The characterisation of Afghanistan as the graveyard of empires has long depicted it as an exceptional site where major powers repeatedly fail. While this phrase is evocative, it obscures a more nuanced reality. Afghanistan has operated less as a final defeat for empires and more as a recurrent arena where external actors test strategies, pursue limited goals, and disengage when costs outweigh benefits. The consequences of these withdrawals do not primarily burden distant capitals but accumulate within Afghanistan's immediate region, with Pakistan experiencing the most significant effects.

Historical accounts challenge the determinism implied by the graveyard metaphor. The British experience in the nineteenth century, often cited as definitive, was not marked solely by defeat. Despite the disastrous retreat during the First Anglo-Afghan War in 1842, Britain recalibrated its approach and, by the late nineteenth century, had established Afghanistan as a buffer state to block rival powers. Influence replaced direct occupation; although this incurred costs and reputational damage, the British Empire adapted and maintained its regional interests.

The Soviet intervention from 1979 to 1989 followed a similar trajectory. The USSR deployed substantial forces, endured significant casualties, and ultimately withdrew after a protracted conflict that strained its resources. However, Afghanistan's war was not the sole cause of the Soviet Union's collapse; existing political and economic weaknesses played more decisive roles. Here, too, a major power entered, sustained losses, and exited once strategic calculations shifted.

The United States' two-decade engagement from 2001 to 2021 aligns with this pattern. Initially focused on counter-terrorism, U.S. objectives extended into state-building efforts that were misaligned with Afghanistan's fractured political economy. Despite extensive financial and human costs, the U.S. withdrew as its strategic focus shifted to other global priorities. The result was neither a clear victory nor an existential defeat but a strategic reorientation.

In all these instances, Afghanistan imposed geographical, social, and political friction, raising the cost of control. External powers........

© The Friday Times