China Power | Diplomacy | East Asia

China Wants to Push Taiwan out of the Pacific

China’s pressure campaign against Taiwan doesn’t end when a country switches recognition to Beijing.

Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung during a visit to Palau to attend the Pacific Islands Forum Leaders’ Meeting, Aug. 27, 2026.

Taiwan and China are back at the annual Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) Leaders Meeting, returning after all external partners were excluded in 2025. And Beijing isn’t happy about it: China’s special envoy called Taiwan’s participation “very inappropriate” and warned, “There will always be consequences.”

With multiple Pacific leaders not in attendance amid whispers of foreign interference, China-Taiwan competition is on everyone’s minds. While no Pacific country switched recognition in 2026, Beijing’s pressure campaign this year has been more systematic and intense than in any year since Naoero (formerly Nauru) flipped ties in 2024.

Under Beijing’s version of the “One China” principle – which holds that Taiwan is part of China – limiting Taiwan’s international space is an ever-present imperative. For Taiwan, defending its sovereignty entails maintaining, and where possible, expanding its diplomatic presence. 

Competition across the Taiwan Strait is clearest to outside observers when countries switch recognition from Taiwan to China, yet for Beijing it never ends there. China then wants to win repeated rhetorical affirmation of the One China principle, institutional buy-in beyond the government of the day, and concrete decisions to limit Taiwan’s presence.

Across the nine Pacific countries where China has diplomatic missions, officials re-affirm their support for Beijing’s One China principle in roughly one in three publicized meetings with Chinese diplomats, according to The Alliance Futures Initiative’s PRC Pacific Embassies Monitor. That rate reflects China’s embassies’ frequent maintenance work aimed at ensuring incumbent and incoming officials are reminded of their support for One China principle. 

Beyond government officials, China also engages with political parties to secure their institutional backing. In July 2026, a delegation of the People’s Alliance Party of Fiji met with the International Liaison Department (ILD) – the Chinese apparatus for party-party relations – in China, giving its institutional support for the One China principle. Later that month, an ILD delegation met with parties across the Solomon Islands political spectrum. 

These statements carry real weight. Just days before the PIF Leaders’ Meeting, Vanuatu’s opposition leader called on the government to affirm its support for the One China principle. The opposition also urged the government to ensure its actions at the upcoming forum will be consistent with the One China principle. In other words: don’t engage with Taiwan. The government responded by rejecting the opposition’s concerns and affirming its adherence to the One China principle. The opposition party’s call shows how Beijing’s drive for support ultimately leads to Pacific governments taking concrete decisions that shrink Taiwan’s international space.

The most tangible recent case was Papua New Guinea’s decision to close Taiwan’s trade office in its capital this July. Prime Minister James Marape rejected claims of foreign pressure, stating that the decision reflected PNG’s longstanding One China policy, which recognizes Beijing’s assertion of sovereignty across the Taiwan Strait. Taipei responded by suspending spot purchases of liquefied natural gas, yet by keeping long-term contracts preserved some of its presence.

Richard Maru, PNG’s trade and international investment minister, has publicly tied Chinese economic benefits to PNG’s moves against Taiwan. In May 2026, Maru........

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