Today, Narendra Modi will become the first Indian prime minister to address the Knesset. The coverage will likely focus on high-level symbolism: two democracies, a warm personal rapport between leaders, a shared suspicion of political Islam. All of that is real and important. But as someone who has spent the past four years studying this region, I want to focus on something that the American strategic conversation is largely ignoring as a potential Iranian escalation looms: the trade infrastructure that is being rapidly built between Israel and India. 

For three decades, Israel’s technology sector has been economically fused with the United States. Its most promising startups often exit to American acquirers, list on Nasdaq, or raise growth capital from US private equity. According to PwC Israel’s annual exits report, American buyers accounted for 58% of Israeli tech exits in 2024 and 51% in 2025 — the latter a year that produced the largest tech exit in Israeli history, Google’s $32 billion acquisition of Wiz. The roster of American firms embedded in Israel’s innovation economy, including Intel, Nvidia, Salesforce, Palo Alto Networks, reads like a who’s who of global technology. 

That architecture of the US-Israel economic relationship is certainly not under immediate threat. But it is no longer the only architecture being built.

In September 2025, India and Israel signed a Bilateral Investment Agreement, a foundational agreement that reduces risk premiums for Indian investors and gives Israeli companies greater legal certainty in the Indian market. In November, both governments signed the terms of reference to formally launch Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations. The first round of those FTA negotiations opened in New Delhi on February 24, immediately preceding Modi’s historic visit. The talks will run through the February 26. 

What makes this more than a routine diplomatic upgrade is the specific infrastructure being constructed. The bilateral investment is the kind of foundational legal architecture that allows for the flow of capital between the countries. Today, Indian acquisitions of Israeli technology companies appear to be essentially nonexistent. A search of the entire deal database on Capital IQ returns just two transactions, and only a handful of outright acquisitions by Indian buyers can be found on public record at all.

The gap between that baseline and the architecture now being assembled is the story that needs to be monitored.

India is not a random emerging partner. It is the world’s most populous country and the fifth-largest economy on earth. It is also, importantly, the kind of partner Washington does not worry about. Unlike Chinese investment in sensitive Israeli sectors, which US pressure has significantly curtailed over the past few years, Indian capital does not carry the same US national security baggage. If Israeli companies want access to Asian capital and Asian markets without navigating American red lines, India is the geopolitically safe option.

Israel understands this. Netanyahu has been explicitly cultivating a relationship with India as part of what he calls a Hexagon of Alliances, a regional architecture linking Israel with India, Greece, Cyprus, and select Arab and Mediterranean states. So while Israel does rely on US investment and partnership across sectors, it is also an autonomous political actor building an alternative architecture. Modi’s visit is a cornerstone of that effort. For Jerusalem, diversifying its relationships is not a threat to its American alliance; it is insurance.

None of this means the US-Israel pipeline is in danger of breaking. The depth of American capital markets, the scale of American acquirers, and the defense and intelligence integration between the two countries create a structural advantage that India simply cannot replicate. The Wiz and CyberArk deals, in which Google and Palo Alto Networks spent a combined $57 billion on Israeli cybersecurity, signal that the US is doubling down on Israeli innovation.

Strategic alignments are ultimately sustained by this kind of investment and by the reality of two economies tying their futures together. The US-Israel tech corridor became what it is because American firms kept showing up: writing checks, acquiring companies, hiring engineers, and building R&D centers. It is the result of choices that Americans made and continue to make. 

With Modi’s visit, India appears to be leaning towards those same choices. The Bilateral Investment Agreement, the FTA negotiations, and the explicit agenda around AI, cybersecurity, and cross-border payments are not the talking points of a country conducting a courtesy call. They are the moves of a country that has looked at Israel’s innovation economy and decided it wants access.

Washington should be paying attention. Today, American commentary on Modi’s visit is consumed almost entirely by the Iran angle and the anticipation of potential military escalation. Those concerns are rightfully top of mind. But while Washington watches the military chessboard, a separate game is being played on the economic one, and no one in the American strategic conversation appears to be watching it. 

As Modi prepares to speak in the Knesset, the question is not what he says about Gaza or regional stability or the bilateral friendship. Those words will matter for one news cycle. The question is what gets signed and what frameworks get formalized.

The answer could signal that Israel’s cross-border capital relationships are shifting, no longer facing exclusively toward Washington. That is not a crisis. It is a competition. And the United States, which has built the most important strategic alliance with Israel for decades, is more than capable of meeting the moment. But it must begin by recognizing what is being built. 

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)