The Luxury of Children
The world’s fertility crisis is more severe than is commonly understood. Last year, humanity’s total fertility level dropped below what demographers call the replacement rate—that is, the average number of children that a woman must have to keep a population constant over the long run. This has never happened before. There have been periods when the human population declined because of wars or epidemics, such as the Black Death, in the fourteenth century, or the diseases brought by Europeans to the Americas in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. But now, simply as a function of their choices, humans will see the world population peak around 2055 and then begin to fall.
The story of the coming decades is not simply one of dwindling and aging. There is a great deal of variation in the baby bust. The most surprising trend may be one that has overturned basic assumptions about fertility rates. Where once it was thought that people—and, by extension, countries—with higher levels of income and education would have lower fertility rates than those who were poorer and less educated, the inverse is increasingly true. Many wealthier people and countries boast higher fertility rates than many poor people and countries.
The inversion is revealing of why governments have had a hard time coming to grips with the fertility crash. The best explanation for why people are no longer having babies is that child-rearing at the scale necessary to maintain populations is fundamentally at odds with the structures of modern life and modern societies. Once an economic necessity, children are now an economic luxury. That portends a world in which economic inequality is accentuated by demographic inequality, with widening fissures within countries and among them. The whole world is grappling with a decline in fertility, but in many different ways. And those differences will stoke further divisions, tensions, and even conflict.
Humanity falling below replacement has passed largely unnoticed. The central projections in the latest release of the United Nations World Population Prospects (in 2024), known as the report’s “medium variant,” still places the world’s total fertility rate slightly above replacement in 2026 and expects the global population to peak as late as 2084. But this medium variant does not fully incorporate the recent drops in births recorded by national statistical agencies, and its projections for future fertility rest on questionable assumptions, including forecasting a strong recovery of fertility rates in countries such as China. By comparison, the report’s “low variant” (the forecast that takes a more pessimistic view of future fertility) accords nearly exactly with my own assessment, which reflects more recent national statistics and takes a less optimistic view on the possible recovery of fertility. In that reading, the world has dropped below replacement fertility levels (approximately 2.2 children per woman) and will only keep dropping.
Fertility rates are plunging so fast that they are overturning many assumptions about demography. The steepest fertility declines have occurred in unexpected countries. Consider this test. Pick the state with the highest fertility rate among the following: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Jamaica, Iran, Malaysia, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Sri Lanka, and the United States.
The United States, the wealthiest of the 12, has the highest fertility rate. This holds true even when just assessing the fertility rate of mothers born in the United States (immigrant mothers have a slightly higher fertility rate than native mothers). Dozens of other middle-income countries now have fertility levels below that of the United States.
That trend runs against the old explanation for demographic change, which held that fertility invariably falls as a community or society gets richer. That is demonstrably no longer the case. Among the countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), richer members tend to have higher fertility rates than do poorer ones, even after controlling for migration flows. Take Mexico. According to the most recent survey, in 2024, a Mexican woman could expect to have 1.2 children over her lifetime, well below the 1.57 average of non-Hispanic white women in the United States. Mexico’s income per capita is only about 28 percent of the U.S. level. And just two decades ago, fertility rates in Mexico were much higher than those in the United States.
This dynamic obtains not just among countries but also within them. Richer and more educated households in the United States and other advanced economies now tend to have more children than........
