Protecting civilians requires more than protecting individual objects. International law must also account for the systems that make civilian life possible.

By Farzaneh Bani Asad Azad

Farzaneh Bani Asad Azad is a PhD candidate in Political Studies and an Iranian diplomat serving at the Permanent Mission of Iran to the United Nations in Geneva.The Act of Aggression by the United States and Israel against the Islamic Republic of Iran, which began on 28 February 2026, has exposed a structural weakness in the way international law often describes civilian harm. The law contains extensive protections for civilians and civilian objects, yet the legal analysis of an attack can become artificially fragmented when each school, hospital, power plant, bridge, railway, airport, pharmaceutical facility or fishing vessel is examined as though it existed in isolation. Modern civilian life does not function that way. It depends on interconnected systems.Official Iranian documentation compiled by 8 April recorded 125,630 civilian units as severely damaged or destroyed, including 100,000 residential and 23,500 commercial units; 857 schools, 339 health-care centres and 32 universities were reported damaged, alongside Red Crescent facilities, airports, civilian aircraft and other critical infrastructure. A joint communication by United Nations special-procedure mandate holders later assembled reports concerning the broader pattern, including extensive harm to education, health, scientific research, cultural and religious sites, residential areas, transport, water and electricity infrastructure, and civilian livelihoods.The figures differ across sources and dates, but the underlying picture is consistent: the damage was not confined to one sector of civilian life. A joint communication of seven United Nations special-procedure mandates, dated 4 August 2026 (AL IRN 13/2026), separately collates information received about civilian casualties, attacks affecting education and health services, and large-scale displacement. Its allegations and figures should be read with the qualifications and source attributions stated by the mandate holders.This article advances two related legal arguments. First, the legality and civilian consequences of attacks on the infrastructure of a modern society cannot always be adequately assessed by looking only at the physical object struck.Where an attack disables interconnected systems indispensable to civilian life, reasonably foreseeable direct and reverberating effects must be taken seriously within the applicable rules of international humanitarian law. I therefore propose a “Right to Civilian Continuity” not as a new autonomous right already crystallised in lex lata, but as an interpretative framework that brings together existing protections under international humanitarian law, international human rights law and the right to development around a common protected interest: preserving the minimum material, human, institutional and social conditions necessary for civilian society to continue functioning during and after armed conflict.Second, the same framework has implications for accountability. If the consequences of an attack must be traced outward—from the object struck to the civilian systems and human lives that depended upon it—responsibility must also be capable of being traced upward: from the strike to the operational unit, from execution to approval and order, and from the order to the decision-maker. In the Iranian case, this inquiry is sharpened by repeated public statements by President Donald Trump threatening power plants, bridges, desalination facilities and other infrastructure; his description of returning Iran to the “Stone Age”; his later acknowledgement of the societal consequences of destroying Iran’s bridges and power plants; and, in relation to at least one bridge strike, his statement: “I gave the order.” None of this substitutes for proof of the elements of an international crime. It does, however, create a serious basis for investigating policy, knowledge, foreseeability, decision-making and individual criminal responsibility in relation to specific attacks.A further distinction is essential. The characterization of the resort to force as an Act of Aggression is a jus ad bellum question. The legality of each individual strike is a separate jus in bello question. Even where the resort to force is unlawful, an individual attack constitutes a war crime only if the relevant elements of the specific offence are established. The analysis below therefore does not infer the criminality of particular strikes from the characterization of the wider use of force.

