It’s been an unusual year for middle powers. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s powerful Davos speech, in which he called on middle powers to band together, brought them to the forefront of the global policy debate. Now, the Iran war has served as a reality check. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby’s recent social media posts dismissed the very idea of a “‘middle powers’ strategy” as a costly distraction. Yet beyond binary, simplistic success-or-failure narratives, the war has shed light on both the limitations of middle powers and the crucial roles they play in the global order.

Middle powers may have learned they can’t reshuffle the overarching edifice of the global order, but they can do more than Colby suggests. They can change its security-centric agenda, priorities, and language—a precious and vital contribution—but to do so, they must all work together.

It’s been an unusual year for middle powers. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s powerful Davos speech, in which he called on middle powers to band together, brought them to the forefront of the global policy debate. Now, the Iran war has served as a reality check. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby’s recent social media posts dismissed the very idea of a “‘middle powers’ strategy” as a costly distraction. Yet beyond binary, simplistic success-or-failure narratives, the war has shed light on both the limitations of middle powers and the crucial roles they play in the global order.

Middle powers may have learned they can’t reshuffle the overarching edifice of the global order, but they can do more than Colby suggests. They can change its security-centric agenda, priorities, and language—a precious and vital contribution—but to do so, they must all work together.

Boats anchor off Oman’s northern Musandam Peninsula near the Strait of Hormuz on June 27.AFP via Getty Images

The Iran war—and, for that matter, the Ukraine and Gaza wars—have illustrated that middle powers have limited, if any, means to prevent the unilateralism and militarism of the great powers.

The United States’ war against Iran has also laid bare the inherent tension between middle powers’ much-coveted quest for autonomy and the need for and cost of alliances. Their alliance with the United States made Gulf middle powers such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates targets of Iranian attacks. This alliance cost them breaches of their security and sovereignty. On the other hand, the war itself made these states more dependent on the United States, at least in the short term, as their need for stronger security guarantees and partnerships has grown, and insecurity regarding Iran has deepened.

Consequently, middle powers have learned that they need to strengthen and diversify their own defense industries and security partnerships. Though still indispensable, the United States is too unreliable and unpredictable to be fully dependent on for security partnerships and defense industry cooperation. The Gulf states will probably seek deeper security ties and........

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