Protecting civilians requires more than protecting individual objects. International law must also account for the systems that make civilian life possible.By Farzaneh Bani Asad AzadFarzaneh Bani Asad Azad is a PhD candidate in Political Studies and Third Secretary atthe Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Office andother international organisations in Geneva.The Act of Aggression by the United States and Israel against the Islamic Republic ofIran, which began on 28 February 2026, has exposed a structural weakness in the wayinternational law often describes civilian harm. The law contains extensive protectionsfor civilians and civilian objects, yet the legal analysis of an attack can becomeartificially fragmented when each school, hospital, power plant, bridge, railway, airport,pharmaceutical facility or fishing vessel is examined as though it existed in isolation.Modern civilian life does not function that way. It depends on interconnected systems.Official Iranian documentation compiled by 8 April recorded 125,630 civilian units asseverely damaged or destroyed, including 100,000 residential and 23,500 commercialunits; 857 schools, 339 health-care centres and 32 universities were reported damaged,alongside Red Crescent facilities, airports, civilian aircraft and other criticalinfrastructure. United Nations special-procedure mandate holders later documented asubstantial part of the broader pattern, including extensive harm to education, health,scientific research, cultural and religious sites, residential areas, transport, water andelectricity infrastructure, and civilian livelihoods. The figures differ across sources anddates, but the underlying picture is consistent: the damage was not confined to one sectorof civilian life.This article advances two related legal arguments. First, the legality and civilianconsequences of attacks on the infrastructure of a modern society cannot always beadequately assessed by looking only at the physical object struck. Where an attackdisables interconnected systems indispensable to civilian life, reasonably foreseeabledirect and reverberating effects must be taken seriously within the applicable rules ofinternational humanitarian law. I therefore propose a “Right to Civilian Continuity” notas a new autonomous right already crystallised in lex lata, but as an interpretativeframework that brings together existing protections under international humanitarianlaw, international human rights law and the right to development around a commonprotected interest: preserving the minimum material, human, institutional and socialconditions necessary for civilian society to continue functioning during and after armedconflict.Second, the same framework has implications for accountability. If the consequences ofan attack must be traced outward—from the object struck to the civilian systems andhuman lives that depended upon it—responsibility must also be capable of being tracedupward: from the strike to the operational unit, from execution to approval and order,and from the order to the decision-maker. In the Iranian case, this inquiry is sharpenedby repeated public statements by President Donald Trump threatening power plants,bridges, desalination facilities and other infrastructure; his description of returning Iranto the “Stone Age”; his later acknowledgement of the societal consequences ofdestroying Iran’s bridges and power plants; and, in relation to at least one bridge strike,his statement: “I gave the order.” None of this substitutes for proof of the elements of aninternational crime. It does, however, create a serious basis for investigating policy,knowledge, foreseeability, decision-making and individual criminal responsibility inrelation to specific attacks.A further distinction is essential. The characterization of the resort to force as an Act ofAggression is a jus ad bellum question. The legality of each individual strike is a separatejus in bello question. Even where the resort to force is unlawful, an individual attackconstitutes a war crime only if the relevant elements of the specific offence areestablished. The analysis below therefore does not infer the criminality of particularstrikes from the characterization of the wider use of force.

