The removal of Nicolás Maduro in early 2026 by the United States has prompted a wave of strategic comparisons, particularly among those seeking a decisive solution to the crisis involving Iran. The apparent success of a swift, targeted intervention in Venezuela has encouraged some policymakers to believe that a similar approach could yield comparable results in Tehran.

This assumption, however, is deeply flawed. It overlooks the fundamental structural and ideological differences between the two regimes—differences that are not merely academic but decisive in determining how each system responds to external pressure and internal disruption.

Venezuela: A System Driven by Survival and Patronage

The collapse of Maduro’s rule exposed the true nature of the Venezuelan Regime. Despite decades of revolutionary rhetoric tied to Hugo Chávez, the state had evolved into a fragmented patronage network. Power was distributed among military elites, political intermediaries, and economic actors whose primary objective was access to oil wealth and state resources.

Once Maduro was removed, these groups did not resist in the name of ideology. Instead, they adapted. Cooperation with Washington became a rational survival strategy. This rapid realignment enabled the United States to secure commitments on oil production, economic reforms, and political concessions. Venezuela’s oil sector—centered in the Orinoco Belt—began a gradual recovery as external actors re-entered the market.

This flexibility was not a sign of ideological transformation; it was evidence that ideology had never been the Regime’s core. Venezuela functioned as a kleptocratic petro-state where loyalty was transactional and could dissolve quickly when the balance of power shifted.

Iran: An Ideological State Engineered for Resilience

The Islamic Republic of Iran represents an entirely different model. Since the 1979 revolution that overthrew Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Iranian system has been deliberately structured as an ideological state. Under Ruhollah Khomeini, the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih established a political order in which religious authority is inseparable from governance.

Institutions such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Basij militia are not merely security tools—they are guardians of a revolutionary ideology. Their loyalty is not rooted in financial incentives but in a deeply embedded belief system that frames the regime as a sacred project.

This ideological foundation explains the regime’s durability. Even under severe economic pressure—such as the near collapse of its currency between 2018 and 2023—Iran continued to invest heavily in its regional network of allies, including Hezbollah and the Houthis. These groups are not simply influence tools; they are extensions of the regime’s ideological identity.

Resilience Beyond Leadership

Recent military pressure, including Israeli strikes on strategic facilities, may have degraded certain operational capabilities. Yet the Regime’s core remains intact. Reports of casualties among senior figures have not disrupted command continuity, as the system is designed to regenerate leadership rapidly.

This resilience is not accidental. It reflects an institutional architecture built to survive precisely the type of shocks that would destabilize a more fragile, interest-based regime. The transition after the death of Ruhollah Khomeini in 1989—when Ali Khamenei assumed power without altering the Regime’s essence—remains a clear example.

The Strategic Miscalculation

Applying the Venezuelan model to Iran would therefore be a strategic miscalculation. Removing individual leaders or applying limited military pressure may create the illusion of progress, but it would leave the Regime’s ideological infrastructure untouched.

Some analysts argue that weakening Tehran could open space for engagement with “pragmatic” factions within the regime. This view misunderstands how ideological systems operate. Compromise, in such contexts, is often tactical rather than transformative—a means of preserving the Regime until conditions shift.

The experience following the 2015 nuclear agreement illustrates this dynamic. While engaging diplomatically, Iran continued advancing key strategic programs and expanding its regional influence, demonstrating that negotiation did not equate to ideological moderation.

What Real Change Would Require

If stability in Iran is to be achieved, it cannot come from superficial changes at the leadership level. It would require a deeper transformation—one that addresses the institutional and ideological foundations of the Regime, including the role of the IRGC, the Basij, and the clerical monopoly on power.

Such change is unlikely to be imposed entirely from the outside. It would need to emerge, at least in part, from within Iranian society itself. Decades of protests—from the student movements of 1999 to the demonstrations following the death of Mahsa Amini in 2022—have shown a persistent demand for political change.

However, expecting unarmed civilians to confront a highly organized and ideologically committed security apparatus without external support is unrealistic. Any meaningful transition would require a combination of internal pressure and external alignment.

The lesson is clear: strategies that succeed against pragmatic, corruption-driven systems cannot simply be transplanted onto ideological states. Venezuela adapted because its Regime was flexible and self-interested. Iran endures because its System is doctrinal and structurally resilient.

Ignoring this distinction risks repeating a familiar mistake—mistaking surface-level change for systemic transformation. Without addressing the ideological core of the Islamic Republic, any apparent victory will be temporary, and the same crisis will inevitably return under a different leadership.

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)