The latest American strikes against Iran following the IRGC’s attacks on commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz have once again raised fears that the Middle East is sliding towards another major war. President Trump’s declaration that the Islamabad MoU is “over” appears to reinforce that perception. Yet the latest escalation is better understood as part of a longer strategic contest that is steadily reducing the IRGC’s regional leverage rather than signaling the collapse of diplomacy. That process did not begin with the latest crisis in Hormuz. It has unfolded throughout the chain of events that began with Hamas’s attack on Israel on 7 October 2023. Since then, wars, proxy conflicts, diplomacy and shifting regional alignments have steadily changed the balance of power. Judged over that entire period rather than through the headlines of any single week, one trend stands out: the IRGC is steadily losing the sources of influence that enabled it to shape events across the Middle East.

The Strait of Hormuz is the latest example. Tehran insists that the post-war framework allows it to regulate shipping through its waters. The United States and its regional partners reject that interpretation, arguing that freedom of navigation cannot be subject to coercion. The attacks on commercial vessels linked to Saudi Arabia and Qatar therefore marked an important turning point. Unlike previous incidents, Washington responded not simply by retaliating but by expanding strikes against the naval, missile and drone capabilities that allow the IRGC to threaten one of the world’s busiest maritime routes. Hormuz, however, is only one part of a much larger story. When the current conflict began, the IRGC possessed several important sources of regional leverage. One by one, they have come under increasing pressure. Hamas has been severely weakened. Hezbollah now faces growing constraints under the evolving Lebanon framework. Syria has moved in a very different direction since the fall of Bashar al-Assad. Washington’s decision to remove Syria from its list of state sponsors of terrorism is significant because it supports the country’s reintegration into the region and further reduces Tehran’s ability to use Syria as the strategic corridor it once depended upon.

A similar pattern has emerged across the Gulf. During the early months of the conflict, Iran........

© The Friday Times