An Assault on a Society, Not Merely on a Collection of TargetsA defining feature of the Act of Aggression against Iran cannot be understood solelythrough the number of strikes carried out. Equally significant is the range of civilianfunctions affected from the outset of the attacks.The residential record also shows that civilian harm unfolded over time rather than in asingle episode. Official Iranian documentation records strikes on residential areas on 13March in Karaj; 14 March in Eyvan, where six members of one family, including a sixmonth-old infant, were killed; 15 March in Shiraz; 16 March in Narenjestan andAmirabad in Arak, where a four-day-old infant was among those killed, and in Mahallatand Tehran; 17 March on Malek-ol-Shoara Bahar Street in Tehran; 19 March inMajidieh; 20 March in Mehrvila, Karaj; 21 March in Dizaj Amir-Madar, Ramsar andDastak; 23 March in Tehran, Tabriz, Qeytariyeh, Velanjak, Khorramabad and Urmia;24 March in Tabriz; 26 March in Zibashahr, Shiraz; 28 March in Saboonchi; 30 Marchin Bandar Abbas and Zanjan; 6 April in Qom; and 7 April in Shahriar and Pardis. Theseincidents are not invoked here to presume the unlawfulness of every individual strike.Their relevance is to the factual scale of disruption and to the need for attack-specificlegal assessment rather than aggregate assertion.One of the earliest and gravest incidents was the attack of 28 February on ShajarehTayebeh Primary School in Minab. Official Iranian figures record the deaths of 168children between the ages of seven and twelve, both girls and boys. A subsequentcommunication by United Nations special procedure mandate holders recorded a lowerfigure, but confirmed several essential facts: children were present at the school at thetime of the attack; the mandate holders had received no information indicating that theschool was being used for military purposes; and the school building was separated fromneighbouring facilities by a wall and had its own entrance. The incident was alsoidentified as requiring an independent investigation into possible serious violations ofinternational humanitarian law.The impact on education was not confined to Minab. Official Iranian records documentextensive damage to hundreds of schools and educational facilities across the country.Higher education was also affected. Several universities sustained damage, includingShahid Beheshti University, parts of which, together with its research facilities, werestruck on 3 April, and Sharif University of Technology, whose faculties, researchinstitutes and scientific infrastructure were damaged in the following days. The impacton universities was not merely structural. At Sharif University, information-technologyinfrastructure providing computational and digital services to thousands of academic andinstitutional users, as well as knowledge-based enterprises, ceased functioning.The health system likewise came under sustained pressure. Hospitals, emergencycentres, Red Crescent facilities, ambulances, pharmaceutical facilities and laboratoriessustained damage. On 31 March, facilities belonging to Toufigh Darou Research andEngineering Company, which produced active pharmaceutical ingredients used intreatments for cancer, cardiovascular diseases and certain specialised conditions, wereattacked. Facilities of Soha Pharmaceutical Company were also damaged on 1 and 2April, disrupting parts of its production and packaging lines.On 2 April, the Pasteur Institute of Iran was also attacked. The Institute, with more thana century of activity in vaccine production, infectious-disease diagnosis, medicalresearch and public health, hosted thirteen national reference laboratories, researchcentres, biobanks and World Health Organization collaborating centres. Theconsequences therefore extended beyond physical damage to buildings and affected partof the country’s diagnostic, research and disease-surveillance capacity.At the same time, water and energy networks sustained damage. By late March,hundreds of incidents affecting electricity transmission and distribution equipment hadbeen recorded in different parts of Iran, while electricity-sector personnel were killed orinjured. Two power plants with generating capacities of 914 MW and 250 MW weredestroyed in Mobarakeh County. In the water sector, damage to infrastructure in Jaskdisrupted drinking-water supplies to 20 villages and more than 10,000 people in onedocumented case.Food production and livelihoods were also affected. Grain-storage facilities, food coldstorage facilities, agricultural infrastructure, livestock and poultry facilities, bottledwater storage and agricultural-fertiliser depots were among the objects damaged. In onecase, a cold-storage facility containing approximately 1,250 tonnes of protein productsat the time of the attack was struck.Taken together, the damage sustained during this period cannot adequately be describedthrough isolated categories such as “school”, “hospital”, “factory” or “power plant”.What came under pressure were multiple essential functions of civilian societysimultaneously.

