A few days after Donald Trump expressed his satisfaction with the recent agreement on Gaza, Israel made it clear that the deal fell short of its ambitions. The agreement had become possible after Hamas announced, for the first time, its willingness to hand over its weapons to the Palestinian committee established under the Board of Peace created by Trump. Rather than responding to the optimism expressed by all parties, Israel reacted with further military escalation, destruction, and the killing of civilians. This is not the first time Israel has placed Washington in an awkward position. This article raises a central question: can Washington compel Israel to implement the current agreement on Gaza? The agreement is significant because it moves the implementation of Trump’s twenty-point peace plan into its second phase. By analysing the conditions that Israel considers insufficient to meet its objectives, the article examines both the extent to which Israel may be able to obstruct the implementation of the agreement and the limits of its ability to do so. It also compares Trump’s ability to secure Israel’s compliance with the terms of the agreements concerning Lebanon and Iran in order to assess whether he can likewise ensure Israel’s implementation of the current agreement on Gaza.

The lack of consensus between the United States and Israel over the details and arrangements of the Gaza agreement has made its implementation fragile. The divergence is evident in the details of these arrangements: Washington’s initial statements were consistent with what Hamas had announced, but were at odds with Israel’s position. This may explain why both Washington and the Board of Peace later retreated on certain aspects of those arrangements in order to bring them more closely into line with the Israeli position. In the aftermath of the announcement of the latest agreement, US statements emphasised that Hamas and the other Palestinian factions would hand over their heavy and medium weapons to the Palestinian committee, while tunnels and military infrastructure would be destroyed simultaneously with the beginning of Israel’s withdrawal towards the Yellow Line. Israel had advanced well beyond that line after the ceasefire entered into force, even though it was intended to mark the point at which the war had ended and the limit beyond which Israeli forces were not expected to proceed during the implementation of the first phase of the agreement. By contrast, official Israeli statements indicated that Israel had no intention of withdrawing until the Gaza Strip had been completely disarmed, including of light weapons, with all weapons either destroyed or removed from the Strip.

Israel has also objected to the participation of Qatar and Turkey in the independent committee established by Trump to verify the parties’ implementation of the agreement. These differences appear to be fundamental and go to the heart of the agreement’s implementation. Statements by the Board of Peace and the US administration have since begun to move towards satisfying Israel, an approach rejected by the independent verification committee, of which Egypt is also a member.

Israel has also objected to the participation of Qatar and Turkey in the independent committee established by Trump to verify the parties’ implementation of the agreement. These differences appear to be fundamental and go to the heart of the agreement’s implementation. Statements by the Board of Peace and the US administration have since begun to move towards satisfying Israel, an approach rejected by the independent verification committee, of which Egypt is also a........

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