Over the last few weeks, the Iranian regime has faced remarkable challenges—and displayed remarkable unity. Hundreds of thousands of Iranians have taken to the streets to protest the Islamic Republic in what has become the most significant internal challenge the state has faced in its 47-year history. But the elite has not yet fractured. Instead of squabbling over how to handle the demonstrations, Iran’s reformist and hardline leaders have worked together to suppress them. To date, none of the regime’s elites objected to the killings of thousands of innocent civilians by security forces. In fact, figures from across the political spectrum have all outwardly (and falsely) blamed the violence on foreign infiltrators.

But behind the scenes, the picture is undoubtedly more tense. Unless they exclusively watch state television and believe their own false narratives, Iranian officials understand that the domestic system is under existential stress. They are aware that U.S. President Donald Trump has threatened to attack Tehran and topple the government. And most of them probably know that the forces driving the protests—including an economic crisis and decades of corruption—cannot be fixed by the country’s obstinate, reactionary leadership. As a result, Iranian officials who want to save themselves have an incentive to remove Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei from power.

If Iran’s elites do move on Khamenei, they will likely act quickly. There will be no sign to outsiders that a coup is coming. And if they succeed, a range of outcomes are possible. The Iranian apparatus has a stark divide between its older and younger generation, and so the character of the next government would depend on which cohort ends up leading it. If the old guard is behind a successful coup, Iran’s next regime will probably remain theocratic at home but become less ambitious abroad. If younger officials take over, Iran will likely grow less religious at home but remain assertive internationally.

Neither camp is likely to bring about democracy. The reason that either group would depose Khamenei, after all, is to preserve its influence. An internal move against the supreme leader would still evince the further erosion of the Islamic Republic. But the uncomfortable truth is that democracy and freedom in Iran will require either external support or that factions inside the ruling system, backed by a segment of the armed forces, join with the Iranian people. Short of that, any political change in Tehran is more likely to be about preserving aspects of the status quo.

For decades, predicting the end of the Islamic Republic has been a fool’s errand. The regime has faced all kinds of crises—wars, mass protests, high inflation—without cracking. Its theocratic system steadily isolated the country, destroyed its economy, and subjected its people to stifling social restrictions. But it retained a powerful security apparatus, and thus proved capable of repeatedly quelling even widespread dissent.

So far, Iran has been able to use its military and police to tamp down on the most recent round of demonstrations. But these protests have, nonetheless, weakened the ruling system. The sheer size, energy, and diversity of this popular uprising—combined with the immense toll of the crackdown—has further rubbished any claim to legitimacy that the Islamic Republic might have hoped to retain among Iran’s people. The regime has now lost the support not only of the country’s........

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