Imagine a military satellite reconnecting after hours without a ground link. An update arrives bearing a valid digital signature. During the blackout, however, the credential behind that signature was revoked on Earth. The signature still checks out. Should the satellite install the update?

That is the overlooked test for the Pentagon’s postquantum transition. Stronger cryptography can establish the origin and integrity of a message. It cannot, on its own, tell a disconnected receiver whether the sender’s permission to issue that command has since been withdrawn.

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The policy window is open. On Oct. 1, the National Security Agency reaffirmed its national security migration timetable, with quantum-resistant support expected in new commercial National Security Systems from 2027. On Tuesday, a newly announced SpaceWERX industry research agreement included the evaluation of postquantum risks in Space Force software. That agreement is a research effort, not a fielded fix. It shows why operational testing belongs alongside cryptographic modernization.

The Pentagon’s postquantum strategy explicitly covers space systems, tactical radios, data........

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