Last May, U.S. President Donald Trump paid a triumphant visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Over the course of a four-day tour, he admired the Gulf capitals’ “gleaming marvels,” cheered on their ambitious modernization plans, and showcased over $3 trillion in pledged Gulf investment and “mega-deals” between U.S. and Gulf businesses.

What a difference a year makes. For weeks after the United States and Israel began their attack on Iran, on February 28, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates all faced barrages of Iranian missiles and drones aimed at military bases, airports, oil refineries, and data centers. On April 8, a cease-fire stopped most of the fighting, but Iran has effectively blocked the Strait of Hormuz, halting shipping of Gulf oil, gas, and other commodities. The problem Gulf leaders now face is broader than the status of the Strait of Hormuz. They do not want a regional order in which a hostile neighbor can dictate how their economies connect to the world, and many are unsettled by how Washington has handled the war and is handling negotiations of a possible peace. There are strategists in every Gulf state arguing to downgrade or cut ties with the United States, pointing out that American security commitments failed to deter Iranian attacks and entangled the region in a months-long war.

The Gulf countries never required perfect peace in their dangerous neighborhood. Yet their efforts over the past decade to diversify their economies away from fossil fuels and to loosen political and social constraints do depend on keeping regional disorder in check. For the foreseeable future, that means continuing to look to the United States as their primary strategic and security partner, because ties run deep and the Gulf has no good alternatives. Various Gulf countries might, in theory, try to make a separate peace with Iran, punish Iran, band together and turn inward, or find other external partners to replace some of what the United States offers. But none of these options will deliver them the stability they need to pursue their domestic goals.

For all Washington’s culpability in the current war, the capriciousness of its policies, and the damage its actions have done to the regional and global economies, in the wake of the conflict there will be an opportunity to deepen the U.S.-Gulf partnership. The United States may lose this opportunity if it effectively cedes the Strait of Hormuz to Iranian control. But if Washington can end the war and secure freedom of navigation in this crucial waterway, it will have a chance to shore up its strategic relationships with the region and reap the economic benefits of participating in its postwar recovery. The global economic disruption of this war has proven the hollowness of the claim that the Gulf needs Washington, but Washington no longer needs the Gulf. In fact, both sides need the economic and strategic partnership the other offers to help them navigate a competitive, unpredictable​​​​​​ world.

WHERE IS THE LEVERAGE?

This war has prompted some soul-searching in the Gulf. The U.S. security guarantee and military presence was supposed to backstop the Gulf states’ development strategies, keeping a lid on regional disorder so that they could pursue domestic transformation. Instead, it attracted Iranian retaliation on Gulf soil. Gulf states’ attempts over the past several years to seek détente with Iran failed to prevent Tehran from striking them. Multinational firms have not fled, but commercial facilities have been damaged, revenues lost, and business halted, all of which has raised questions about the Gulf’s future as a competitive destination for international talent and investment. Factories can be rebuilt and revenues can recover, but confidence is harder to restore.

Gulf countries’ nightmare scenario is for the war to end with Iran weakened but not defeated, the Strait of Hormuz effectively blocked, and the Gulf squarely in a vengeful regime’s crosshairs. Some Gulf........

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