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Worse Than an Axis

49 0
30.06.2026

If actions speak louder than words, the four major adversaries of the United States have sent a very clear message over the past few months. In June, Chinese leader Xi Jinping took his first international trip of 2026 to North Korea, where he and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un agreed to expand their cooperation with no mention of denuclearization. Xi’s trip took place just weeks after Russian President Vladimir Putin made his 25th official visit to China, where he and Xi signed 20 different agreements spanning trade, technology, and economic cooperation. Meanwhile, news reports emerged detailing how Beijing and Moscow have provided indirect support to Iran in its war with Israel and the United States, including satellite imagery of U.S. forces in the region, missile propellant, and advanced drones. These four countries—China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia—don’t have a formal alliance but are increasingly aligning and supporting one another in ways that are materially changing the balance of power and challenging the United States and its allies.

Skeptics argue that this alignment remains shallow, divided by competing interests and mutual suspicion. In this perspective, it is nothing like the feared Axis powers during World War II because it lacks any formal commitments or aggressive public rhetoric. The U.S. intelligence community even makes a version of this argument in its 2026 Annual Threat Assessment, concluding that these relationships are “limited and primarily bilateral” and that the concept of “adversary alignment” risks overstating the depth of current cooperation.

But the absence of a formal bloc does not mean the cooperation is weak. In fact, bilateralism may be precisely what makes it effective. These four states have cooperated on military integration, technological transfers, and mutual learning in a way that exceeds that of most previous authoritarian partnerships. The bilateral arrangements among Washington’s adversaries today can be negotiated faster, are easier to conceal or deny, and are more readily tailored to each pair’s immediate strategic needs than traditional, formal authoritarian alliances. Indeed, history suggests that authoritarian alliances have often proved brittle and unreliable when formalized, particularly when they involve more than two countries. What is emerging among these four powers may be more flexible, and in some respects more dangerous.

Washington’s challenge, then, is not to determine whether a new authoritarian axis has emerged. It has not. The more important question is whether a looser but ever more capable network of military, technological, and political cooperation can generate strategic effects comparable to or even exceeding that of a formal alliance. Increasingly, the answer appears to be yes. The United States will not be able to break apart this alignment. But by understanding its structure and taking it seriously, Washington may still be able to limit its effectiveness.

TRANSACTIONAL TODAY, STRATEGIC TOMORROW

China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia have long shared an adversarial relationship with the United States, but only since 2022 have they developed something approaching meaningful cooperation. The principal catalyst was Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine that year, after which Moscow faced severe sanctions and the rapid depletion of key weapons stocks. As Russia needed more external military support, it became far more willing to exchange its advanced military technology and operational expertise in........

© Foreign Affairs