China Power | Diplomacy | East Asia

The EU’s Contradictory Narratives on China

Both sides are trying to sustain trade talks and practical cooperation, but the EU’s new security definition of China may complicate this progress.

From left to right: António Costa (president of the European Council), Xi Jinping (president of the People’s Republic of China), and Ursula von der Leyen (president of the European Commission) at the China-EU Summit in Beijing, July 24, 2025.

EU-China relations are being defined in two very different ways at the same time. 

On June 29, during Chinese Commerce Minister Wang Wentao’s visit to Brussels, the EU and China reached a mutually agreed new definition of their economic relations – “stable and balanced key trading partners.” To give substance to the term, the two sides launched a trade and investment consultation mechanism (TIC), which consists of trade and investment balancing, export controls, intellectual property rights, and WTO reform. This new definition has since appeared multiple times in Chinese outlets and official statements, including People’s Daily, the Ministry of Commerce, and the Chinese readout of Dutch Trade Minister Sjoerd Sjoerdsma’s visit to China.

Yet almost at the same time, a much harder definition was emerging from the European security debate. In the European Council’s latest official “assessment of the EU’s strategic environment,” China is described as “a critical long-term strategic challenge,” and a “crucial enabler for Moscow” in the Ukraine conflict. This paper was endorsed by EU member states’ ambassadors on July 8 and reportedly adopted at the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) on July 13. 

The assessment is an update to the EU’s threat assessment since 2022, in which China was still characterized in line with the European Commission’s 2019 definition: “a partner for cooperation, an economic competitor and a systemic rival.”

These dynamics create a contradictory signal in today’s China-EU relationship. Economically, both sides want to stabilize and rebalance the relationship in order to prevent trade tensions from turning into a broader trade war. Strategically, however, the EU is moving toward a more explicit security framing of China, especially in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. This situation begs the question of whether two divergent definitions of the same relationship can coexist.

The busy summer of China-EU trade negotiations showed that both sides still want to keep the economic relationship manageable. In a press conference held by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, the spokesperson announced that the second round of TIC will be held in Beijing this fall, with EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič expected to make the trip to China. This is just one of multiple meetings and negotiations scheduled to happen before the October deadline set by the European side for “tangible progress” on trade; vice-minister level meetings will be held in August and September. 

Neither side expects a structural transformation of China’s manufacturing-based economic model. Instead, they are creating conditions to harvest lower-hanging fruit. First, China has committed to reducing the deficit by importing EU goods in Chinese government procurement or state trading, Denis Redonnet, the European Commission’s deputy director general for trade and economic security, told the European Parliament’s trade committee. A “joint monitoring mechanism” will be discussed before the end of July to monitor increases in Chinese imports into Europe. 

At the member-state level, diplomatic and economic channels have also become more active. During Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Norway from July 2 to 7, China emphasized partnership, political dialogue, respect for core........

© The Diplomat