The Koreas | Economy | East Asia

The Iran Crisis Is Fueling South Korea’s Drive for Nuclear Energy 

Amid the Middle East conflict, South Korea is determined to find new pathways to strengthen localized, “autonomous” energy solutions by targeting civil nuclear and renewable energy. 

Heavily dependent on energy imports, South Korea is bracing for the economic and industrial fallout of the escalating Iranian conflict. Following the Israeli-U.S. airstrikes on Iranian targets in late February, Tehran has threatened to blockade the Strait of Hormuz – a maritime chokepoint through which roughly one-sixth of the global oil and a third of liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipments pass.

For Seoul, the implications are immediate and severe. Less than a week after the strikes, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung, upon returning from a diplomatic tour in Southeast Asia, immediately convened an extraordinary Cabinet meeting to assess the cross-regional implications of the crisis. 

During his briefing, Lee warned that “in an era of infinite competition… the only one that can help and save us is ourselves,” emphasizing the need for South Korea to safeguard its national interests amid mounting market volatility. Lee’s statement comes as South Korean policy leaders prepare for the large-scale energy impacts of the conflict in the Middle East. 

For South Korea – an energy import nation highly vulnerable to external market shocks – renewable and civil nuclear energy may represent the “homegrown” energy solutions the nation desperately needs. Yet, even these local energy sources rely on international supply chains and bilateral cooperation frameworks.

An Energy Crisis Felt in Seoul

South Korea relies heavily on the Middle East for its energy supplies. Historically, nearly 70 percent of the country’s crude oil imports originate from the region. Under the current disruptions, approximately 1.7 million barrels of crude oil bound for South Korea each day are reportedly delayed or stranded in transit. 

Natural gas shipments face similar uncertainty. This year, 14 percent of South Korea’s planned LNG imports were expected to come from the Middle East, including upwards of 5 million tons from Qatar. While Seoul in recent years has made efforts to diversify LNG suppliers, including expanding plans for U.S.-origin LNG imports, many of these supply channels remain underdeveloped or pending implementation. 

As global fuel prices rise rapidly, political voices in South Korea are once again calling into question the nation’s long-standing dependency on energy imports. In response, the Lee administration is exploring longer-term solutions aimed at strengthening domestic energy resilience – mainly through nationwide expansion of renewables and civil nuclear energy.

Powering a High-Tech Economy

South Korea’s energy demand is expected to steadily rise in the coming decades. The government predicted that national electricity demand will increase annually at an average of 1.8 percent – reaching 129 gigawatts (GW) by 2038. South Korea rising demands are mainly driven by the expansion of AI-related data centers, semiconductor manufacturing, and widespread electrification across the country. 

To this point, meeting these demands has required increasing reliance on imported energy sources, mainly through oil, coal, and LNG products. Amid the ongoing crisis, however, the Lee administration has called for a deeper look into cross-regional energy imbalances and the future potential of a “locally produced, locally consumed” energy strategy centered on renewable and civil nuclear energy. For Seoul, the lesson is simple: energy security begins at home.

Even as the Lee administration leans into renewables, Minister of Climate, Energy, and Environment Kim Sung-hwan recently re-affirmed the key role of civil nuclear energy in the future of South Korea’s energy mix. Nuclear power currently accounts for one-third of the nation’s energy needs. South Korea’s nuclear industry leaders – Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP), Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), Doosan Enerbility, Hyundai E&C, among others – represent over 70 years of technical know-how and industry experience. 

According to South Korea’s 11th Basic Plan for Electricity Supply and Demand, at least two new large-scale nuclear reactors, totaling 2.8 GWe, and a 700 MW small modular reactor (SMR) will be constructed by 2038. These plans are in addition to the three 1400 MW APR 1400 reactors currently under construction – the first of which, Saeul 3, is expected to come online in late 2026.

Nuclear power – though often framed as a domestic energy solution – still depends on global supply chains, and, of critical importance for Seoul, the South Korea-U.S. bilateral civil nuclear partnership.

De-risking Civil Nuclear Fuel Supply

As the fifth largest nuclear energy producer, South Korea operates 26 large-scale gigawatt nuclear reactors domestically. After constructing four APR-1400 reactors in the United Arab Emirates, Seoul has sought out (and successfully won, in the case of Czechia) nuclear export opportunities beyond the Korean Peninsula.  

Despite South Korea’s well-recognized debut in the global nuclear export market, the nation’s domestic nuclear fuel cycle is neither complete nor autonomous. To date, the country does not possess industry-scale nuclear fuel production facilities – a critical industry gap that the Lee administration is actively attempting to remedy.

