A consensus is increasingly developing among defence analysts around the world that Iran has won the war. It now controls the Strait of Hormuz, which the United States and its allies have no power to reopen by military means whatsoever.

Since the start of the war, the Iranian rial has gained around 11 per cent against the US dollar, as it now sells almost twice the volume of oil, and no longer at discounted prices. This has provided Iran with economic strength, enabling it to sustain the war and support its population, which is bearing the bombing by US–Israeli air forces. Simultaneously, Iran has gained military confidence against its adversaries, who now appear to be projecting power from a distance.

It would be unfair to describe Iran’s military strategy as merely asymmetrical. Rather than investing in a conventional modern air force, Iran has chosen to prosecute the war at a more advanced level. What is unfolding can be seen as a form of sixth-generation warfare confronting the fifth-generation military machinery of the United States and Israel, both of which rely heavily on conventional air power and aircraft carriers. These assets were forced to withdraw from the battlefield in the initial phase. Indisputably, Iran’s military strategy—supported by Russian and Chinese assistance—has outmanoeuvred the combined US–Israeli effort.

Talk of deploying the US 82nd Airborne Division to capture Kharg Island remains just that talk. Defence analysts broadly agree that such a move is unlikely. Meanwhile, the vast weapons stockpiles of Gulf monarchies have proven ineffective in the face of Iran’s threats to destroy their oil and other critical infrastructure should they join any military venture alongside the United States or Israel.

More significantly, Iran’s warning that it could target desalination plants would leave Gulf states without drinking water for an indefinite period, resulting in a humanitarian catastrophe. Under such circumstances, they have little choice but to refrain from any kinetic involvement.

A clear indication of who is prevailing in a war often lies in who is seeking a ceasefire.

Pakistan’s efforts to host peace talks between Iran and the United States generated considerable global attention, briefly placing Islamabad at the centre of international diplomacy. However, the meeting of foreign ministers from Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia in Islamabad—held without the participation of the warring parties—stopped short of achieving similar significance. Iran has clearly refused to negotiate on the 15 points proposed by the United States. It is difficult to see why Tehran would agree to terms aimed at restoring a pre-war status quo when it perceives itself to hold both strategic advantage and military momentum.

Countries that have long aligned themselves with the United States, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan, may also be compelled to reconsider their strategic orientations, alignments, and future foreign policies

Countries that have long aligned themselves with the United States, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan, may also be compelled to reconsider their strategic orientations, alignments, and future foreign policies

Reports suggest that the United States was unable to provide security guarantees for the Iranian delegation during a potential visit to Islamabad. The Speaker of Iran’s Parliament has stated that Washington seeks to use talks to buy time to prepare ground forces for deployment along Iran’s coastline. This may be one of the few remaining options available to the United States if it fails to secure a face-saving exit from the war.

Should the United States pursue this course, the consequences could be severe. The conflict risks descending into a far more dangerous phase, potentially involving the use of nuclear weapons out of frustration by either the United States or Israel. Such an escalation would almost certainly invite a response from another nuclear power, though which one remains uncertain. Allowing the use of nuclear weapons without consequence would establish a precedent that could embolden future use.

Whatever the outcome or timing of the war’s end, one conclusion appears increasingly certain: the pre-war status quo will not return. The future of US dominance in the Middle East looks increasingly uncertain. Concepts such as “Greater Israel” will become untenable under these changing conditions. States that have aligned themselves openly or otherwise with the United States and Israel, including the United Arab Emirates, India, and others, may be compelled to adjust to the emergence of Iran as a more assertive regional power.

A brief look at parallel developments reinforces this trajectory.

Russia has announced a suspension of gas exports for three months from 1 April, citing domestic needs. Whether this justification holds or not, the implications are significant. With Russian gas supplies curtailed and Qatari and Iranian energy already constrained, the economic consequences for countries such as India could be substantial.

This may be further compounded by US pressure on European partners, including threats to restrict energy supplies in the context of trade negotiations. Notably, India and Europe concluded a major trade agreement only two months ago, adding another layer of complexity to the situation.

The economic outlook for Gulf states, particularly the United Arab Emirates, is also uncertain. Economies such as Dubai’s—long reliant on tourism and real estate inflows, including unregulated capital—may face prolonged disruption. A reconfigured regional order could require accommodation with Iran’s position, including new arrangements such as maritime taxation, the removal of US military presence, and a reassessment of involvement in conflicts in Sudan, Somalia, and Yemen.

For the United States and Israel, the central question is one of cost. At what point will they choose to accept this shifting reality? Will the United States continue to bear the burden of Israel’s strategic posture, or will it recalibrate—potentially leaving Israel to confront a significantly altered regional balance? What is the future of Israel’s undeclared nuclear capability? Could it be compelled to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections? It would be premature to draw firm conclusions, but these questions are likely to gain urgency as the war progresses.

Countries that have long aligned themselves with the United States, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan, may also be compelled to reconsider their strategic orientations, alignments, and future foreign policies. Not only that, the Pakistani elite, whose power has long been underpinned by its ties with Saudi Arabia and the United States, may find its position increasingly untenable as these external anchors weaken.

© The Friday Times