The October 7 attacks exposed more than an intelligence lapse; they challenged the assumptions underpinning Israel’s modern defense strategy. The country’s emphasis on border fortifications, missile defenses, and rapid mobilization has delivered formidable tactical capabilities but has also left Israel largely reactive to threats orchestrated by regional adversaries. Israel should complement territorial defense with a limited expeditionary capability capable of disrupting hostile networks beyond its borders. Yet such a transformation would require not only new military structures but also political restraint, stronger logistical capacity, and a clear understanding of the risks inherent in projecting power. The debate is therefore less about creating an offensive military than about redefining deterrence in a region where threats increasingly originate far from Israel’s frontiers.

Wars often expose not merely tactical shortcomings but conceptual ones. The October 7 attacks did both. Israel’s intelligence failures have been extensively scrutinized. Less attention has been paid to the strategic assumptions that allowed those failures to prove so consequential.

For decades, Israel’s defense posture has rested on an increasingly familiar formula: strengthen the border, improve surveillance, intercept incoming attacks, and mobilize overwhelming force once deterrence fails. The approach has produced remarkable technological sophistication. It has also left Israel responding to threats largely on terms chosen by its adversaries.

The result is a paradox. Israel possesses one of the world’s most capable militaries, yet it increasingly finds itself fighting defensively. Missile-defense systems blunt attacks but cannot prevent them. Border barriers complicate infiltration but cannot eliminate it. Air power inflicts heavy costs but rarely........

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)