South Korea’s nuclear energy industry is entirely dependent on imported enriched uranium to fuel its nuclear reactor fleet. In 2024, South Korea imported approximately 1,209,340 kilograms of enriched uranium from top global suppliers, including Russia (45 percent), Canada (17 percent), Australia (15 percent), and France (7 percent) among others. Such reliance on enriched uranium imports mirrors the supply chain vulnerabilities of fossil fuels, exposing South Korea to added energy import risks.

Further complicating the matter, the South Korea-U.S. official agreement on civil nuclear energy – also formerly known as the “123 Agreement” – signed in 2015, limits South Korea’s nuclear capacities in areas of proliferation-sensitive fuel cycle activities, including high-level uranium enrichment (HEU) and spent fuel reprocessing technologies.

Unlike Japan’s nuclear agreement, which allows for “comprehensive consent” in advance for nuclear fuel cycle activities, the South Korea-U.S. 123 Agreement requires case-by-case U.S. approval for HEU (uranium enrichment beyond 20 percent) and all forms of reprocessing activities. The difference between the United States’ nuclear deals with South Korea and Japan has long been a point of frustration for South Korean policymakers.

Diplomatic Opening for Nuclear Negotiations

Recent geopolitical developments may offer new incentives for revived South Korea-U.S. nuclear negotiations. In November 2025, the Trump administration seemed to open the door to talks on expanding South Korea’s civilian nuclear program, alongside U.S. approval for South Korean-built nuclear-powered submarines. Since then, the Lee administration has swiftly assembled a top-tier multi-agency negotiating team to explore greater flexibility for South Korean civilian nuclear activities. 

Seoul’s interests are straightforward: greater domestic control and authority over nuclear fuel production is crucial for ensuring national energy security and strengthening South Korea’s competitiveness in the global nuclear export market.

Despite Seoul’s quick ramp-up, however Washington’s response has been hesitant. Many traditional nonproliferation experts, while recognizing South Korea’s nonproliferation commitments, are nonetheless concerned about the long-term implications of South Korean attainment of dual-use nuclear technologies. Though outcomes from the forthcoming South Korea-U.S. civil nuclear negotiations remain to be seen, it is clear that Seoul’s push for a localized, (semi)autonomous nuclear fuel supply chain is unlikely to lessen.

In an era of market volatility, South Korea’s solution to its energy resilience dilemma may ultimately not run through the Strait of Hormuz, but rather through the strategic expansion of its tried-and-true civil nuclear infrastructure. 

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Heavily dependent on energy imports, South Korea is bracing for the economic and industrial fallout of the escalating Iranian conflict. Following the Israeli-U.S. airstrikes on Iranian targets in late February, Tehran has threatened to blockade the Strait of Hormuz – a maritime chokepoint through which roughly one-sixth of the global oil and a third of liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipments pass.

For Seoul, the implications are immediate and severe. Less than a week after the strikes, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung, upon returning from a diplomatic tour in Southeast Asia, immediately convened an extraordinary Cabinet meeting to assess the cross-regional implications of the crisis. 

During his briefing, Lee warned that “in an era of infinite competition… the only one that can help and save us is ourselves,” emphasizing the need for South Korea to safeguard its national interests amid mounting market volatility. Lee’s statement comes as South Korean policy leaders prepare for the large-scale energy impacts of the conflict in the Middle East. 

For South Korea – an energy import nation highly vulnerable to external market shocks – renewable and civil nuclear energy may represent the “homegrown” energy solutions the nation desperately needs. Yet, even these local energy sources rely on international supply chains and bilateral cooperation frameworks.

An Energy Crisis Felt in Seoul

South Korea relies heavily on the Middle East for its energy supplies. Historically, nearly 70 percent of the country’s crude oil imports originate from the region. Under the current disruptions, approximately 1.7 million barrels of crude oil bound for South Korea each day are reportedly delayed or stranded in transit. 

Natural gas shipments face similar uncertainty. This year, 14 percent of South Korea’s planned LNG imports were expected to come from the Middle East, including upwards of 5 million tons from Qatar. While Seoul in recent years has made efforts to diversify LNG suppliers, including expanding plans for U.S.-origin LNG imports, many of these supply channels remain underdeveloped or pending implementation. 

As global fuel prices rise rapidly, political voices in South Korea are once again calling into question the nation’s long-standing dependency on energy imports. In response, the Lee administration is exploring longer-term solutions aimed at strengthening domestic energy resilience – mainly through nationwide expansion of renewables and civil nuclear energy.

Powering a High-Tech Economy

South Korea’s energy demand is expected to steadily rise in the coming decades. The government predicted that national electricity demand will increase annually at an average of 1.8 percent – reaching 129 gigawatts (GW) by 2038. South Korea rising demands are mainly driven by the expansion of AI-related data centers, semiconductor manufacturing, and widespread electrification across the country. 

