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Assessing KMT Leader Cheng Li-Wun’s Political Narrative

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12.08.2026

Interviews | Diplomacy | East Asia

Assessing KMT Leader Cheng Li-Wun’s Political Narrative

Insights from Wayne Tan.

KMT Chair Cheng Li-wun poses for a photo in front of the flags of the United States and the Republic of China during a visit to the Massachusetts Governor’s Office, June 5, 2026.

The Diplomat author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into U.S. Asia policy. This conversation with Dr. Wayne Tan – professor at the Graduate Institute of International Politics, National Chung Hsing University (Taiwan), where he also serves as director of the Center for Indo-Pacific Strategy and Non-Traditional Security – is the 521st in “The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.”  

How would you characterize Kuomintang (KMT) party chair Cheng Li-wun’s political narrative regarding Taiwan’s autonomy and sovereignty?

Political narratives should not be confused with strategic reality. One of the central arguments in my recent work is that Taiwan’s room for strategic maneuver is increasingly constrained by structural forces beyond the control of any Taiwanese political leaders. Whether one belongs to the KMT or the DPP [Democratic Progressive Party], Taiwan operates within an international system shaped by the intensifying strategic competition between the United States and China.

Viewed from this perspective, Cheng Li-wun’s narrative can be understood as a paradoxical attempt to maximize Taiwan’s autonomy through “self-restraint” rather than “strategic proactivity.” Unlike narratives that seek to reinforce sovereignty through greater international visibility, Cheng appears to argue that Taiwan’s de facto autonomy is best preserved by lowering the probability of military conflict and maintaining channels of communication with Beijing. 

However, it is important to realize that any genuine risk of military conflict across the Taiwan Strait arises not from Taiwan’s conduct, but from Beijing’s persistent use of gray-zone coercion, which has steadily eroded the stability of the status quo. Taiwan has never been the problem. Rather, it is the current Xi Jinping administration that has repeatedly generated instability through increasingly coercive actions in the region.

For this reason, I would be cautious about attributing excessive importance to Cheng’s political narrative. Taiwan’s leaders possess agency, but it is constrained agency. They can influence tactics, manage crises, and shape domestic political debate. What they cannot do is fundamentally alter the structural forces driving U.S.-China rivalry. As long as China continues to rise and the United States remains committed to preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon in Asia, Taiwan will remain one of the principal arenas of great-power competition. That reality is largely independent of which political party governs Taiwan or how its leaders frame questions of autonomy and sovereignty.

What are the strengths and weaknesses of Cheng’s rhetorical platform?

The strength of Cheng’s rhetoric is that it recognizes an uncomfortable reality often overlooked in Taiwan’s domestic political debate: military conflict would be catastrophic regardless of who prevails politically. In this sense, her discourse appeals to prudence rather than ideology. From an international relations perspective, reducing misperception and preserving diplomatic communication are entirely rational objectives. Thomas Schelling demonstrated decades ago that deterrence and communication are complementary rather than contradictory. Stability depends not only upon military capability but also upon credible signaling.

However, recognizing the reality mentioned above is not the same as overcoming it. The central weakness of Cheng’s platform lies in the implicit assumption that greater self-restraint or expanded dialogue can substantially reduce China’s ambitions toward Taiwan. That assumption is difficult to sustain when viewed through the logic of realism. If Beijing regards Taiwan as........

© The Diplomat