Attacking Connectivity: Roads, Railways and Civil AviationOne of the most consequential dimensions of the Act of Aggression against Iran was thedamage inflicted upon the country’s networks of connectivity.On 2 April, Bridge B1 was attacked. According to the available documentation, thirteenpeople were killed and several others injured. A further strike occurred while rescuepersonnel were present at the site. On 7 April, attacks on bridges and transport linksintensified. Targets included Bayat Bridge on the Payambar-e Azam Freeway, sectionsof the Tehran–Karaj Freeway and Shahid Modarres Bridge, bridges west of Qom, theAlborz–Zanjan railway bridge, railway lines in Karaj, and the Yahyaabad railway bridgein Kashan. The strike on the Alborz–Zanjan railway bridge killed one person and injuredeleven others, while other railway attacks also caused casualties.Ground transportation, however, represented only one part of the picture. Civil aviationinfrastructure was repeatedly attacked.Official Iranian documentation records attacks on airports and civilian aviation facilitiesin several cities. At Kish Airport, the runway, radar equipment and passenger aircraftsustained damage. Bushehr Airport was attacked and a civilian passenger aircraft wasdestroyed. Parts of Kharg Airport were damaged, while several passenger aircraft weredestroyed at Mehrabad Airport.The chronology of civil-aviation damage is equally important. Official Iranian recordsdescribe strikes on Bam Airport on 25 and 28 March; the radar at Imam KhomeiniInternational Airport on 25 March; Kermanshah and Tabas airport facilities on 26March; Mehriz Airport and the control tower and runway at Tabriz Shahid MadaniInternational Airport on 28 March; and Kashan Airport on 1 and 7 April, includingdamage to the passenger waiting hall. On 4 April, the control tower at KermanshahAirport was hit and its cabin destroyed. These incidents must be assessed individually,including the status and use of the relevant facilities at the time of attack, but takentogether they demonstrate the breadth of disruption to civilian connectivity.Subsequent attacks were recorded against Bandar Abbas and Bandar Lengeh airports,the control tower and runway at Tabriz Airport, Kashan Airport, the control tower atKermanshah Airport, the control tower at Tabas Airport, Bam Airport and its passengerterminal, Mehriz Airport, and the radar installation at Imam Khomeini InternationalAirport.This dimension is particularly relevant to civilian continuity. Airports, bridges andrailways are not merely transport infrastructure; they are channels through which civiliansociety remains connected. Patients, doctors, humanitarian personnel, medicines, goods,students, workers, families and commercial activity depend upon these networks. Thedestruction of connectivity may therefore impair civilian services and functions thathave not themselves been directly attacked.

Ports, Fishing Vessels and LivelihoodsIn southern Iran, the consequences of the attacks reached directly into the means bywhich local communities sustain themselves.Official documentation records attacks against ports, shipbuilding companies,commercial vessels and fishing boats. An attack on Bandar Pol pier on 29 March killedfive people and injured four others. On 31 March, an attack on a cargo vessel in theRamchah area of Qeshm killed eight people. On 1 April, shipbuilding facilities and localfishing vessels in Qeshm were attacked, while on the following day warehouses andfacilities at Bahman Port and Doha fishing pier on Qeshm Island sustained damage.This pattern did not fully end with the ceasefire, whose first day was 8 April. Sporadicstrikes were reported during the ceasefire; hostilities resumed on 8 June and continueduntil a Memorandum of Understanding was signed on 14 June. A further wave of attackswas recorded on 8–9 July.During attacks on 8 and 9 July, at least 30 fishing vessels at Panj-Pelleh pier in BandarAbbas and 10 additional fishing vessels at Banoud pier in Asaluyeh were destroyed orcaught fire, directly affecting the livelihoods of fishing communities dependent uponthose vessels.During the same period, the Aq-Tappeh-Khan railway bridge in northern Iran wasdamaged by a cruise-missile strike. Its significance extended beyond the connection oftwo geographic points; the route formed part of Iran’s rail and commercial connectivitywith its northern neighbours and Central Asia.These incidents demonstrate an important point: even where a ceasefire temporarilyinterrupts large-scale hostilities, it does not automatically restore civilian continuity.Damaged systems require reconstruction, and renewed attacks may interrupt the processthrough which society attempts to return to ordinary civilian life.

