It is being argued that Pakistan has broken out of its South Asian “geographical prison” and positioned itself at the heart of the Middle East. The credit for conceiving, advancing, and successfully executing this Middle East–centric policy is, according to this narrative, due largely to General Asim Munir. After decades in which Pakistan’s human, economic, and diplomatic sacrifices were absorbed by the rocky terrain of Afghanistan, the argument goes, Pakistan has finally made an assertive entry into a region defined by petrodollars, vast investment capacity, and enormous mineral wealth. The emerging defense framework between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye is being presented as a symbol of this new geopolitical direction.

But does a change in strategic positioning necessarily amount to a change in economic fortunes?

But does a change in strategic positioning necessarily amount to a change in economic fortunes?

That is the more consequential question. Is Pakistan’s economic statecraft capable of capitalizing on this opportunity? Does the country possess the diplomatic, economic, and institutional machinery required to translate its renewed strategic relevance into investment, trade, technology transfer, defense manufacturing, exports, and employment? Is there a team capable of turning this rare strategic opening into a sustained transformation of the national economy or will Pakistan once again secure strategic dividends without being able to convert them into economic strength? The question matters because Pakistan has never been short of strategic opportunities.

During the Cold War, Pakistan acquired considerable importance for global powers. In successive Afghan wars, it paid an enormous human, economic, and diplomatic price. And later, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) presented perhaps the clearest recent example of a major geo-economic opportunity. Yet the fundamental question has remained the same: Has Pakistan been able to convert strategic relevance into enduring economic power? That question now hangs over the defense pact involving Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye.

Strategically, the agreement is being described as potentially transformative for both the Middle East and South Asia. Each country brings a distinct asset base. Saudi Arabia possesses capital and access to one of the world's most dynamic regional markets. Türkiye has developed sophisticated industrial and defense capabilities. Pakistan brings military expertise, a substantial human-resource base, geographical relevance, defense-production experience, and a large domestic market. If these strengths can be integrated, the economic possibilities could indeed be substantial. But potential is not performance. And that is where the celebratory narrative must give way to critical examination.

This is not the first time Pakistan and Türkiye have sought to build a broader regional partnership. Decades ago, Pakistan, Iran, and Türkiye created the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) framework, envisioning closer economic, technical, and cultural cooperation among the three countries. The concept was ambitious for its time. Geography, shared interests, and political will appeared to provide a strong foundation. Yet the arrangement failed to realize its full potential and was overtaken by the dramatically altered regional........

© The Friday Times