To this point, meeting these demands has required increasing reliance on imported energy sources, mainly through oil, coal, and LNG products. Amid the ongoing crisis, however, the Lee administration has called for a deeper look into cross-regional energy imbalances and the future potential of a “locally produced, locally consumed” energy strategy centered on renewable and civil nuclear energy. For Seoul, the lesson is simple: energy security begins at home.

Even as the Lee administration leans into renewables, Minister of Climate, Energy, and Environment Kim Sung-hwan recently re-affirmed the key role of civil nuclear energy in the future of South Korea’s energy mix. Nuclear power currently accounts for one-third of the nation’s energy needs. South Korea’s nuclear industry leaders – Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP), Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), Doosan Enerbility, Hyundai E&C, among others – represent over 70 years of technical know-how and industry experience. 

According to South Korea’s 11th Basic Plan for Electricity Supply and Demand, at least two new large-scale nuclear reactors, totaling 2.8 GWe, and a 700 MW small modular reactor (SMR) will be constructed by 2038. These plans are in addition to the three 1400 MW APR 1400 reactors currently under construction – the first of which, Saeul 3, is expected to come online in late 2026.

Nuclear power – though often framed as a domestic energy solution – still depends on global supply chains, and, of critical importance for Seoul, the South Korea-U.S. bilateral civil nuclear partnership.

De-risking Civil Nuclear Fuel Supply

As the fifth largest nuclear energy producer, South Korea operates 26 large-scale gigawatt nuclear reactors domestically. After constructing four APR-1400 reactors in the United Arab Emirates, Seoul has sought out (and successfully won, in the case of Czechia) nuclear export opportunities beyond the Korean Peninsula.  

Despite South Korea’s well-recognized debut in the global nuclear export market, the nation’s domestic nuclear fuel cycle is neither complete nor autonomous. To date, the country does not possess industry-scale nuclear fuel production facilities – a critical industry gap that the Lee administration is actively attempting to remedy.

South Korea’s nuclear energy industry is entirely dependent on imported enriched uranium to fuel its nuclear reactor fleet. In 2024, South Korea imported approximately 1,209,340 kilograms of enriched uranium from top global suppliers, including Russia (45 percent), Canada (17 percent), Australia (15 percent), and France (7 percent) among others. Such reliance on enriched uranium imports mirrors the supply chain vulnerabilities of fossil fuels, exposing South Korea to added energy import risks.

Further complicating the matter, the South Korea-U.S. official agreement on civil nuclear energy – also formerly known as the “123 Agreement” – signed in 2015, limits South Korea’s nuclear capacities in areas of proliferation-sensitive fuel cycle activities, including high-level uranium enrichment (HEU) and spent fuel reprocessing technologies.

Unlike Japan’s nuclear agreement, which allows for “comprehensive consent” in advance for nuclear fuel cycle activities, the South Korea-U.S. 123 Agreement requires case-by-case U.S. approval for HEU (uranium enrichment beyond 20 percent) and all forms of reprocessing activities. The difference between the United States’ nuclear deals with South Korea and Japan has long been a point of frustration for South Korean policymakers.

Diplomatic Opening for Nuclear Negotiations

Recent geopolitical developments may offer new incentives for revived South Korea-U.S. nuclear negotiations. In November 2025, the Trump administration seemed to open the door to talks on expanding South Korea’s civilian nuclear program, alongside U.S. approval for South Korean-built nuclear-powered submarines. Since then, the Lee administration has swiftly assembled a top-tier multi-agency negotiating team to explore greater flexibility for South Korean civilian nuclear activities. 

Seoul’s interests are straightforward: greater domestic control and authority over nuclear fuel production is crucial for ensuring national energy security and strengthening South Korea’s competitiveness in the global nuclear export market.

Despite Seoul’s quick ramp-up, however Washington’s response has been hesitant. Many traditional nonproliferation experts, while recognizing South Korea’s nonproliferation commitments, are nonetheless concerned about the long-term implications of South Korean attainment of dual-use nuclear technologies. Though outcomes from the forthcoming South Korea-U.S. civil nuclear negotiations remain to be seen, it is clear that Seoul’s push for a localized, (semi)autonomous nuclear fuel supply chain is unlikely to lessen.

In an era of market volatility, South Korea’s solution to its energy resilience dilemma may ultimately not run through the Strait of Hormuz, but rather through the strategic expansion of its tried-and-true civil nuclear infrastructure. 

Kayla Orta is a nonresident fellow at the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council.

Iran War energy impact

South Korea energy imports

South Korea energy security

South Korea nuclear energy

South Korea nuclear power

U.S.-South Korea 123 Agreement

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