In 2018, the United States walked away from the Iran nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The 2015 agreement that President Obama signed was rejected by the Trump administration, which argued the deal was flawed at its core. Trump insisted the deal delayed, rather than dismantled, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, ignored ballistic missiles, and turned a blind eye to Tehran’s regional aggression.

Eight years later, the uncomfortable question is not why the United States left the deal, but whether leaving it made war with Iran more likely.

The answer, Operation Epic Fury, is a resounding yes.

The Case for Leaving Was Not Irrational

Critics of the JCPOA were not wrong about its limitations. The agreement imposed real yet temporary constraints. Key provisions such as enrichment levels, centrifuge use, and stockpiles, were designed to expire. Iran’s nuclear infrastructure was reduced but not dismantled.

Even worse, the deal treated Iran’s nuclear program in isolation. It did nothing to address the Islamic Republic’s expanding ballistic missile arsenal or its growing network of proxies: Hezbollah in Lebanon, militias in Iraq and Yemen and its support of Hamas in Gaza. For many in Washington and Jerusalem, this was not a comprehensive solution.

From that perspective, withdrawal was framed as a strategic risk. The goal was to apply maximum economic pressure, force Iran back to the table and negotiate a broader, longer, and stronger agreement. It was a coherent theory. However, it didn’t work.

From Containment to Acceleration

What followed was not a better deal, but the gradual collapse of the constraints that had existed. Within a year, Iran began systematically breaching the agreement’s limits. Enrichment levels rose. Stockpiles expanded. Advanced centrifuges returned. Monitoring dissipated.

The result was not theoretical. Iran’s “breakout time” — the time needed to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon — shrank dramatically. What had been measured in roughly a year under the deal, became a matter of weeks.

This became the central paradox of the withdrawal.  A policy designed to stop Iran’s nuclear advancement ended up accelerating it.

The Escalation Spiral

At the same time, the broader U.S.-Iran relationship moved from tension to confrontation.

The “maximum pressure” campaign escalated. Tanker attacks in the Gulf. The downing of a U.S. drone. Strikes on Saudi oil facilities. The killing of Qassem Soleimani. Iranian missile attacks on U.S. bases.

Each of these steps did not inevitably lead to war, but each made war more conceivable. And in the background, something more dangerous was happening. Iran was moving closer to nuclear threshold capability.

Israel’s Dilemma: When Time Collapses

For Israel, the implications were even more acute. Israeli strategy has long rested on a simple principle: Iran must never reach nuclear weapons capability. Not declared weapons—capability. The threshold itself was a red flag.

But when breakout time shrank from year to weeks, strategy collapsed into urgency. Diplomacy became less credible. Deterrence became more fragile. Military options, once distant, became immediate.

Post-JCPOA reality became most dangerous, as the closer Iran appeared to the nuclear threshold, the more likely it was that Israel, the United States, or both would conclude that time had run out. When decisions are driven by the fear that “this is the last window of opportunity,” the margin of error vanished in both Washington and Jerusalem.

The Illusion of Control

The architects of the withdrawal believed they were regaining leverage. In reality, they traded a flawed but functioning constraint system, for a far more volatile environment, one in which Iran had both more capability and fewer restrictions.

To be clear: the JCPOA was not a perfect agreement. It postponed difficult questions rather than resolving them. But it did something else which was critical. It bought time.  And time, in nuclear strategy, is not a luxury. It is the difference between diplomacy and war.

Where Does This Leave Us

Today, the United States and Israel face a far narrower set of choices than they did in 2015. The space between diplomacy and military action has diminished rather than expanded. The lesson was not that the JCPOA should never have been challenged. The lesson was that abandoning an imperfect deal without a viable replacement would not reset the board. Rather, it destabilized it.

The uncomfortable truth is that the United States left the Iran deal to prevent a future nuclear crisis. Instead, it may have accelerated one, bringing the region closer to the very war it sought to avoid.

And now we are left with the following question: not if the deal was flawed, but whether there is still enough time left to avoid the consequences of its collapse.

Operation Epic Fury: When There Is No Longer a Choice

By the time Operation Epic Fury became a reality, the debate was no longer about strategy. It was about timing. The JCPOA gave policymakers the ability to speak in the language of options: diplomacy, deterrence, pressure, containment. The assumption was that time was still on their side and that Iran’s nuclear program could be slowed, negotiated, or managed.

However, that assumption quietly collapsed after 2018.

Once Iran’s breakout time shrank from a year to mere weeks, the entire strategic equation changed. A nuclear threshold state was not just a future risk to Israel; it became an immediate one. It created a reality in which a decision in Tehran could translate into a weapon before the world could react. For both the United States and Israel it appears as if those consequences became untenable.

This is what critics of Epic Fury miss. It has become impossible to frame the operation as a discretionary escalation, as if Washington or Jerusalem simply chose force over diplomacy. By the time Epic Fury was launched, diplomacy had already lost its credibility. Pressure, too, had failed to produce concessions. The timeline for preventing a nuclear threshold had nearly vanished. In that environment, restraint meant surrendering the initiative.

Could leaders have chosen not to act? Technically, yes. Strategically, no.

So what was the alternative to Operation Epic Fury? Acquiescence to a nuclear threshold Iran, and all the cascading risks that come with it?  Operation Epic Fury was launched because every other pathway to avoid it had closed. And that is the real legacy and tragedy of the JCPOA’s collapse.

It did not just bring the region closer to conflict, it created a situation in which, eventually, conflict became the only remaining tool.

And when war becomes the only tool left in the toolbelt, it is no longer a choice. It is the outcome.

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)