‘Bombing to Lose’? Victory and Deterrence
The current war with Iran was barely a few days old when pundits and scholars began compiling lists of its alleged failures. Many critics rushed to judgment without first defining their theory of victory or explaining what victory would actually mean in this conflict. In doing so, many self-described realists conveniently forgot one of the most important implications of an anarchic international system: the security dilemma first articulated by John H. Herz. In an anarchic world without a central authority, states must rely on self-help to guarantee their survival, yet actions taken to increase one state’s security often decrease the security of others, creating cycles of fear, arms competition, and escalation.
A realistic assessment of the conflict therefore requires recognizing that wars often unfold as part of this tragic dynamic. The use of force is not always aimed at immediate victory in the conventional sense but at restoring credibility, altering adversaries’ expectations, and reshaping the strategic environment. Judging the outcome of a war only days after it begins—without considering these longer-term deterrence dynamics—reflects analytical impatience rather than serious strategic evaluation.
Robert A. Pape argues that the emerging war with Iran is following a familiar pattern seen in many modern conflicts: early tactical success through air strikes followed by escalation that risks widening the war and undermining the original political goals. Drawing on his long-standing research on coercive air power—especially in his book Bombing to Win—Pape contends that precision bombing often produces an illusion of strategic progress. Destroying military targets can be militarily impressive, but it rarely forces governments to concede on core political interests or collapse internally.
According to Pape, bombing campaigns often generate nationalist backlash, strengthening rather than........
