The Strait of Hormuz has always been more than a narrow maritime passage. It is the point where multiple strategic ecosystems converge: NATO’s energy security, the political dynamics of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Iran’s asymmetric doctrine, the Israeli–Iranian shadow conflict, and the broader turbulence radiating from Gaza, Syria, and the Levant. For decades, analysts warned that a crisis in Hormuz would not remain a regional disturbance. It would ripple instantly through the global system, with NATO territory absorbing the economic and political shock. Yet when the crisis finally arrived, the alliance found itself unprepared—not because the threat was unforeseeable, but because the architecture that should have anticipated it was never aligned with the reality of the region.

For generations, the United States approached Hormuz with a single, rigid assumption: if Iran ever closed or mined the Strait, American firepower could break it open and the rest could be sorted out later. This mindset was not tied to any particular administration or ideology. It was a structural habit, reinforced by decades of tactical dominance and the belief that no regional actor could meaningfully challenge U.S. naval superiority. The United States built extensive tactical options—strike packages, mine countermeasure contingencies, carrier-based responses—but never developed a true strategic framework for deterrence, alliance messaging, global energy shock management, Iranian asymmetric escalation, or NATO–GCC coordination. The result was a gap between tactical confidence and strategic fragility.

Inside NATO, the logic of Hormuz was understood in principle. The alliance recognized that a crisis in Hormuz would have immediate consequences for European economies and global markets. There were exploratory steps toward cooperation: maritime domain awareness initiatives,........

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