I recently returned from Tashkent, Uzbekistan, where conversations with old Russian friends and newer arrivals in the city who weren’t even of military age in 2022 left me with an unsettling sense of déjà vu.

One Russian software CEO, who was on a business trip, told me he had sent a dozen male employees of military age on “extended vacation” to Armenia for a few months. Several of my contacts who fled Russia in 2022, but had since returned, are now preparing to leave again or have already gone back to Georgia or Turkey. 

“My plan is simple: wait it out outside Russia until it’s safe to return,” said 29-year-old Ruslan, who featured in my recently published book, “Leaving Russia.”

When the partial mobilization was announced in September 2022, Ruslan fled Moscow with his pregnant fiancée and their Labrador, Smeliy, driving almost 2,000 kilometers (1,240 miles) to Georgia in their battered Renault Duster. They struggled to settle in Tbilisi and, in 2024, returned home after a year in Serbia, convinced it was safe to do so.

“This time, I’m leaving on my own for a while,” explained Ruslan, who flew back to Georgia last month. “I never imagined I’d have to go through this all over again.”

There are growing signs of a new wave of Russian emigration, with people already leaving ahead of the State Duma elections on Sept. 18-20. Meduza reported that rumors of post-election mobilization sent Russian arrivals and housing demand surging in Georgia, Armenia and Serbia. Serbian realtors described long lines for apartments, with demand at its highest level since early 2024. Some clients were already booking accommodation for late September.

There is also mounting evidence that Russia is preparing to expand its military manpower, but it may not need another headline-grabbing mobilization order to do so. 

Unlike in 2022, the Kremlin now has quieter ways to replenish and expand its ranks: sustained recruitment,........

© The Moscow Times