The current war with Iran was barely a few days old when pundits and scholars began compiling lists of its alleged failures. Many critics rushed to judgment without first defining their theory of victory or explaining what victory would actually mean in this conflict. In doing so, many self-described realists conveniently forgot one of the most important implications of an anarchic international system: the security dilemma first articulated by John H. Herz. In an anarchic world without a central authority, states must rely on self-help to guarantee their survival, yet actions taken to increase one state’s security often decrease the security of others, creating cycles of fear, arms competition, and escalation.

A realistic assessment of the conflict therefore requires recognizing that wars often unfold as part of this tragic dynamic. The use of force is not always aimed at immediate victory in the conventional sense but at restoring credibility, altering adversaries’ expectations, and reshaping the strategic environment. Judging the outcome of a war only days after it begins—without considering these longer-term deterrence dynamics—reflects analytical impatience rather than serious strategic evaluation.

Robert A. Pape argues that the emerging war with Iran is following a familiar pattern seen in many modern conflicts: early tactical success through air strikes followed by escalation that risks widening the war and undermining the original political goals. Drawing on his long-standing research on coercive air power—especially in his book Bombing to Win—Pape contends that precision bombing often produces an illusion of strategic progress. Destroying military targets can be militarily impressive, but it rarely forces governments to concede on core political interests or collapse internally.

According to Pape, bombing campaigns often generate nationalist backlash, strengthening rather than weakening the targeted regime. This makes expectations that air strikes alone could destabilize or overthrow the Iranian government unrealistic. Instead, weaker states typically respond with asymmetric or horizontal escalation—expanding the conflict into areas where they can impose costs on stronger powers.

In Iran’s case, Pape warns that escalation could focus on regional and global economic vulnerabilities, especially the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly a fifth of the world’s oil supply passes. Iran possesses capabilities such as naval mines, missiles, and drones that could threaten shipping and dramatically raise global energy prices. Even a single successful attack on a tanker or naval vessel could trigger broader military escalation and significant economic disruption.

Pape therefore argues that the United States risks falling into an “escalation trap”: initial bombing success encourages deeper military involvement, while Iran expands the conflict in ways that increase costs and instability without producing a decisive strategic outcome.

John J. Mearsheimer interprets the war with Iran through the lens of offensive realism, arguing that large bombing campaigns are unlikely to achieve decisive political objectives and may instead produce strategic failure. In several recent interviews he characterizes the campaign as a case of “bombing to fail,” meaning that air power is being used in ways that cannot plausibly deliver the political outcomes policymakers hope for.

Mearsheimer’s first claim is that air power alone rarely defeats determined states. Even extensive bombing may damage military infrastructure or nuclear facilities, but it cannot eliminate a regime or force a major strategic surrender without ground occupation. Because the United States and its allies have no intention of invading Iran—a country far larger and stronger than past targets like Iraq—he argues that the military campaign lacks a realistic path to victory.

Second, Mearsheimer believes bombing will likely produce the opposite political effect inside Iran from what advocates expect. External attack tends to strengthen nationalist solidarity and consolidate support around the regime rather than trigger internal collapse. Instead of weakening the government, the strikes could increase domestic legitimacy for resistance.

Third, he warns that escalation could lead Iran to retaliate asymmetrically across the region. Possible responses include attacks on U.S. forces, strikes on allies, and threats to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, which could dramatically raise global energy prices and widen the conflict.

From a realist perspective, Mearsheimer concludes that the campaign risks expanding the war without solving the underlying strategic problem: Iran’s determination to maintain security and regional influence in a hostile environment.

Neither author addresses the problem from the perspective of deterrence or considers what victory in war would actually mean.

The prewar strategic environment between Israel, the United States, and Iran was characterized by a significant credibility deficit in deterrence. Classical deterrence theory emphasizes that threats must be both clear and believable to influence an adversary’s behavior. As Thomas Schelling argued, deterrence depends on the ability to communicate a credible commitment to impose costs if certain actions are taken. For many years, Israel and the United States issued repeated warnings regarding Iran’s nuclear program and regional activities, yet these threats were rarely followed by sustained direct military action against Iranian assets. Over time, Iranian decision makers could reasonably conclude that escalation—through proxies, missile development, or nuclear progress—would not trigger decisive retaliation.

From a strategic perspective, this situation reflected the kind of credibility gap that undermines deterrence. In the language of John J. Mearsheimer, states operate in an anarchic international system where power and resolve must be demonstrated, not merely declared. When threats are not enforced, adversaries learn to discount them. The absence of visible enforcement therefore weakened the deterrent posture of both Israel and the United States.

The current war alters this dynamic by restoring credibility through action. By demonstrating a willingness to employ force directly against Iranian capabilities, Israel and the United States have begun to reestablish the link between threat and punishment that is central to deterrence. Even if the conflict does not produce a decisive victory, the demonstration of resolve forces Tehran to reassess the risks of continued escalation.

At a minimum, this shift can generate a period of tactical deterrence stability, serving as a time-buying mechanism during which Iran recalculates its strategic options. In addition, the conflict can function as what Elli Lieberman describes as a teaching moment in deterrence. The logic resonates with the arguments of Robert A. Pape, who emphasizes that coercion works when the adversary becomes convinced that continued resistance will impose unacceptable costs. War-fighting deterrence, rather than passive containment, can therefore teach an adversary the consequences of escalation.

If this lesson is internalized, tactical deterrence may gradually evolve into strategic deterrence, producing longer-term stability. Should the weakening of the Iranian regime also contribute to internal political change, the consequences would extend beyond deterrence itself. While regime change cannot be assumed as a primary objective, such an outcome would represent a strategic bonus, potentially reshaping the political landscape of the Middle East for years to come.

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)