An Assault on a Society, Not Merely on a Collection of TargetsA defining feature of the Act of Aggression against Iran cannot be understood solely through the number of strikes carried out. Equally significant is the range of civilian functions affected from the outset of the attacks.The residential record also shows that civilian harm unfolded over time rather than in a single episode. Official Iranian documentation records strikes on residential areas on 13 March in Karaj; 14 March in Eyvan, where six members of one family, including a six-month-old infant, were killed; 15 March in Shiraz; 16 March in Narenjestan and Amirabad in Arak, where a four-day-old infant was among those killed, and in Mahallat and Tehran; 17 March on Malek-ol-Shoara Bahar Street in Tehran; 19 March in Majidieh; 20 March in Mehrvila, Karaj; 21 March in Dizaj Amir-Madar, Ramsar and Dastak; 23 March in Tehran, Tabriz, Qeytariyeh, Velanjak, Khorramabad and Urmia; 24 March in Tabriz; 26 March in Zibashahr, Shiraz; 28 March in Saboonchi; 30 March in Bandar Abbas and Zanjan; 6 April in Qom; and 7 April in Shahriar and Pardis.These incidents are not invoked here to presume the unlawfulness of every individual strike. Their relevance is to the factual scale of disruption and to the need for attack-specific legal assessment rather than aggregate assertion.One of the earliest and gravest incidents was the attack of 28 February on Shajareh Tayebeh Primary School in Minab. Official Iranian figures record the deaths of 168 children between the ages of seven and twelve, both girls and boys. A subsequent communication by United Nations special-procedure mandate holders cited reports of at least 156 civilians killed, including 120 children, while noting that casualty figures remained contested. The mandate holders reported that children were attending the school at the time of the attack, that they were aware of no information indicating military use of the school, and that independent investigations suggested the school was separated from the neighbouring compound by a wall and had its own street entrance. The incident was identified by UN mandate holders as warranting an independent investigation into possible serious violations of international humanitarian law. [UN Special Procedures, AL IRN 13/2026, 4 August 2026, pp. 4–5.]The impact on education was not confined to Minab. Official Iranian records document extensive damage to hundreds of schools and educational facilities across the country.Higher education was also affected. Several universities sustained damage, including Shahid Beheshti University, parts of which, together with its research facilities, were struck on 3 April, and Sharif University of Technology, whose faculties, research institutes and scientific infrastructure were damaged in the following days. The impact on universities was not merely structural. At Sharif University, information-technology infrastructure providing computational and digital services to thousands of academic and institutional users, as well as knowledge-based enterprises, ceased functioning.The health system likewise came under sustained pressure. Hospitals, emergency centres, Red Crescent facilities, ambulances, pharmaceutical facilities and laboratories sustained damage. On 31 March, facilities belonging to Toufigh Darou Research and Engineering Company, which produced active pharmaceutical ingredients used in treatments for cancer, cardiovascular diseases and certain specialised conditions, were attacked.Facilities of Soha Pharmaceutical Company were also damaged on 1 and 2 April, disrupting parts of its production and packaging lines.On 2 April, the Pasteur Institute of Iran was also attacked. The Institute, with more than a century of activity in vaccine production, infectious-disease diagnosis, medical research and public health, hosted thirteen national reference laboratories, research centres, biobanks and World Health Organization collaborating centres. The consequences therefore extended beyond physical damage to buildings and affected part of the country’s diagnostic, research and disease-surveillance capacity.At the same time, water and energy networks sustained damage. By late March, hundreds of incidents affecting electricity transmission and distribution equipment had been recorded in different parts of Iran, while electricity-sector personnel were killed or injured. Two power plants with generating capacities of 914 MW and 250 MW were destroyed in Mobarakeh County. In the water sector, damage to infrastructure in Jask disrupted drinking-water supplies to 20 villages and more than 10,000 people in one documented case.Food production and livelihoods were also affected. Grain-storage facilities, food cold-storage facilities, agricultural infrastructure, livestock and poultry facilities, bottled-water storage and agricultural-fertiliser depots were among the objects damaged. In one case, a cold-storage facility containing approximately 1,250 tonnes of protein products at the time of the attack was struck.The same UN communication records differing figures from Iranian authorities and civil-society sources for affected schools and healthcare facilities.Those datasets should not be treated as interchangeable or added together: they differ in scope, methodology and reporting dates. [UN Special Procedures, AL IRN 13/2026, 4 August 2026, pp. 3–6.]Taken together, the damage sustained during this period cannot adequately be described through isolated categories such as “school”, “hospital”, “factory” or “power plant”. What came under pressure were multiple essential functions of civilian society simultaneously. The 4 August 2026 joint communication (AL IRN 13/2026) provides a particularly relevant account of the interdependence of civilian services. The mandate holders expressed concern that displacement was reportedly caused not only by damage to homes but also by attacks on critical infrastructure that disrupted water, electricity, transport, healthcare and education, making urban areas increasingly difficult to inhabit. They also warned that repeated displacement could erode the coping capacity of affected families. This is an assessment of reported allegations, not an independent judicial finding; nevertheless, it illustrates why an exclusively object-by-object description of harm is insufficient. [UN Special Procedures, AL IRN 13/2026, 4 August 2026, p. 12.]

