Building Without Owning: India's Defence Intellectual Property Rights Dilemma
Listen to this article:
India’s long-pending quest for self-reliance in the military sector remains trapped in a stubborn intellectual property rights (IPR) dilemma.
For while the country aspires to technological sovereignty under the banner of Atmanirbharta or indigenisation, its defence industrial base (DIB) continues to depend on foreign designs, licensed-production arrangements and externally controlled technologies. As a consequence, even when India designs and locally manufactures advanced military platforms and systems, it often does not own the underlying IPR.
At its most basic, IPR determines who owns the technology embedded within a military platform, weapon system or related piece of equipment. This extends far beyond patents and trademarks, to encompass design data, source codes, engineering drawings, manufacturing processes and materials technology, as well as control over how that technology can be used, modified, shared and ultimately, exported.
Ownership of a platform and ownership of the technology embedded within it are often separate matters. A country may purchase, operate and even manufacture a military system under licence, yet the intellectual property governing key technologies within that platform remains firmly in foreign hands, restricting the ability to modify or commercially exploit them without the original owner’s approval.
Yet, this distinction has long been blurred in official narratives in the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the armed forces and defence industry and India’s military modernisation journey over the past six decades offers repeated examples of this disconnect between manufacturing capability and technological ownership.
Limited control over the underlying design architecture
The MiG-21, MiG-27, Jaguar and later the Su-30MKI fighter programmes, along with the Hawk 132 Advanced Jet Trainer (AJT), all followed variations of the same template: progressively higher levels of domestic manufacture, but limited control over the underlying design architecture.
Even when India negotiated more favourable terms – as with the Su-30MKI – the outcome remained broadly similar. In this instance, the fighter combined a Russian airframe and propulsion system with Indian mission computers and communications equipment, French navigation systems and Israeli targeting and electronic-warfare force multipliers. Yet integrating these technologies did not confer ownership of the underlying intellectual property.
As a result, India became highly proficient at system integration and adaptation – executing its trademark jugaad or improvised innovation across imported platforms – but far less successful at originating the underlying technologies itself.
India’s now-defunct Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) project with Russia further illustrated the complexity of the IPR dilemma. Conceived in 2007 and pursued for more than a decade, the programme was intended to jointly develop a variant of what eventually emerged as Russia’s Sukhoi Su-57 fifth-generation stealth fighter for the Indian Air Force (IAF).
Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), the lead Indian agency for........
