Influence, Diplomacy & the Campaign Against Israel
As first reported in the Wall Street Journal, Qatar was alleged to have offered to “take care of” Karim Khan, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), in connection with his pursuit of arrest warrants against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and then–Defence Minister Yoav Gallant in 2024.
According to a witness statement reportedly submitted to the FBI, there were claims of a Qatari-linked effort to discredit a woman who had accused Khan of sexual misconduct shortly before the warrants were issued. Recordings of meetings allegedly captured discussions about attempting to link the accuser to Israel to undermine her credibility. Reporting suggested Khan received firm assurances of protection from the Qatari state itself, rather than from an individual intermediary.
Benjamin Netanyahu sharply criticized the ICC, describing it as a “corrupt and morally bankrupt institution,” and arguing that the allegations against Israel lacked merit from the outset. These developments unfolded in the aftermath of the October 7, 2023 attacks, in which Hamas terrorists brutally slaughtered approximately 1,200 people and took around 250 hostages into Gaza, triggering Israel’s ongoing military response.
This is not an isolated episode involving Qatar, nor merely a reflection of tensions arising from the current war. To understand the broader context, one must look back to October 1993, shortly after the signing of the Oslo Accords. The so-called “Philadelphia meeting” brought together US-based activists aligned with Hamas in a covert gathering recorded by the FBI. Discussions focused on opposing the Oslo process while carefully operating within US legal constraints, including advancing Hamas’s agenda through charitable and community channels while maintaining plausible deniability. The meeting later surfaced in terrorism financing cases as evidence of a wider support network operating within the United States.
There is no evidence that Qatar was involved in that 1993 meeting. However, in the years that followed, it emerged as a significant external actor in Hamas’s circle, hosting senior leaders such as Khaled Meshaal and Ismail Haniyeh, providing substantial financial assistance to Gaza, and positioning itself as a key intermediary in negotiations. These leaders reportedly lived in luxurious five-star hotels and amassed billions in wealth while the people of Gaza were denied basis needs to drive a narrative of suffering and oppression by Israel. The relationship, therefore, is not direct but evolutionary, reflecting today a more formalized state-linked role.
Beyond this, Qatar expanded its global reach through sustained financial engagement with universities and cultural institutions across the West. This influence operates through funding arrangements, partnerships, and institutional relationships that shape research priorities and public discourse. Such engagement privileges particular narratives, including more critical framings of Israel. Similar debates have emerged in Australia, where scrutiny of foreign funding in higher education and institutions has intensified. In recent times, Qatar Airways has taken a significant stake in Virgin Australia to increase its local dominance.
It is also important to consider the broader legal and diplomatic framework. Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong and Prime Minister Anthony Albanese have both indicated that Australia would arrest Netanyahu or Gallant should they enter Australia. This fits well with Albanese’s early union days where he led anti-Israel protests, particularly during the second Intifada while Israelis were victims of suicide bombers on busses, shopping malls, night clubs and other public places.
Similar positions have been echoed by other Western leaders, including within the European Union and United Kingdom. The ICC itself remains contested – its jurisdiction, selectivity, and lack of independent enforcement power continuing to fuel debate among legal scholars and policymakers alike.
Against this backdrop, it is inherently contentious for a democratic leader to face international legal proceedings while responding to a mass-casualty terrorist attack on their own population. Would Winston Churchill have faced the ICC for his role in fighting the Nazis?
Then why don’t conflicts and atrocities against Christians in Nigeria, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan by Islamist groups ever command the same focus. Likewise, repression in Iran, including executions and the suppression of protest movements, hardly draw attention. The plight of Uyghurs held in concentration camps in China commands no attention. It seems that no Jews, no news prevails.
Statements from leaders, including Penny Wong, are often made rapidly in the immediate aftermath of fast-moving events, when facts remain incomplete and subject to revision. Incidents such as the explosion at Al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza illustrate how early narratives can crystallize long before full verification is possible. Later on, the facts no longer matter as the damage is already done. Perhaps, the likes of Wong are fully aware of that fact but use the opportunity for personal attacks to drive their agenda.
This raises a broader and increasingly uncomfortable question: the reliability and selection of sources in modern conflict reporting. Information emerging from areas governed by Hamas, including figures issued by the Gaza Health Ministry or Qatar’s Al Jazeera network, are widely circulated internationally, yet is also treated by many with caution given the absence of independent verification and the realities of operating under a designated terrorist authority.
It also speaks to a deeper issue of perspective. Governments, particularly foreign ministries must interpret events not only through legal frameworks, but through the geopolitical realities of the regions concerned. The Middle East remains one of the most complex and volatile theaters in international affairs, shaped by entrenched conflict, shifting alliances, and persistent security threats. Countries such as Australia operate in a markedly different strategic environment, far removed from the immediacy of regional warfare and border insecurity. Penny Wong thinks restraint and diplomacy work in the middle east, however that is seen as weakness by the likes of Iran and its terrorist proxies. Peace through strength is what will achieve peace. After all, that is what lead to the Abraham Accords between Israel and many of its moderate neighbors.
Within this context, defenders of Israel’s conduct argue that the laws of armed conflict already recognize the obligation to distinguish between civilians and combatants, and that militaries operating in dense urban environments face extraordinary challenges in doing so. They point to practices such as advance warnings to civilians ahead of operations as evidence of efforts to reduce harm, even in highly complex theaters of war. Military analysts, including John Spencer, an expert in this domain have argued that modern urban warfare presents conditions in which civilian harm is tragically difficult to avoid, while also noting that some militaries have adopted extensive warning and mitigation measures that are uncommon in comparable conflicts. These assessments remain debated among legal and military experts, but they form part of a broader argument about intent, proportionality, and compliance with the laws of war.
Israel’s adversaries have long recognized the limits of direct military confrontation and instead prioritized influence in the informational and diplomatic arenas. In this view, the conflict is not confined to the battlefield, but extends into media, institutions, and global discourse where narrative and legitimacy become strategic instruments. This is why we all watched footage of university encampments and harassment of Jewish students go unpunished. These are the fruits of the 1993 Philadelphia meeting!
Ultimately, the question is not whether international law applies, but how consistently and realistically it is interpreted and enforced. Where that balance appears uneven, it continues to fuel claims of double standards in the international response to conflict.
And for some critics, the broader concern extends beyond any single case or institution. It is the extent to which wealthy regional actors, particularly those with vast energy revenues and growing diplomatic reach, including Qatar can exert influence across international forums, mediation channels, and public discourse, while Western governments simultaneously seek their cooperation on energy, security, and regional stability. The result is a complex diplomatic environment in which principle and pragmatism are constantly in tension, and in which perceptions of inconsistency are almost inevitable.