Attacking Connectivity: Roads, Railways and Civil AviationOne of the most consequential dimensions of the Act of Aggression against Iran was the damage inflicted upon the country’s networks of connectivity. On 2 April, Bridge B1 was attacked. According to the available documentation, thirteen people were killed and several others injured. A further strike occurred while rescue personnel were present at the site. On 7 April, attacks on bridges and transport links intensified.Targets included Bayat Bridge on the Payambar-e Azam Freeway, sections of the Tehran–Karaj Freeway and Shahid Modarres Bridge, bridges west of Qom, the Alborz–Zanjan railway bridge, railway lines in Karaj, and the Yahyaabad railway bridge in Kashan. The strike on the Alborz–Zanjan railway bridge killed one person and injured eleven others, while other railway attacks also caused casualties. Ground transportation, however, represented only one part of the picture. Civil aviation infrastructure was repeatedly attacked. Official Iranian documentation records attacks on airports and civilian aviation facilities in several cities. At Kish Airport, the runway, radar equipment and passenger aircraft sustained damage.Bushehr Airport was attacked and a civilian passenger aircraft was destroyed. Parts of Kharg Airport were damaged, while several passenger aircraft were destroyed at Mehrabad Airport. The chronology of civil-aviation damage is equally important. Official Iranian records describe strikes on Bam Airport on 25 and 28 March; the radar at Imam Khomeini International Airport on 25 March; Kermanshah and Tabas airport facilities on 26 March; Mehriz Airport and the control tower and runway at Tabriz Shahid Madani International Airport on 28 March; and Kashan Airport on 1 and 7 April, including damage to the passenger waiting hall. On 4 April, the control tower at Kermanshah Airport was hit and its cabin destroyed. These incidents must be assessed individually, including the status and use of the relevant facilities at the time of attack, but taken together they demonstrate the breadth of disruption to civilian connectivity.Subsequent attacks were recorded against Bandar Abbas and Bandar Lengeh airports, the control tower and runway at Tabriz Airport, Kashan Airport, the control tower at Kermanshah Airport, the control tower at Tabas Airport, Bam Airport and its passenger terminal, Mehriz Airport, and the radar installation at Imam Khomeini International Airport.This dimension is particularly relevant to civilian continuity. Airports, bridges and railways are not merely transport infrastructure; they are channels through which civilian society remains connected. Patients, doctors, humanitarian personnel, medicines, goods, students, workers, families and commercial activity depend upon these networks. The destruction of connectivity may therefore impair civilian services and functions that have not themselves been directly attacked.

