Rabbi Shimon’s Logic and the Sanhedrin That Might Be And More Chulin 81-82
Chulin 80 — “Rabbi Shimon’s Logic and the Sanhedrin That Might Be”
Our Gemara on this daf discussed the concept that a ritual slaughter which is unable to accomplish its purpose is considered a null act and has no implications. For example, if one slaughters a tereifa or an animal that is forbidden to benefit from (such as one convicted of killing a human), since the slaughtering did not accomplish its ultimate purpose of rendering the meat permitted to eat, this slaughtering has no ritual effect whatsoever. The difference being, there would be no requirement to cover its blood, if it were the kind of animal that normally would require it, and also the mother or child could be slaughtered on the same day and eaten because the first slaughter was not really valid. This is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.
Rabbi Shimon is known throughout Shas for a number of trademark opinions. This is one of them. Another famous opinion of his is regarding an unintentional act, which under many circumstances is permitted, such as dragging a chair on the ground, even though it could make a furrow (Beitzah 23a).
And the most famous of Rabbi Shimon’s opinions is that he will infer the implied logical reason for a commandment, and therefore use that reason to allow for exceptions when it runs against the apparent logic.
For example, the Gemara (Bava Metzia 115a) discusses the prohibition (Devarim 24:17) “Do not take the cloak of a widow as collateral.”
Presumably, this commandment is to protect and have compassion over a widow who tends to be economically vulnerable and impoverished. (The Gemara actually develops this further. Since there is an additional command to return required collaterals when needed, he will end up frequenting her house, leading to rumors of impropriety.) What about a wealthy widow? Rabbi Yehuda holds there is no exception, as the law applies from generalities. Rabbi Shimon uses the apparent logic that this is a safety net for a poor widow, therefore it does not apply to a wealthy widow.
Rav Cohen (the “Nazir,” Kol Nevuah 147) notes that this is a key philosophical and psychological outlook of Rabbi Shimon. The mitzvos are evaluated in terms of their essence. Slaughtering is only meaningful if it accomplishes the purpose of enabling the food to be kosher to eat, an action is only sinful if intended, and globally, any commandment’s specific laws can be induced from its apparent meaning and function.
We do not rule in accordance with Rabbi Shimon. It is important to digest that Rabbi Shimon’s Torah would be a different universe. Effectively, according to him, the Sanhedrin would be empowered to deduce new laws from their implications in the same manner that they darshen verses. Just as an example, the Gemara Niddah (31b) states:
“Rabbi Meir would say: For what reason does the Torah say that a menstruating woman is prohibited from engaging in intercourse with her husband for seven days? It is because if a woman were permitted to engage in intercourse with her husband all the time, her husband would be too accustomed to her, and would eventually be repulsed by her. Therefore, the Torah says that a menstruating woman shall be ritually impure for seven days, during which she is prohibited........
