Could sharing publicly available footage of a military incident land you in prison in Kuwait? Journalist Ahmed Shihab-Eldin’s early March 2026 arrest for resharing already-circulated videos of alleged Kuwaiti friendly fire amid Iran tension brings this question into sharp focus. Understood to be facing charges of spreading false information and endangering national security, he exemplifies a pattern of broad security laws targeting journalism. Groups, including the Committee to Protect Journalists and CNN, as well as international media, note that the footage was in the public domain, warning that authorities may risk conflating reporting with crime when it’s most crucial.

Shihab-Eldin is certainly not just a bystander. An American-born Kuwaiti journalist of Palestinian descent, he has worked for several prominent media organisations, including the New York Times, HuffPost, Al Jazeera, and the BBC, having cultivated a substantial digital following. Before his detention, Shihab-Eldin consistently used his platform to document the genocide in Gaza, including civilian casualties, starvation, and infrastructure destruction, as well as the raids on Al-Shifa Hospital, the strikes on Rafah and the asymmetric conflict.

Before his detention, Shihab-Eldin consistently used his platform to document the genocide in Gaza, including civilian casualties, starvation, and infrastructure destruction, as well as the raids on Al-Shifa Hospital, the strikes on Rafah and the asymmetric conflict.

Before his detention, Shihab-Eldin consistently used his platform to document the genocide in Gaza, including civilian casualties, starvation, and infrastructure destruction, as well as the raids on Al-Shifa Hospital, the strikes on Rafah and the asymmetric conflict.

With that in mind, the legal framework invoked in Kuwait becomes central to understanding the case. The decree that came into effect in March (2026) introduced penalties of up to ten years’ imprisonment for anyone who “disseminates news or spreads false rumours relating to military entities” with the deliberate intention of undermining those institutions. Shihab-Eldin’s reporting is thought to be assessed through this provision, but the law’s wording seems to be legally ambiguous, as it does not clearly define what constitutes the distortion required for prosecution. Kuwait is also relying on decades-old state security statutes, which have been in force since 1970. Under these standards, any limitation on expression must satisfy three cumulative requirements, which include a clear legal basis, a legitimate aim such as national security, and proof that the restriction is necessary and proportionate. Where a law leaves room for unpredictable interpretation, then it risks failing the “foreseeability” requirement, since individuals cannot reasonably anticipate what expression may lead to criminal liability. This has a powerful consequence, as many will practice self-censorship to avoid crossing an invisible line.

More than 80 Mideast energy facilities damaged in war, over one-third severely hit: IEA chief

This dynamic is not unique to Kuwait, reflecting a broader regional pattern in which wartime communication and documentation of military incidents are increasingly subject to security framing. According to Reuters, Qatar’s Ministry of Interior announced in March 2026 that authorities had detained 313 individuals from various countries for filming and distributing video clips, disseminating misleading information and rumours, and publishing content to provoke public anxiety. Moreover, in the United Arab Emirates, Abu Dhabi police reported arresting 109 people of multiple nationalities for recording sites and events tied to Iranian strikes on the UAE and sharing false information online. Similarly, in Bahrain, four individuals were taken into custody for “filming and broadcasting clips about the effects of Iranian attacks and spreading false news”. Reporters Without Borders notes that since US-Israeli hostilities against Iran began in March 2026, followed by Iranian strikes on Gulf states, the group has warned of an intensifying regional crackdown on journalists. Still, Kuwait’s position appears more puzzling. It has historically been considered comparatively less restrictive than its Gulf neighbours, reflected in Article 36 of the Kuwaiti Constitution, which guarantees “freedom of opinion”. Everyone has the right to express their opinion, whether orally, in writing or otherwise, and to publish it. However, despite this relative openness, it still ranks 128th out of 180 countries in the 2025 Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index, placing it in the “difficult situation” category. The fact that it is at once less restrictive than other regions but still structurally constrained helps to explain why vague security laws are consequential, as they challenge the assumption that relative openness guarantees effective Press protection.

While the international and civil society response to Shihab-Eldin’s detention has been notable, official government action has been limited. Reporters Without Borders and the Committee to Protect Journalists have expressed deep concern over his detention and called on the Kuwaiti authorities to free him immediately and cease their campaign of harassment against members of the press.

Despite the close security partnership between Washington and Kuwait City, no official statement from the US government regarding the detention of its dual citizen journalist has been made.

Despite the close security partnership between Washington and Kuwait City, no official statement from the US government regarding the detention of its dual citizen journalist has been made.

As a result, this gap between advocacy and enforcement reflects the broader geopolitical reality in which press freedom concerns are often subordinated to security partnerships and regional stability considerations.

After US-Israeli war on Iran: What is left of the Gulf countries’ trust in America?

At the heart of the matter, then, is not Shihab-Eldin’s intent, as he has been described as an ethically conscious reporter, “one of the most gentle souls”, as Francesca Albanese mentions, but the structure of the law he is reportedly accused of violating. The friendly fire incident in Kuwait is, in many ways, a microcosm of a much larger question. When a correspondent shines a light on a military mishap, he is making apparent the costs and contradictions of warfare. That exposure can be uncomfortable, as it can complicate diplomatic narratives or question the perceived “precision” of operations.  International law has long grappled with this tension by leaning on clear, narrowly tailored rules, not on catch-all provisions that treat the scale of visibility as a proxy for guilt.

Any law that imprisons a journalist for resharing public footage crosses from a security measure to a logical contradiction. If the footage is real, it cannot be “false information”. If it is already circulating, sharing it adds no new harm.

Any law that imprisons a journalist for resharing public footage crosses from a security measure to a logical contradiction. If the footage is real, it cannot be “false information”. If it is already circulating, sharing it adds no new harm.

And if the state’s concern is genuine, there are far less restrictive remedies than a prison cell. If such elastic security adjacent laws are allowed to stand as they are presently being applied, then this case will mark another step in the criminalisation of the press where the simple act of contextualising and drawing attention to becomes, in effect, a legally punishable “offence”.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

© Middle East Monitor