Sport, Culture and Social LifeCivilian life cannot be reduced to physical survival.On 28 February in Lamerd, a sports hall and nearby residential buildings were struck.Available documentation records the deaths of children and adolescents who werepresent inside the sports facility. Other sports facilities were also damaged during theAct of Aggression, including facilities within Tehran’s Azadi Sports Complex andnumerous school sports facilities.Cultural heritage and public spaces likewise sustained damage. Golestan Palace inTehran and historical buildings in several provinces were affected; libraries, museumsand cultural centres were also among the damaged sites. In one case, a library containingmore than 35,000 books was destroyed.These forms of harm should not be relegated to the margins of the analysis. Education,sport, culture, social interaction, recreation and participation in public life arecomponents of a functioning civilian society. A society whose hospitals remainoperational but whose schools, universities, libraries, sports facilities and public spaceshave ceased to function may remain physically alive, but its civilian life has neverthelessbeen profoundly impaired.

Bushehr and Risks That Do Not Stop at the Point of ImpactAttacks on nuclear facilities raise distinct legal concerns because their potentialconsequences may be long-term and transboundary.Article 56 of Additional Protocol I of 1977 provides a treaty regime of special protectionfor “works and installations containing dangerous forces”, expressly including dams,dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, subject to the conditions and exceptionsset out in that provision. The United States is not a party to Additional Protocol I, soArticle 56 should not simply be presented as a treaty obligation binding it as such. Theprovision nevertheless identifies the distinctive civilian danger posed by attacks onnuclear electrical generating stations, while customary international humanitarian lawseparately requires particular care where attacks on works or installations containingdangerous forces may cause severe civilian losses. This special regime should not beindiscriminately extended to every nuclear facility.This distinction is particularly relevant to the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant.Iranian documentation records that the plant’s premises were struck on 17 March andagain on 24 and 27 March. According to preliminary assessments, those three incidentsdid not result in technical damage or casualties. On the morning of 4 April, however, aprojectile exploded near the plant’s security perimeter; the blast wave and fragmentsdamaged an ancillary building and killed a member of the facility’s physical-protectionpersonnel. The plant’s principal structures remained undamaged and no operationaldisruption was reported.The absence of a radioactive release does not eliminate the legal significance of attacksagainst such an installation. The assessment must take account of the risk reasonablyforeseeable at the time the attack was planned or decided upon, rather than relying solelyon the fact that the most serious possible consequence did not ultimately materialise.

From the Protection of Objects to the Protection of Civilian ContinuityInternational law does not currently recognise an autonomous right entitled the Right toCivilian Continuity. To claim otherwise would go beyond the present state of lex lata.The constituent elements of the concept, however, are already protected underinternational law.International humanitarian law protects civilians and civilian objects, restricts attacks tomilitary objectives, prohibits disproportionate attacks and requires feasible precautionsto avoid or minimise civilian harm. Special protections also exist for medical units andpersonnel, objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, and certainworks and installations containing dangerous forces.International human rights law, in parallel, protects the rights to life, health, water, food,housing, education and other conditions essential to human existence. The right todevelopment adds another dimension by placing the human person at the centre of thedevelopment process and protecting participation in, contribution to and enjoyment ofdevelopment.The concept of civilian continuity does not create these protections; it brings them intoanalytical relationship with one another.In contemporary societies, a hospital does not operate independently of electricity andwater networks; a pharmaceutical factory does not function independently oflaboratories and transportation; a school is not independent of families, teachers and safeaccess routes; and food production depends upon energy, storage and transport.For the purposes of this article, civilian continuity may therefore be defined as:the preservation of the minimum material, human, institutional and social conditionsnecessary for a civilian population to continue its individual and collective life duringand after armed conflict, including access to health care, water, food, housing, education,mobility, communications, livelihoods and other fundamental functions of civiliansociety.This is proposed as an interpretative legal framework, not as a declaration that a newrule of international law has already crystallised.Its principal contribution lies in shifting the unit of analysis from the object to itsfunction, and from the function to its human consequences.

Reverberating Effects and ForeseeabilityThis shift in perspective has direct implications for the application of the principles ofproportionality and precautions in attack.The harm caused by an attack on a power plant is not necessarily confined to physicaldamage to the plant and its equipment. If the resulting electricity outage disables waterpumps, hospital equipment, pharmaceutical or food cold-storage facilities,communications systems or productive capacity,........

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