Iran and the Limits of American Power
Over two weeks into wide-scale protests against the Islamic Republic regime in Iran, the death toll and number of arrests are rapidly mounting. Iranian human rights organizations place the number of dead at 2,500, while other sources suggest it may exceed 10,000. Needless to say, the Iranian people have displayed remarkable bravery in challenging an authoritarian government that still retains immense repressive power. And by emboldening Iranians to turn out by repeatedly raising the prospect of U.S. military intervention to defend Iranian demonstrators, U.S. President Donald Trump is implicated as well in the outcome of the protests.
There are, however, major question marks regarding the potential efficacy of U.S. military action in protecting demonstrators. Unfortunately, one of the few judgments that can be made with some confidence is that foreign military intervention is unlikely to produce a consolidated democracy of any kind, let alone one favorable to the interests of the intervening power. If, as should be the case, the U.S. objective is to support the Iranian people in transitioning to democratic governance, success may hinge on what Trump chooses not to do. Although the United States can and should help, how it does so will determine whether its influence proves beneficial or detrimental to the Iranian people—in whose hands Iran’s fate ultimately must lie.
As the regime’s violence against Iranian demonstrators has increased, Iranians and international observers have turned their eyes to the White House for any sign that Trump will follow through on threats to intervene. Trump sharply criticized the regime the day after protests began in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar on December 28 over primarily economic issues. The demonstrations quickly expanded and turned political, leading Trump to declare on January 2 that the United States was “locked and loaded.” He later dismissed the deaths of Iranians on January 8 as the result of “three stampedes,” suggesting he would not “hold anyone responsible for that.” But since then, he has largely stuck to a more hawkish tone, confirming that his administration was examining military options, pronouncing on January 9 that the Iranian regime had crossed a redline and on January 13 that “help is on its way.”
It is conceivable that Trump is telegraphing a U.S. attack, that he has yet to make a decision, or that he is deliberately trying to sow confusion. Even if his thinking falls into one of these categories, the president could always change his mind. That said, it seems clear that Trump has recently become more comfortable taking military risks, which increases the likelihood of U.S. military involvement. Never a true isolationist, he views his second term military actions as successful, culminating in the tactically impressive though strategically puzzling capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. Evocative news stories, the use of raw power, and minimal casualties all appeal to Trump—and a strike on Iran could supply all three. Since the target of these operations would not necessarily be the nuclear facilities he claims to have “obliterated” last June, Trump could direct a resumption of U.S. military activity in Iran without taking on undue risk or undermining his narrative of success.
Another factor in Trump’s decision will be his perception of whether the government or the protesters are likely to triumph in the end. The president is loath to associate himself with a losing cause (he once defamed fallen American soldiers as “suckers”). If it appears that the regime is on the verge of quelling the protests, he is more likely to distance himself from the Iranian people’s cause than to intervene to preempt a massacre. Alternatively, Trump may be eager to deliver the coup de grâce against a regime that is already coming apart at the seams. The president’s refusal to meet with the former crown prince of Iran, Reza Pahlavi, in Mar-a-Lago, has been attributed to a perception in the White House that he does not have the mettle to lead Iran even if the regime is toppled.
The United States cannot, unfortunately, directly protect Iranian protesters from the air. U.S. planes cannot lower a protective shield over........