Ports, Fishing Vessels and LivelihoodsIn southern Iran, the consequences of the attacks reached directly into the means by which local communities sustain themselves. Official documentation records attacks against ports, shipbuilding companies, commercial vessels and fishing boats. An attack on Bandar Pol pier on 29 March killed five people and injured four others. On 31 March, an attack on a cargo vessel in the Ramchah area of Qeshm killed eight people. On 1 April, shipbuilding facilities and local fishing vessels in Qeshm were attacked, while on the following day warehouses and facilities at Bahman Port and Doha fishing pier on Qeshm Island sustained damage.This pattern did not fully end with the ceasefire; whose first day was 8 April. Sporadic strikes were reported during the ceasefire; hostilities resumed on 8 June and continued until a Memorandum of Understanding was signed on 14 June. A further wave of attacks was recorded on 8–9 July. During attacks on 8 and 9 July, at least 30 fishing vessels at Panj-Pelleh pier in Bandar Abbas and 10 additional fishing vessels at Banoud pier in Asaluyeh were destroyed or caught fire, directly affecting the livelihoods of fishing communities dependent upon those vessels. During the same period, the Aq-Tappeh-Khan railway bridge in northern Iran was damaged by a cruise-missile strike.Its significance extended beyond the connection of two geographic points; the route formed part of Iran’s rail and commercial connectivity with its northern neighbours and Central Asia.These incidents demonstrate an important point: even where a ceasefire temporarily interrupts large-scale hostilities, it does not automatically restore civilian continuity. Damaged systems require reconstruction, and renewed attacks may interrupt the process through which society attempts to return to ordinary civilian life.

Sport, Culture and Social LifeCivilian life cannot be reduced to physical survival.On 28 February in Lamerd, a sports hall and nearby residential buildings were struck. Available documentation records the deaths of children and adolescents who were present inside the sports facility. Other sports facilities were also damaged during the Act of Aggression, including facilities within Tehran’s Azadi Sports Complex and numerous school sports facilities.Cultural heritage and public spaces likewise sustained damage.Golestan Palace in Tehran and historical buildings in several provinces were affected; libraries, museums and cultural centres were also among the damaged sites. In one case, a library containing more than 35,000 books was destroyed.These forms of harm should not be relegated to the margins of the analysis.Education, sport, culture, social interaction, recreation and participation in public life are components of a functioning civilian society. A society whose hospitals remain operational but whose schools, universities, libraries, sports facilities and public spaces have ceased to function may remain physically alive, but its civilian life has nevertheless been profoundly impaired.

Bushehr and Risks That Do Not Stop at the Point of ImpactAttacks on nuclear facilities raise distinct legal concerns because their potential consequences may be long-term and transboundary. Article 56 of Additional Protocol I of 1977 provides a treaty regime of special protection for “works and installations containing dangerous forces”, expressly including dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, subject to the conditions and exceptions set out in that provision.The United States is not a party to Additional Protocol I, so Article 56 should not simply be presented as a treaty obligation binding it as such. The provision nevertheless identifies the distinctive civilian danger posed by attacks on nuclear electrical generating stations, while Rule 42 of the ICRC study of customary international humanitarian law identifies a requirement of particular care in attacks on works and installations containing dangerous forces, including nuclear electrical generating stations, to avoid the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.The precise customary scope of special protection must be distinguished from the treaty-specific conditions of Article 56. This special regime should not be indiscriminately extended to every nuclear facility. This distinction is particularly relevant to the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. Iranian documentation records that the plant’s premises were struck on 17 March and again on 24 and 27 March. According to preliminary assessments, those three incidents did not result in technical damage or casualties. On the morning of 4 April, however, a projectile exploded near the plant’s security perimeter; the blast wave and fragments damaged an ancillary building and killed a member of the facility’s physical-protection personnel.The plant’s principal structures remained undamaged and no operational disruption was reported. The absence of a radioactive release does not eliminate the legal significance of attacks against such an installation. The assessment must take account of the risk reasonably foreseeable at the time the attack was planned or decided upon, rather than relying solely on the fact that the most serious possible consequence did not ultimately materialise.

From the Protection of Objects to the Protection of Civilian ContinuityThe concern expressed by seven UN special-procedure mandates about infrastructure-related displacement reinforces the need to analyse civilian functions across sectors. In their joint communication of 4 August 2026, they expressed concern that reported disruption of water, electricity, transport, healthcare and education was rendering urban areas increasingly uninhabitable. This article develops a distinct interpretative proposition from that factual and legal concern; the proposed “Right to Civilian Continuity” is the author’s framework, not a right recognized as such by the mandate holders.........

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