’s bases in Laos and Cambodia, this would only make China double down on its presence. The Soviet presence at Cam Ranh Bay did not end China’s support for anti-Vietnam insurgents in Laos and Cambodia. There are simply no countries that can help Vietnam compete with China over Laos and Cambodia to the degree the Soviet Union could. The United States is not a continental power in mainland Asia. As such, Hanoi cannot abandon its stance of non-alignment.

It would also not be viable for Vietnam to threaten to attack China’s bases in Laos and........

© The Diplomat